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Abstract
This thesis comprises an introduction and four distinct chapters. Its central 
theme is the role played by the allocation of asset ownership rights in 
motivating asset-specific investment, when contracts are incomplete.
Chapter 1 considers the debt financing of an entrepreneurial project. To 
encourage asset-specific investment and loan repayment, debt structure should 
minimise both (voluntary) strategic default and liquidation following 
(unavoidable) liquidity default. Liquidation incentives are critical and shown to 
depend crucially on creditor characteristics. In general, borrowing from multiple 
creditors with contrasting attributes is found optimal. The benefits of borrowing 
from a creditor also undertaking project trade are explored.
In Chapter 2 the relationship between asset ownership and investment 
specificity is examined. Asset control encourages efficient, asset-specific 
investment by owners. However, lock-in fears lead non-owners to choose 
widely applicable but less effective investment. The interactions between asset 
ownership, firms' technology choices and workers' investments are considered. 
In particular, it is found that the costs and benefits of individual integration 
decisions are sensitive to overall industry structure.
The specificity framework is extended in Chapter 3 to model a retailer's 
product choice. Vertical merger encourages investment in integrated supply 
and foreclosure of non-integrated manufacturers. An anti-competitive as 
opposed to an efficiency interpretation depends delicately on the trade-off 
between the benefits of supplier-specific investment and multi-product retailing. 
Where retailers compete, it is shown that vertical integration implements 
effective competition-reducing differentiation strategies.
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In Chapter 4 vertical integration, through the incentive effects of asset 
ownership, is shown to amount to a specialisation decision. The attractions of 
encouraging investment in input as opposed to final good production depend 
on the effectiveness of investment at each manufacturing stage, and the scale 
benefits of input sales to generally rivalrous downstream firms. These benefits 
are sensitive to downstream competitive pressures, yielding a potentially non­
monotonic relationship between competition and integration.
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Introduction
7
At the heart of this thesis is the idea that ownership matters. A casual example 
of its importance is provided by Margaret Thatcher's policy of selling council- 
owned housing to tenants. My own grandparents were among the first to take 
advantage of this opportunity. Ignoring the political dimension and focusing on the 
personal, there can be no doubt that few other events in the last twenty years 
have had as great an impact on their lives. No one entering their house, both 
before and after this reallocation of property rights, could fail to notice the 
influence a change in ownership has had on their actions. This relationship 
between the allocation of ownership rights and individual incentives will be our 
fundamental concern. Specifically, we will focus on the central role played by 
ownership in motivating asset-specific investment. In particular, we will focus on 
the organization of the firm.
Intuitively, ownership matters because it confers authority over assets. It was my 
grandparents decision alone to install double-glazed windows, to knock down an 
internal partition, to install heating in all rooms. Crucially, ownership provides 
some control over the relationships that involve the asset. In my grandparents 
case, nothing was more important than securing their absolute right to occupy the 
house. In recent years it has become increasingly apparent, of course, that initial 
property rights are not a guarantee of perpetual control. Where house purchase 
is based on mortgage finance, for instance, default on contracted repayments 
may result in a transfer of ownership and control rights to creditors. This is an 
important issue, to which we will return. My grandparents were fortunate in this 
respect - Mrs Thatcher's generosity allowed them to buy their house outright.
A formalisation of these ideas was provided by the incomplete contracts approach 
to ownership formulated by Grossman and Hart, in their classic 1986 JPE paper 
[Grossman and Hart (1986)]. They offered a rigorous re-statement and extension 
of ideas that had evolved in a literature extending back to the seminal work of 
Ronald Coase on the nature of the firm [Coase (1937)]. At the heart of the 
Grossman-Hart perspective is the identification of asset ownership rights with 
residual control rights. These residual rights yield control of the asset wherever 
restrictive contracts agreed by the asset owner are silent, or unenforceable. As
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Coase recognised, such general, broadly specified powers of authority are a 
defining feature of organization within the firm.
Of course, residual rights have operational importance only where contracts are 
incomplete i.e. where the enforceable terms of contractual agreements are not 
all-encompassing. Indeed, as Oliver Williamson has eloquently argued 
[Williamson (1985), p.30-32], an authority-based governance structure is relevant 
only where contractual incompleteness coincides with opportunistic behaviour and 
asset specificity. When complete, definitive contracts can be written, residual 
control rights are irrelevant. Without opportunism, the power of a broadly defined 
"promise" is sufficient to guarantee efficiency. Finally, in the absence of 
specificity, asset ownership is no longer critical. Instead, market based 
transactions can be relied upon to generate desirable outcomes. Again, Coase 
foreshadowed the emphasis specificity places on long-term, idiosyncratic 
relationships in his focus on contracting issues in the 1937 Economica article.
It is the combined assumptions of incomplete contracts, opportunism and asset 
specificity that provide the link between ownership and investment incentives in 
the Grossman-Hart framework. If investment is asset-specific, then by definition 
the relationship between the investor and relevant assets is critical to value 
creation. However, if complete, definitive contracts can be written, this only 
implies a minimal relationship between the investor and the asset owner. The 
precise nature of the investment, the terms of access to the asset and any 
division of the returns to investment can be enforceably specified once-and-for-all, 
in advance of any asset-investor interaction. Yet if contractual incompleteness 
bites, the allocation of the residual control rights of ownership will define the 
nature of an on-going interaction. Once asset-specific investment has been 
undertaken, the investor is then essentially locked-in to a long-term relationship 
with the asset owner.
In particular, an opportunistic owner may manipulate the incompleteness of 
contracts to abrogate any initial agreement. New terms for the asset-investor 
relationship must then be renegotiated after investment has been undertaken.
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In general, this will enable the owner to secure a share in the returns to 
investment.1 Consequently, the investor will only receive a fraction of those 
returns. Foreseeing this eventuality, the investor is likely to underinvest in the 
asset specific relationship.
An obvious remedy to the underinvestment problem cited is to allocate asset 
ownership rights to the investing party. The investor is then guaranteed the full 
return on investment, ensuring efficiency. However, in general, any asset will be 
involved in numerous asset-investor relationships. Any particular allocation of 
residual control rights, encouraging investment by the owner, will then inevitably 
imply inefficient underinvestment by non-owning parties.2 Indeed, the observation 
that the costs and benefits of ownership "can be understood as two sides of the 
same coin" [Hart and Moore (1990), p.1120] represents the fundamental insight 
of the Grossman-Hart framework.
As stressed, the particular assumptions of incomplete contracts and asset 
specificity are fundamental to the approach highlighted. With respect to the first 
of these key assumptions - the pervasive impact of contractual incompleteness - 
little work has been undertaken to add substance to its superficial merits.3 In 
part, this reflects the elusiveness of a formal model of bounded rationality, which 
underlies much of the motivation for the difficulty in writing incomplete contracts 
[see e.g. Williamson (1985)]. Recent work by Segal (1995) represents a notable 
preliminary attempt to place the foundations of the incomplete contracts 
assumption on a firmer footing. In essence, one must ask why can definitive 
contracts not be written? In a number of recent papers, sophisticated
1 Of course, an opportunistic investor too may seek to use contractual 
incompleteness to renege on the terms of the initial agreement.
2 Note that allocating residual control rights jointly to several agents will not 
eliminate the general underinvestment problem. For consistency, some form of 
decision-making mechanism regarding these rights would have to be instituted 
e.g. veto powers, majority voting. Inevitably, such processes would again involve 
a sharing of returns to individual asset-specific investment.
3 A discussion of the foundations of the incomplete contracts assumption is 
provided in Hart (1995), Chapter 4.
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mechanisms have been employed to push back the bounds on contractability. For 
example, it is widely assumed in the incomplete contracts literature that, though 
not verifiable to a court of law, actions are observable to the interacting agents. 
If mechanisms can be designed such that these knowledgeable agents truthfully 
reveal whether the terms of contracted agreements have been met, then a 
complete contract environment can be effectively restored.
While accepting the weakness of an inadequate understanding of this 
cornerstone in our approach to ownership, we firmly believe that the general 
principles of the incomplete contracts perspective are robust. We will not 
undertake a rigorous analysis of its foundations here. Rather, we will (tentatively) 
take the pervasiveness of incomplete contracts as given in the analysis to follow.
In contrast, the other critical assumption underlying our approach - asset 
specificity - will be considered in some detail. In general, investment will not be 
wholly specific to a single asset. There are two dimensions to this. Firstly, an 
investment will rarely require access to a unique asset to generate any value at 
all i.e. few assets are essential, as defined in Hart-Moore (1990). Secondly, an 
investment will rarely generate maximum value in conjunction with a single asset 
alone i.e. there are generally complementarities between assets. Likewise, 
assets are rarely investment-specific.
Once these aspects of specificity are recognised, a multilateral framework for 
analysis is illuminating, indeed inevitable. In particular, an investor's return and 
therefore incentives to invest will depend on the value of alternative asset 
configurations, and the distribution of asset ownership rights. For example, if an 
investment requires access to many assets, and ownership of those assets is 
widely dispersed, then the return on the investment must be shared with many 
owners. Significant underinvestment is then likely.
Hart and Moore (1990) makes a notable contribution in this multilateral direction. 
They emphasise the coordination role of collecting asset ownership rights in the 
hands of a single owner. The firm can therefore be thought of as a nexus of
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ownership rights. Their key insight is that such integration can improve the 
investment incentives of non-owning workers, in addition to those of owner- 
investors. In reducing the number of parties involved in asset access negotiation, 
and hence the division of investment returns, concentrating ownership can 
encourage asset-specific investment by such workers.
A second significant contribution in a multilateral framework is provided by Bolton 
and Whinston (1993). They model an environment where a monopoly input 
supplier, serving multiple manufacturers, may be capacity constrained. In effect, 
when capacity constraints do not bind, the supplier has assets (inputs) which are 
specific to each buyer's investment, since there is then no competition for input. 
On the other hand, when capacity constraints bind, the asset or assets are no 
longer totally buyer specific. In this capacity constrained context a vertically 
integrated input supplier may overinvest at the downstream manufacturing stage. 
By raising the value of the supplier's internal supply option, such investment 
reduces the extent of any supplier lock-in to the non-integrated manufacturer. In 
turn, this raises the supplier's share of the non-integrated buyer's investment 
returns.
As highlighted, at the heart of the transaction cost approach is the view that when 
investment is asset specific, markets will not operate effectively. The distribution 
of surplus will therefore be driven by individual negotiating positions. In a 
multilateral environment, with a myriad of actual and potential interactions, 
determining the outcome of this overall bargaining problem would be an 
extremely complex task. Furthermore, the appropriate structure for this problem 
will not, in general, be unambiguously determined. Precise outcomes are likely 
to depend delicately on the details of the specific institutional environment. Hart- 
Moore and Bolton-Whinston, for example, adopt very different approaches to the 
bargaining structure. Hart-Moore adopt a cooperative approach, based on the 
Shapley value, while Bolton-Whinston explicitly model a non-cooperative setup. 
It is reassuring that the broad pattern of results, at this first cut, appears relatively 
robust. Clearly, an ad hoc approach to the bargaining problem is, fundamentally, 
undesirable. Nevertheless, the bargaining structures we adopt in our analysis are
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more-or-less arbitrary. We believe significant insight, at minimum complexity cost, 
can be achieved in this manner.
The two multilateral papers cited above differ significantly in their approach to the 
determination of asset ownership. The Hart-Moore analysis is conducted in the 
efficiency spirit of the traditional transaction cost literature. Extending the 
Grossman-Hart approach to a multilateral environment, they (implicitly) invoke the 
Coase Theorem, in considering ownership rights allocations that maximise overall 
efficiency. This contrasts with the framework adopted by Bolton-Whinston.
Bolton and Whinston stress that where the overall pattern of asset ownership is 
not (or cannot be) definitively and enforceably contracted upon, then externality 
effects may arise in the equilibrium allocation of ownership rights. They argue 
that, in precisely the incomplete contract environment considered, it may be 
impossible to detail optimal ownership arrangements for every conceivable 
contingency. Adopting crude and rigid ownership rules may then be extremely 
inefficient. Furthermore, in an industry setting, anti-trust regulations may limit the 
range of enforceable inter-firm ownership agreements. In undertaking bilaterally 
attractive trade in ownership rights, the two agents involved will not then 
internalise the impact of their decisions on third parties. In the Bolton-Whinston 
context, generally inefficient integration outcomes may result.
In Chapter 2 of the thesis we consider the specificity of investment explicitly. The 
more specific an investment, the more effective it will be in a particular 
application. General investment will be less effective in any given use, but have 
wider applicability. Unlike earlier models we focus not only on human capital 
investment by agents, but also on physical capital investment by firms. Indeed, 
we will pay particular attention to the interaction between these investment 
decisions.
Where ownership and investor roles are separated, fear of lock-in will discourage 
efficient, specific investment. For instance, non-owning workers will be reluctant 
to develop firm-specific skills, preferring general human capital that maximises
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employment options. Integrated outcomes will ensure close linkages between 
assets and between owners and assets, but lead to poorly tailored skills for non­
owning workers. Non-integrated structures, on the other hand, in fragmenting 
ownership encourage more widespread ties between workers and assets, at the 
expense of weaker linkages between assets.
We will assume ownership trade is driven by bilateral, rather than overall 
efficiency, concerns. Externality effects may then emerge. Integrated firms are 
likely to develop idiosyncratic technologies. Consequently, in highly integrated 
settings the market for any particular skills is likely to be thin. Investment by non­
owning workers in given specific skills is therefore discouraged, increasing the 
mismatch costs of integration. However, in deciding to integrate, individual firms 
will not internalise the impact of their decisions on the industry-wide costs of 
integration.
This last point can be illustrated using the housing example with which we began. 
My grandparents live on a large estate of identical houses. Any neighbourhood- 
specific (e.g. employment), or moveable house-specific (e.g. furniture) investment 
could therefore be easily re-deployed, at little cost, to an alternative house. 
However, while the whole estate was council-owned, the possibility of a 
neighbourhood house transfer would not prevent lock-in to the local authority.
In contrast, suppose a number of tenants had purchased their homes on the 
estate already, and a healthy housing market existed. My grandparents would 
then no longer be locked-in to the council, since the option of a private house 
purchase would then always be available. Efficient, house-specific investment 
would be safeguarded, without the need for my grandparents to undertake any 
property purchases themselves. Of course, in making their individual ownership 
decisions, other tenants will not consider the impact on my grandparents.
The recognition that bilateral considerations alone may drive ownership structure 
is essential, if a theory of the firm is to contribute significantly to our 
understanding of industry-wide organisation. This relationship between
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organisation within the firm, and the interaction between firms is surely of 
fundamental importance.4 The potential for bilaterally motivated integration allows 
not only the existence of externalities, but also for the possibility that integration 
is undertaken for strategic reasons.
At one level, of course, it is a logical conclusion of the Coasian argument that the 
processes that determine the boundaries of the firm must also define the nature 
of market interaction between firms. Stated simply, markets begin where firms 
end. However, important strategic implications may emerge even when ownership 
decisions do not affect inter-rival transactions directly. Our central thesis is that 
ownership has a significant impact on individual incentives. Vickers (1985) and 
Bonanno and Vickers (1988), among others, have recognised the strategic role 
of firm structure, in manipulating such incentives. However, only recently have 
strategic considerations been married to an explicit theory of ownership and the 
boundaries of the firm. In Chapters 3 and 4 we will adopt such an approach.
In Chapter 3 we model a retailer, who must decide between rival suppliers and 
between single-product and multi-product retailing. As in Chapter 2, the retailer 
has an investment specificity decision to make. In the model, this takes the form 
of a discrete location choice. Vertical integration may encourage supplier-specific 
location, where an independent retailer would choose general investment. Indeed 
costly merger will only take place if a change in the retailer's location decision is 
induced.
Retailer supply patterns may, but need not, be sensitive to the location decision. 
Integration can therefore result in foreclosure of the non-integrated supplier. 
Whether this foreclosure is efficient or not depends delicately on the inter­
relationship between the relative merits of specific versus general investment, and 
single versus multiproduct retailing. In the context of this simple model we 
explore the interaction between efficiency and competition motives for vertical
4 Indeed, in exploring the birth of the modern corporation Alfred Chandler links 
innovation in the internal organization of the firm with the emergence of 
oligopolistic industry structure.
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integration.
We extend the basic model to consider the impact of vertical integration on 
competition between retailers. Integration, in encouraging supplier-specific 
investment, allows retailers to adopt product differentiation strategies, 
ameliorating the effects of competition. We show that retailer competition 
concerns may motivate otherwise unattractive merger. For moderate levels of 
competition, a partially integrated industry structure then results, as integration 
by a subset of firms is sufficient to reduce competition significantly. For stronger 
competition levels, a coordinated integration process is required to realise the 
benefits of reduced competition. In this case, a fully vertically integrated industry 
results. The integration process then has the characteristics of an integration 
chain.
In the final chapter of the thesis, Chapter 4, we again consider the industry-wide 
effects of vertical integration. In the spirit of Grossman-Hart, we explicitly model 
the investment trade-off inherent in any ownership allocation. In the vertical 
context, integration effectively amounts to a strategy of specialisation at a 
particular production stage. If asset ownership is concentrated in the hands of 
downstream managers, strong downstream investment is encouraged but there 
will be little investment at the upstream level. In contrast, a non-integrated 
structure encourages moderate investment at both production stages. The 
resolution of this trade-off will, in part, reflect the relative effectiveness of 
investment at each stage in the overall value-creation process.
In a multilateral industry environment this trade-off will also depend on the 
possibilities of trade with other firms. In our particular context, a non-integrated 
upstream supplier may make additional input sales to other downstream firms. 
Non-integration is then encouraged by scale effects on upstream investment - 
cited in the traditional transaction cost literature as a factor limiting the extent of 
vertical integration.
As competition between downstream firms intensifies, the attractions of this input
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supply role are ambiguous. For weak competition, supplying rivals with input may 
have a negative effect on overall profits - the impact on downstream profits 
outweighing any added profits from input sales. However, as final product market 
competition intensifies, the profits of the input supply operation become 
increasingly attractive, as downstream profits are increasingly dissipated. A non­
monotonic relationship between the intensity of final market competition and 
industry structure may therefore be observed.
In the preceding discussion we have assumed that, where a trade of ownership 
rights is bilaterally attractive, such trade will always take place, even when 
contracting restrictions prevent the socially optimal ownership configuration from 
emerging. Of course, those parties giving up ownership rights to valuable assets 
will require compensation. Yet it is a fundamental tenet of our incomplete 
contracts - residual control rights approach that such compensation cannot be 
credibly offered directly from future returns to efficient asset-specific investment. 
Therefore, if initial asset ownership is separated from agents with potentially 
significant efficiency-enhancing investments, actual investment by these agents 
may not take place, unless they have access to sufficient initial finance. The 
power of the Coase Theorem here relies critically on an absence of wealth 
constraints. There is little reason to believe the distribution of asset-specific skills 
will be reflected in the distribution of initial wealth. This is especially true given 
the incomplete contracting emphasis on idiosyncratic, non-marketable investment. 
Concentrating control rights in the hands of those with initial wealth is therefore 
unlikely to be efficient.
For efficiency, mechanisms are required for the effective transfer of initial cash 
endowments, from wealthy agents to those with valuable investment 
opportunities. Of course, such project funding will only be forthcoming if lenders 
can secure adequate repayment, at least in expected terms. Yet in precisely the 
incomplete contract environment outlined, where we have argued that asset 
ownership matters most, guaranteeing repayment may also be most difficult.
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Returns will accrue in the first instance to the agents in control of project assets. 
Where these returns are non-contractible and the controlling agents are able to 
divert project returns for private benefits [see Hart-Moore (1989), and Hart 
(1995)], repayments must be voluntary (ruling out standard equity). Project cash 
can be extracted from controlling managers only if future access to valuable 
assets is made credibly contingent on such repayment. This debt-like relationship 
between project finance and contingent asset control was highlighted in the path- 
braking analysis by Aghion and Bolton (1992). Repayment-inducing benefits of 
future asset control may include continued access to multi-period project returns, 
as in Hart-Moore (1989), or repeated finance for new project opportunities, as in 
Bolton-Scharfstein (1990).
Of course, the credibility of any threat to deprive the manager of asset control in 
the event of default, depends critically on the assets generating significant value 
for the creditor in alternative use. This value will, for instance, depend on the 
extent to which the asset-manager relationship is idiosyncratic, and also on the 
buoyancy of asset resale markets. We will return to this issue in greater detail 
below..
Where project returns are driven by entrepreneurial asset-specific investment, the 
financier's problem therefore involves a fundamental tension. To maximise project 
cash extraction, the threat to seize control of entrepreneurial assets in the event 
of default must be credible. Yet as we have seen in earlier discussion, security 
of asset control is essential if the entrepreneur is to undertake asset-specific 
investment in incomplete contract environments.
This problem is exacerbated when project returns are uncertain. Our incomplete 
contracting environment may prevent scheduled debt repayments responding 
directly to the state of nature. However, one would ideally like the structure of the 
debt agreement to reflect the contingent nature of project returns. In particular, 
an ideal debt contract would ensure maximum feasible repayments in every state 
of nature, while minimising the threat of unavoidable default, and loss of project 
control, by the entrepreneur. As stated in Bolton and Scharfstein (1993): "an
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optimal contract balances the benefits of deterring strategic defaults against the 
costs of inefficient liquidation following liquidity defaults".
One approach to this problem is to adopt a standard incentive design framework. 
The magnitudes of cash transfers from the entrepreneur are likely to be simply 
verifiable. By ensuring repayments are state dependent, a renegotiation-proof, 
incentive compatible debt contract allows the state of the world to be effectively 
revealed by the entrepreneur. By making the extent of the liquidation threat 
contingent on repayment, it is then (indirectly) dependent on the state of the 
world. Of course, the need for incentive compatibility, in general leads to 
inefficiency.
Alternatively, if the extent to which an initial debt contract can be renegotiated is 
state-dependent, then equilibrium repayments too may be made contingent on 
the state of the world. Creditors' incentives to renegotiate debt after default will 
reflect their liquidation values for project assets. Now if the levels of renegotiated 
repayments can be structured to accurately reflect the pattern of state contingent 
project returns, then maximum cash extraction can be achieved, while ensuring 
minimum inefficient liquidation. This approach to debt and renegotiation was 
pioneered in Hart and Moore (1989). We adopt their framework in Chapter 1 of 
the thesis.
A creditor's liquidation value for a project is determined by one of two factors - 
the strength of the resale market for project assets, and the creditor's own private 
value for the project. Clearly, the magnitude of this last factor will reflect the 
creditor's abilities to extract value from the project i.e. it will depend on creditor 
characteristics. In Chapter 1 we argue, in the spirit of Shleifer and Vishny (1992), 
that the resale market for project assets is likely to be weak in precisely those 
states where the project entrepreneur is cash constrained, and likely to default 
on debt repayments. After all, our incomplete contracts approach has been based 
on a foundation of asset specific, idiosyncratic investment. Those agents with 
high value for such project assets are therefore likely to come from the same 
industry as the original entrepreneur, and will suffer many of the same shocks.
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As a result, potential buyers for project assets are likely to be cash constrained 
precisely when liquidity default occurs, in bad states of nature. The extent of debt 
renegotiation in bad states of the world will therefore be driven by the creditor's 
own value for project assets. Consequently, creditor characteristics will be 
important for the structure of debt and for the total finance that can be raised. 
The question of from whom entrepreneurs borrow matters.
Suppose we represent a creditor's private value for liquidated assets by a factor 
L. The ability of low L creditors to extract project cash will be limited in the bad 
state of the world. Nevertheless, this does act as a commitment to renegotiate 
when the entrepreneur is cash constrained, allowing the face value of debt to be 
set high. Low L creditors are therefore able to extract maximum project cash in 
the good state. High L creditors, on the other hand, are effective at cash 
extraction in the bad states of the world - potentially too effective - since they do 
not rely on asset resale markets. To prevent excessive liquidation of project 
assets, such creditors may have to limit the face value of debt, in turn restricting 
their cash extraction powers in the good state. Significantly, these contrasting 
attributes suggest the value of multiple creditor borrowing. This possibility is 
explored in Chapter 1. We also explore the extent to which additional creditor 
linkages with the entrepreneurial project, through trade for example, can be used 
to advantageously manipulate L. Where a creditor depends heavily on project 
trade, liquidation incentives are likely to be diluted.
As stated at the outset, the central theme of this thesis is that ownership matters. 
In incomplete contract environments, ownership confers control of assets. 
Control, in turn, will drive incentives for asset-specific investment. In the following 
chapters we will explore the consequences of this basic mechanism for project 
finance, for the optimal boundaries of the firm, and for industry structure and 
competition.
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Chapter 1
Project Development, Liquidation Values 
and
Multiple Creditor Borrowing
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1.1 Introduction
In this paper we consider a situation where a project, initiated by an entrepreneur, 
requires a cash investment F to go ahead. The entrepreneur has no capital 
resources of her own and therefore she must obtain external finance if the project 
is to proceed. A financier will only lend her the required capital if he can ensure 
sufficient repayment to break even on the loan.
The initial project returns accrue in the first instance to the entrepreneur and 
cannot be allocated directly to the creditor, since return streams are taken to be 
unverifiable and hence non-contractible. As a result the entrepreneur must be 
provided with adequate incentives to voluntarily repay the creditor. The structure 
of an optimal debt contract provides such incentives.
A key feature of an effective debt contract is the right of the creditor to seize 
project assets if the borrower (the entrepreneur) defaults on contracted 
repayments. The potential loss of project control rights discourages voluntary 
(strategic) default on loan agreements by the entrepreneur. However in poor 
states of the world low project returns may result in unavoidable (liquidity) default. 
Loss of control in such circumstances may have adverse effects on 
entrepreneurial effort investment.
As illustrated in e.g. Grossman and Hart (1986), idiosyncratic asset specific 
investment may be sensitive to the allocation of asset ownership and control 
rights when contracts are incomplete. In the current context the potential 
unavoidable loss of project control in the event of enforced liquidity default will 
discourage investment in long-term project returns by the entrepreneur. As 
stressed in a number of recent papers (e.g. Hart and Moore (1989)) future return 
streams play a crucial role in extracting debt repayments from an entrepreneur. 
The decrease in future project value through diminished effort investment leads 
to reduced incentives to meet debt obligations, and possible increases in 
voluntary (strategic) default.
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An ideal debt contract would be sufficiently flexible to permit contract 
renegotiation and continued entrepreneurial control of project assets in the event 
of low project returns and liquidity default, and yet rigid enough to secure 
maximum feasible repayment from the entrepreneur in all states of nature. In the 
paper we examine how the structure of the optimal debt contract attempts to 
reconcile these objectives, and in particular how it responds to changes in a key 
creditor characteristic - the ability of the creditor himself to manage and generate 
value from liquidated project assets.
When a creditor has limited ability to manage project assets successfully himself 
the attraction of liquidation depends on the strength of the resale market for 
project assets. In good states of the world cash rich industry managers will form 
a healthy market for liquidated project assets. Any limited personal value the 
creditor has for the assets is then irrelevant. Strong asset resale markets enable 
the creditor to extract maximum debt repayment in good states, where the 
entrepreneur is cash rich. Conversely in bad states of the world the market for 
project assets will be weak since potential buyers are likely to be cash 
constrained - a point stressed in Shleifer and Vishny (1992). The incentives to 
liquidate on the part of the creditor are consequently weak, encouraging 
renegotiation of the original contract with the entrepreneur. The creditor is thus 
unable to extract significant debt repayment from the entrepreneur in these 
states. However, in precisely these (bad) states the creditor has little cash to offer 
in any case. The creditor's commitment to renegotiation when cash is tight 
enables him to set high debt face value, securing maximum repayment in the 
good state (when renegotiation is unattractive) while easily preventing liquidity 
default in the bad state.
The value of project assets for a creditor with considerable ability to manage 
those assets himself is less dependent on the strength of the market. This 
enables such a creditor to extract repayment from the entrepreneur even when 
market conditions are poor. However, entrepreneurial cash constraints are likely 
to be tight in such conditions and the creditor's incentives to wrest control from 
the entrepreneur may in fact be too strong. To avoid the consequences of
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enforced liquidity default (i.e. reduced entrepreneurial effort) the strong creditor 
may have to lower the face value of the debt, or else provide the entrepreneur 
with sufficient cash reserves to avert default when project returns are low. Such 
provision is however costly, reducing the funds available for project finance.
To recapitulate, low creditor project value acts as a commitment to renegotiation 
when cash is limited, enabling high debt face values to be set. In turn this allows 
large repayments to be extracted in good states of the world. High creditor asset 
value enables cash to be extracted in bad states, when project asset markets are 
weak. But the need to prevent liquidity default limits cash extraction in the good 
state. These contrasting qualities suggest the merits of borrowing from multiple 
creditors.
We find that multiple creditor finance dominates single creditor finance when 
borrowing from creditors with diverse values for project assets is combined. The 
priority assigned to the various debts is also found to be important. The optimal 
debt contracts combine low and inflexible senior debt owed to creditors with 
considerable value for project assets with high, renegotiable junior debt owed to 
creditors with low value for project assets. The (non-negotiable) senior debt 
ensures maximum repayment in bad states where returns are low and project 
asset markets are weak, while the junior debt allows maximum repayment to be 
extracted in good states (when markets are strong and renegotiation unattractive) 
but is negotiated to manageable levels in bad, cash constrained states. Such a 
combination of debt contracts elicits maximum feasible repayment from the 
creditor in all states of the world, and hence maximises the funds available for 
project finance.
Those creditors with high values for liquidated assets are likely to be closely 
involved with the entrepreneur's industry - allowing them to develop the skills to 
be able to generate some return from the assets. Yet for these creditors spare 
cash may well be in short supply during bad states of the world (since their 
industry loans are unable to repay in such states). If these creditors are senior 
claimants then if the entrepreneur defaults on both loans the assets will pass to
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them. Their high value for project assets makes renegotiation post-default 
unattractive (given that in the bad states the entrepreneur has little cash to offer), 
and thus deters voluntary default. On the other hand if creditors with low 
liquidation value for the assets are senior claimants the assets pass to them in 
default, and the high liquidation value creditors get nothing (Cash constraints 
mean that high liquidation value creditors are unable to "buy out" the senior debt). 
Low liquidation value creditors are keen to renegotiate the initial debt contracts 
since they have little value for project assets. Voluntary default is therefore 
attractive. To extract maximum cash in bad states (and increase feasible lending) 
creditors with high values for project assets should be senior claimants, 
discouraging voluntary default. Such debt should however be low, to prevent 
unavoidable default and liquidation.
Finally the paper considers the merits of obtaining project finance from a trading 
partner in contrast to situations where the trading and creditor roles are distinct. 
It is found that the adverse knock-on effects of liquidation (i.e. loss of 
entrepreneurial project skills) on trading partner profits reduces liquidation 
incentives where the trading partner is also the creditor. When creditor value for 
project assets is high, such weakening of liquidation incentives is beneficial - 
reducing the costs of avoiding enforced, cash constrained default. In such cases 
the creditor and trading partner roles should be combined, with the creditor taking 
as large a share of project trade as possible. However for creditors with a low 
value for liquidated project assets a further weakening of liquidation incentives 
reduces entrepreneurial debt repayment and hence restricts viable project 
financing to an even greater extent. In such circumstances the creditor and 
trading partner roles should remain separated.
In many circumstances a trading partner's ability to manage project assets will 
increase with the extent of his interaction with the entrepreneur. In this case the 
greater a creditor's share of project trade the greater the value he can extract 
from project assets in the event of liquidation. Such an influence may dominate 
the trade profit effect. It will then be optimal for a creditor with limited intrinsic 
ability to manage liquidated assets to take on a maximal share of project trade
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- reversing the earlier conclusion. The experience effects of increased project 
interaction then boost rather than diminish the creditor's liquidation value.
A growing number of papers have considered the relationship between optimal 
debt structure and debt renegotiation in an incomplete contract setting (see e.g. 
Hart and Moore (1989), Aghion and Bolton (1992)). A number of recent papers 
have also considered the role of multiple creditors in such a setting e.g. Bolton 
and Scharfstein (1993), Berglof and von Thadden (1994). None of these papers 
however has considered the inter-relationships between creditor liquidation 
values, the resale market for project assets and the propensity of creditors to 
renegotiate debt contracts when borrowers are in financial distress. Nor do these 
papers consider the implications of debt structure for long-term human capital 
investment - a central theme in this paper. This last issue is addressed in a 
different context by von Thadden (1995).
Hart and Moore (1990) stresses the importance of debt seniority structure, but 
unlike our analysis they do not focus on the relationship between seniority and 
post-default debt renegotiation incentives.
Finally, several recent papers have explored the links between finance provision, 
investment and the allocation of property rights e.g. Aghion and Tirole (1994), 
Gertner, Scharfstein and Stein (1994). In particular Aghion and Tirole examine 
the ability of a creditor to extract returns from an entrepreneur when the creditor 
is also a trading partner (customer) - a theme which we address in this paper too, 
though in a somewhat different context.
1.2 An Introductory Example
The paper's principal arguments are illustrated in the following simple example.
We will consider an entrepreneurial project that, if initiated, can generate returns 
over two periods. Date 1 project returns depend on the state of nature. In bad
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states of nature (probability 1/2) £20 is generated, while in the good state 
(probability 1/2) the return is £60. The date 2 project return is £100, irrespective 
of the state of nature.
Project initiation requires a cash injection F at date 0. The entrepreneur has no 
wealth so the cash required must be borrowed from the (competitive) date 0 
finance market. Project returns are non-verifiable, therefore financiers cannot be 
offered equity shares in the project.
For this simplified example we will assume that entrepreneurial control of project 
assets must be feasible at all dates, in all states of nature.5
Feasible debt contracts involve the repayment of debt with face value D at the 
end of date 1. In the event of default the creditor can take control of project 
assets, generating liquidation values Le and LB in the good and bad states 
respectively. We assume that the entrepreneur can avoid post-default liquidation 
by offering the creditor a repayment equal to his liquidation value.
In the cases below we will consider the maximum project finance available when 
there is (i) a single class of low LB creditors (Case A), (ii) a single class of high 
Lb creditors (Case B), and (iii) both high and low LB creditor classes (Case C).
Case A (Low LB Creditor Borrowing):
Suppose that the creditor can generate a return of £16 at date 2 from the project 
assets in the bad state, and £80 from the project in the good state i.e.
Lb = £16
Lg = £80
The optimal debt face value is then D = £60, generating maximum project finance 
of F = £38.
5 The idea driving this assumption is that the prospective benefits of project 
control are essential in motivating entrepreneurial activity. Of course, the 
feasibility of securing project control does not imply that the entrepreneur will 
always choose to do so.
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In the bad state the project provides the entrepreneur with £20 in cash at date 
1. Since the debt has a face value of £60 the entrepreneur has no option but to 
default on the loan agreement. However, to avoid post-default liquidation the 
entrepreneur need offer the creditor £16 only. This is the value of the creditor's 
liquidation option. Such a payment ensures the entrepreneur continued control 
of project assets worth £100 at date 2 - and is therefore always attractive.
In the good state the entrepreneur has £60 in cash available when debt 
repayment is due. If the debt of £60 is paid in full the entrepreneur secures 
access to project assets worth £100 at date 2. The default option is not attractive 
since it leads to liquidation of project assets by the creditor. To see this, note that 
the creditor's return from liquidation in the good state (£80) exceeds any post­
default payment the entrepreneur can offer. The entrepreneur will therefore prefer 
to pay the debt of £60 in full.
Expected repayments therefore amount to 1 /2 £60 + 1 /2 £16 = £38. A competitive 
date 0 finance market ensures that up to £38 will be made available to the 
entrepreneur for project finance.
It should be clear that where the creditor's bad state liquidation value is less than 
£20 liquidation will never occur in that state, whatever the face value of the debt. 
The creditor's ability to extract repayment from the entrepreneur is limited by this 
liquidation value. Bad state repayment (and hence initial cash availability) is 
therefore increasing in LB for LB < £20.
Case B (High LB Creditor Borrowing):
Suppose now that the creditor's liquidation values are given by:
Lb = 50 
Lg = 80
Feasible debt is then limited to £20, allowing maximum project finance of £20.
Full debt repayment is just feasible in the bad state of the world from date 1 
project returns of £20. Such repayment ensures control of assets worth £100 at
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date 2. Failure to repay the debt results in liquidation - since the creditor's value 
for project assets (£50) exceeds the cash available to the entrepreneur (£20).
In the good state the entrepreneur has £60 in cash to make scheduled 
repayments. Payment of £20 guarantees the entrepreneur future project returns 
worth £100. In the event of default, the entrepreneur cannot retain control of 
project assets since the creditor's liquidation value LG = £80 > £60. The debt of 
£20 is therefore paid in full.
The face value of the debt is limited by the entrepreneur's ability to meet 
scheduled repayments in the bad state. If the debt were set above £20, 
entrepreneurial control of the project would then inevitably be lost. This ceiling on 
debt restricts the cash that can be extracted from the entrepreneur in the good 
state. For LB > £20, debt (and initial finance) is therefore limited to £20.
Note that the problems encountered with borrowing from a high LB creditor can 
be ameliorated somewhat through the provision of an additional £30 cash reserve 
to the entrepreneur, beyond the finance used for project investment. She can 
then avoid liquidation in the bad state, whatever the debt face value, using the 
cash available at date 1 (£20 in project returns + £30 cash reserve). However, 
in the good state post-default repayments are limited to £80 - the creditor's 
liquidation value LG. Not all date 1 cash (£60 project returns + £30 cash reserve) 
can therefore be extracted in the good state. Maximum project finance can be 
boosted in this way to F = 1/2 £80 + 1/2 £50 - £30 = £35.
Cases A and B together highlight the non-monotonic relationship between 
creditor liquidation incentives and maximum project finance.
Case C (Two Creditor Borrowing):
Finally consider entrepreneurial borrowing from both high and low LB creditors. 
Optimal project financing then involves borrowing £4 from the high LB creditor and 
£36 from the low LB creditor - a total of £40. High LB creditor debt is set at £4 and 
is senior to the low LB debt which is set at £56.
31
In the bad state the entrepreneur has £20 cash available to repay debt with a 
total face value of £60. Clearly the entrepreneur cannot meet both debt 
repayments in full. Failure to repay the senior debt will result in certain liquidation, 
since that creditor's value for project assets (£50) exceeds the cash available to 
the creditor (£20). If the entrepreneur repays the senior creditor in full she is left 
with £16 from date 1 returns. This is just sufficient to avoid liquidation by the 
junior creditor. Two creditor borrowing therefore results in full project cash 
extraction in the bad state.
In the good state the entrepreneur has £60 in available cash, and can just meet 
scheduled debt repayments. Default in not attractive since a minimum of £80 
must then be paid to one or both creditors to avoid liquidation. Scheduled debt 
repayment ensures that all date 1 project cash is extracted in the good state too.
The combination of debt contracts allows full extraction of date 1 project returns 
in both good and bad states. Project finance is therefore available up to a 
maximum of F = 1/2 £60 + 1/2 £20 = £40.
We have seen in the single creditor case that low LB debt is open to successful 
renegotiation in the bad state of nature. This enables such debt to be set high, 
extracting maximum project cash in good states, while guaranteeing continued 
entrepreneurial control of the project in the bad state. The down side of low LB 
debt is its inability to extract entrepreneurial cash in the bad state, precisely 
because of this amenability to renegotiation.
High Lb debt has complementary properties. High LB creditors will be reluctant to 
renegotiate with the entrepreneur in the event of bad state default (since 
liquidation returns are high). This inflexibility enables maximum cash to be 
extracted in the bad state. To prevent unavoidable liquidation such power must 
be restrained. To do this high LB debt must be set low to guarantee repayment 
feasibility in all states. This debt ceiling limits cash extraction in good states.
A combination of high and low LB debt optimally aligns these contrasting
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attributes, enabling maximum cash extraction in both good and bad states.
1.3 The Model
At the heart of the model is an entrepreneur with an idea. For the project to 
proceed an essential, indivisible asset must be purchased at cost F. Since the 
entrepreneur has no money of her own she must obtain finance from the capital 
market if the project is to go ahead.
Once it is up-and-running, the project generates returns over two periods - date 
1 and date 2.
Date 1 returns depend solely on the state of nature :
V i =
XG probability pG
XB probability pB
The magnitude of date 2 returns v2 is determined by the level of entrepreneurial 
effort. This effort is undertaken at date 1/2. Generating date 2 returns Y involves 
a private effort cost, C(Y), incurred at date 1/2.
Assumption 1.1: C(0) = 0, C' > 0, C" > 0
Let Y* = argmax Y - C(Y)
In a first best world finance F would be available provided:
F < pG XG + pB XB + Y* - C(Y*)
Two additional assumptions regarding the magnitudes of date 1 and date 2 
returns are made:
Assumption 1.2: 0 < XB < XG < Y*
Assumption 1.3: Y* - C(Y*) > pG XG + pB XB
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Assumption 1.2 ensures that if optimal investment is undertaken by the 
entrepreneur, long term (date 2) project returns exceed short term (date 1) 
returns, in all states of the world. Assumption 1.3 states that provided optimal 
entrepreneurial effort has been undertaken at date 1/2 then long term project 
returns even net of effort costs exceed expected date 1 returns.
Only the entrepreneur can initiate the project and get it "up and running". Full 
entrepreneurial control in the early stages of the project is therefore essential. As 
a result date 1 project returns are specific to the entrepreneur, and accrue in the 
first instance to her. However, once entrepreneurial effort has been undertaken 
and the project is under way it can be run by a substitute manager. Some fraction 
of date 2 returns can therefore be extracted without continuing entrepreneurial 
involvement in the project - a detailed discussion will follow.
For project development to proceed external finance is required. A competitive 
market of identical financiers is assumed to exist at date 0. These financiers have 
unlimited access to capital and to 0 NPV investment projects. There is, however, 
a shortage of investment projects generating positive profit opportunities.
Although observable to all active parties, project returns are not verifiable to a 
court of law. As a result the terms of any contract between the entrepreneur and 
a financier cannot be made conditional on actual project returns. In particular, 
control of project assets cannot be allocated directly on the basis of realised date 
1 returns. Neither can reward for entrepreneurial investment be made on the 
basis of realised returns. It is also assumed that the human capital investment 
made by the entrepreneur is not contractible. No contracts can therefore be 
written directly rewarding the entrepreneur for undertaking specified investment.
Since the returns from the project are unverifiable, and accrue to the project 
manager in the first place, financiers cannot be offered an equity share in the 
project. We will assume however that monetary transactions between the 
entrepreneur and the financier are verifiable, and hence can be written into the 
terms of a contract.
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The financier will be prepared to supply essential start-up cash to the 
entrepreneur provided he can expect to break even on the loan. The financier 
must therefore be assured that either the entrepreneur will make voluntary re­
payments, or that he will have sufficient access to and control of valuable project 
returns to cover his initial outlay.
Of particular relevance are simple debt contracts involving debt face value D to 
be repaid at the end of date 1. Failure to repay the specified amount constitutes 
a default on the agreement. Post-default, the following procedure is adopted: The 
entrepreneur can make a single take-it-or-leave-it offer to the creditor. If this is 
accepted, the entrepreneur makes the revised payment and keeps control of 
project assets. If it is not accepted, control of project assets passes to the 
creditor. The entrepreneur thus has all the bargaining power in any post-default 
negotiations with the creditor.
As a considerable simplification we will not allow debt contracts that involve 
randomised liquidation in the event of default.6
A financier can generate returns Lj(Y) in state i (i = G,B) by managing the project 
himself at date 2 or by selling project assets, provided entrepreneurial investment 
Y has been undertaken at date 1/2.
Assumption 1.4: L| (Y) < Y
To simplify notation, let Lj = Lj(Y*)
The liquidation value is a measure of the financier's ability to manage, and 
generate a return from project assets. This ability to generate date 2 value from 
project assets is never greater than that of the entrepreneur herself. Since the 
entrepreneur initiated the project it is assumed that no party can generate a
6 In particular this rules out debt contracts where the extent of fractional 
liquidation is dependent on repayments made. Such contracts can be used to 
discourage voluntary liquidation, while ameliorating the consequences of liquidity 
default somewhat - see e.g. Bolton and Scharfstein (1993).
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greater return from the project than the entrepreneur herself. When the 
entrepreneur is replaced as manager the loss of her human capital is likely to 
lead to at least some reduction in project value.
It will be informative to adopt the following additional structure for liquidation 
payoffs.
We will assume that the creditor has the right to sell any assets he controls 
(following default by the entrepreneur). Indeed we will further assume that at date 
1 there is a competitive market of project managers willing to take on the project. 
Once the project is under way, it is assumed that these managers can generate 
as much value from the project as the original entrepreneur. However, they 
cannot initiate projects - entrepreneurial innovation skills are a scarce resource.
In good states of the world these managers have unlimited financial resources, 
but in bad states of the world their cash is tied up. This last assumption is crucial. 
The idea here is that the fortunes of industry "insiders" - the potential substitute 
managers - are correlated with those of the entrepreneur himself. When the 
entrepreneur's project returns are low (bad states of the world), the substitute 
managers are cash constrained too. By contrast, when date 1 project returns are 
high (good states of nature) industry insiders are in a strong financial position - 
with access to plentiful cash reserves - guaranteeing vigorous demand for project 
assets.
The market value Mj for project assets (assuming optimal entrepreneurial 
investment) is therefore given by:
M j  =  <
Y if i = G
0 if i = B
To reiterate, the idea here is that potential substitutes for the entrepreneur i.e. 
agents with the requisite skills to take over and run the project are likely to come 
from related businesses. Shocks that adversely affect the entrepreneur are
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therefore likely to affect the replacement manager's prospects too. This structure 
is in the spirit of Shleifer and Vishny (1992).
Whenever project asset markets are weak i.e. in the bad state, the financier must 
rely on his own ability to manage the project to generate value from liquidated 
assets. The private value of project assets to the financier himself, assuming 
entrepreneurial investment at date 1/2, is given by XY (X <  1).
Thus L, (Y) = max[ XY, MJ
As a further simplification we will assume that Y* = XG. This allows us to focus 
on events in the bad state of the world, and on a single key creditor characteristic 
- his private value for project assets (measured by X).
In this case, the financier's liquidation values in bad and good states are 
therefore given by LB(Y) = AY and LG(Y) = Y respectively.
1.4 Single Creditor Analysis
We will begin our analysis by supposing that the date 0 capital market consists 
of a single class of identical potential financiers. In particular, all financiers share 
a common ability to manage project assets in the bad state - measured by 
parameter X. We will focus on the following issue: What is the largest project 
finance requirement F that can be met, and what financial structure supports it?
Note that for any project finance to be forthcoming the creditor must be certain 
that effort will be undertaken by the entrepreneur at date 0. Without such effort 
the date 2 value of project assets is 0. If this is the case then there is no value 
to the entrepreneur in securing date 2 control of project assets. Consequently no 
incentive will exist to make any debt repayments at the end of date 1. 
Furthermore, if no effort is undertaken at date 0 (implying Y = 0) the date 2
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liquidation value of project assets to the creditor is 0.
Lemma 1.1:
No project finance will be forthcoming at date 0 unless financiers can ensure 
effort will be undertaken by the entrepreneur at date 1/2.
Contractual incompleteness prevents direct reward for effort. In fact, such effort 
can only be motivated by giving the entrepreneur control of date 2 project returns. 
The entrepreneur will then benefit directly from increased effort through larger 
date 2 returns. The greater the probability that the entrepreneur will lose control 
of project assets at the end of date 1, the smaller her expected date 2 return on 
effort, and hence the weaker will be her effort incentives.
To secure control of project assets for date 2 the entrepreneur must either avoid 
default by paying the debt D in full, or else she must offer the creditor his state- 
dependent liquidation value Lj during post-default debt renegotiation.
In general it will be optimal to provide the entrepreneur with a cash reserve R at 
date 0 to facilitate debt repayment or renegotiation.7 For now we will ignore this 
possibility, but will return to consider it in some detail below.
Lemma 1.2:
For a debt with face value D to be consistent with continued entrepreneurial 
control of project assets in state i, the following condition must be satisfied: 
min[D, LJ < X|
If the entrepreneur can avoid liquidation in state i, she always will do, as the date 
2 gains always exceed the largest possible repayment needed to secure them 
(L,(Y) < Y).
7 Hart and Moore (1989) analyse the trade-off between high debt plus cash 
reserve ("pure transfer") and low, manageable debt ("pure debt") in some detail.
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A creditor will only be prepared to provide the entrepreneur with project finance 
if he can expect to break even on the loan. Expected repayments must therefore 
cover the initial loan F i.e.
pG min[D, LG] + pB min[D, LB] > F 
Competitive pressure in the date 0 capital market will ensure that this condition 
holds with equality.
Ensuring that the entrepreneur can secure date 2 control of the project in all 
states of the world does not of course guarantee that she will choose to do so. 
The benefits of such control are the date 2 returns generated by entrepreneurial 
effort. The costs of such returns are not just the direct costs of effort, but also the 
cost of the debt repayments needed to secure access to such returns. Effort will 
be undertaken and repayments made provided:
Y* - C(Y‘) - pG min[D, LG] - pB min[D, LB] > 0
For liquidation to be avoidable in all states we know from Lemma 1.2 that:
Pg x g + Pb x b ^ Pg minP> l g! + Pb min[D, LB]
Assumption 1.3 then ensures that first best effort will always be undertaken if 
date 2 control of project assets can be assured.
Alternatively, the optimal finance contract could involve the entrepreneur 
maintaining control of the project in state i only. In this case liquidation will occur 
in state j. The creditor's expected return on his initial lending is then given by: 
Pi min[D, L,] + p, L,
This expected return must cover the initial loan F + R.
To encourage crucial entrepreneurial investment, for which the entrepreneur will 
reap a reward in state i only, debt must be limited to ensure that:
Pi Y. - C(Y,) - Pi min[D, LJ > 0
where Y; = argmax Y - C(Y)
If the following condition holds then liquidation in one state alone will never 
occur.
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Condition 1A:
Let Y|= argmax P| Y - C(Y). Then:
(') PgYg - C(Yg) - pGXB < 0
(ii) Yb < XG
The first part of Condition 1A states that, if the entrepreneur is to be encouraged 
to invest when liquidation in the bad state is inevitable, the debt face value must 
be set so low that in fact default can be avoided in the bad state too. Similarly, 
the second part of the condition states that default in the good state alone will not 
occur. Where continued project control is feasible it will always be chosen by the 
entrepreneur.
Since effort must be attractive for finance to be forthcoming we can therefore 
restrict our attention to the case where date 2 entrepreneurial control of the 
project can be assured in all states of the world. The issue is then simply one of 
maximising the finance available at date 0:
max F = pG min[D,LG] + pB min[D,LB]
D
s.t. min [D, L,] < X|
The solution to the above problem is as follows:
— XB d = XG = Y F = pBLB + pG XG
Lb > XB D = XB F* = XB
The relationship between F* and LB is illustrated in Figure 1.1.
When Lb < XB the entrepreneur can and always will avoid liquidation in the bad 
state, whatever the face value of the debt. She can secure continued control of 
project assets by offering the creditor his liquidation value LB post-default. In 
effect, a low value for LB acts as a commitment on the part of the creditor to 
renegotiate the debt contract in bad states. This enables the creditor to set a high
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Figure 1.1
X b
LbXb0
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debt face value D and extract maximum cash from the entrepreneur in the good 
state, when project returns are high. Note that in the good state a healthy asset 
resale market ensures LG = Y. Of course, such renegotiation possibilities limit the 
cash that the creditor can extract in the bad state. However the entrepreneur has 
little cash to offer in this state in any case.
When Lb < XB a marginal increase in LB will not affect the creditor's commitment 
to renegotiate debt to manageable levels in bad states of nature. However a 
higher LB allows greater cash extraction in precisely these states, where the 
creditor relies on his liquidation threat to force repayments from the entrepreneur. 
The prospect of higher expected repayments ensures greater finance is available 
at date 0. F* is therefore increasing in LB for LB < XB.
Without entrepreneurial effort, debt repayments at date 1 will never occur. Yet 
without the prospect of repayment no creditor will be prepared to provide finance 
at date 0. To encourage optimal effort, the entrepreneur must be guaranteed date 
2 project control in all states of the world. When LB > XB this can only be 
achieved by setting the face value of the debt at an always repayable level D = 
XB. If the debt is set any higher, default is inevitable in the bad state and 
liquidation will follow, since the creditor's liquidation value (LB) exceeds the cash 
available to the entrepreneur (XB). Of course, a low debt face value limits the 
cash that can be extracted from the entrepreneur in good states, when date 1 
project returns are high. This restricts the finance available at date 0.
Cash Reserve Provision (R > 0)
Suppose now that the entrepreneur can provide a cash reserve R in addition to 
project finance F at date 0. It is easy to see that such a reserve may be optimal. 
A cash reserve R adds to the funds available to the entrepreneur at date 1 and 
thus relaxes any cash constraints faced at that time, when debt repayment is 
due. Of course this extra cash reserve is lent by the creditor in anticipation of 
future repayment. Expected repayments at date 1 must therefore rise, or finance 
F must be reduced, as R is increased.
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To find the maximum finance available in this new setting, with cash reserve
provision, we must solve the following optimisation problem:
max F = pG min[D, LG] + pB min[D, LB] - R
R,D
s.t. min[D, LJ < X, + R
Y* - C(Y*) - (F + R) > 0
The relationship between maximum project finance F* and the key lender 
characteristic LB is illustrated in Figure 1.2.
Proposition 1.1
For creditors with low private value for project assets (LB < XB) maximum project 
finance F* is strictly increasing in LB, while for higher LB values (LB > XB) it is non­
increasing. Indeed for XB < LB < XG - C* maximum finance available is strictly
decreasing in LB. The relationship between F* and LB is therefore non-monotonic.
For creditor's with LB < XB a cash reserve is of no value in increasing project 
finance. The problem then is one of extracting cash from the entrepreneur in bad 
states of the world. Providing the entrepreneur with additional funds merely 
exacerbates this problem. Zero cash provision, as assumed above, is optimal.
With Lb > XB project returns alone are insufficient to avoid liquidation in the bad 
state unless debt is set low (D = XB). For higher debt to be consistent with no 
post-default liquidation, the entrepreneur must have her project income 
supplemented. If the entrepreneur is given a cash reserve R = LB - XB at date 
0, she can avoid liquidation post-default in the bad state. Debt can then be set 
high (D > XG), extracting maximum cash in the good state.
In the good state, project returns alone are sufficient to avoid liquidation at the 
end of date 1 (since LG = Y* = XG). Every £1 of cash reserve can therefore be 
retained by the entrepreneur. The greater is LB, and therefore R, the larger the 
loss to the creditor from this reserve provision in the good state. For given debt
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repayments, the project finance available at date 0 must therefore fall.
If the creditor provides the entrepreneur with project finance F and cash reserve 
R, debt must be structured such that expected repayments cover this loan in 
equilibrium. This of course means that in order to benefit from date 2 project 
returns the entrepreneur must not only incur effort costs C(Y) but also make 
expected repayments F + R to get access to those returns. Investment will only 
be attractive if:
Y* - C(Y‘) - (F + R) > 0
Note that if any effort is attractive it will be the first best level. As LB increases the 
cash reserve R necessary to avoid liquidation in the bad state, with high debt 
face value increases. Eventually the constraint must bind, limiting total 
repayments. Further increases in R can only be accommodated by decreases in 
F and in debt face value D. Eventually a point is reached where LB = D and F = 
XB. Further increases in LB then have no effect on F.
In the Appendix we prove a version of Proposition 1.1, for the more general case 
where Y* > LG and Y* > XG. The basic structure of our results carries over to this 
more general case. Two sources of difference, however, are worthy of comment.
First, note that the general case allows LG < XB. Setting debt face value at D = 
XB is not then restrictive. In the bad state, the creditor can never hope to extract 
more than min[LB, XB], while in the good state repayment will be limited to the 
liquidation value LG (< D = XB). Clearly, project finance is then increasing in LB for 
Lb < XB and non-decreasing in LB for LB > XB. The advantage of a commitment 
to renegotiate debt in the bad state (provided by low LB) is the ability to set high 
debt in the good state. With LG < XB, low LB commitment is redundant, and 
merely reduces potential repayment in the bad state.
If LG > LB > XB, it is optimal to provide the entrepreneur with a cash reserve R = 
Lb - XB, provided effort investment is sure to be undertaken. In the general case, 
where Y* > XG is entirely possible, it may be that LG > XG + R, provided R = LB -
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XB is not too large. In such circumstances, the creditor can extract all date 1 
project returns from the entrepreneur and recover all cash reserves provided at 
date 0, while also ensuring date 2 entrepreneurial control of project assets. 
Maximum feasible project funding (F* = pGXG + pBXB) is then available for a range 
of values of LB > XB.
1.5 Multiple Creditor Borrowing
As the analysis in the previous section has demonstrated, a creditor with a given 
X (ability to manage project assets) and hence LB has particular advantages and 
disadvantages in his ability to finance project development.
Low Lb creditors are flexible to renegotiation of debt contracts. Low renegotiated 
payments will be accepted in bad states of the world, however high the face 
value of debt. This flexibility allows such investors to set high debt face value, 
extracting maximum repayment in good states of the world (since a healthy asset 
resale market then exists). The relative weakness of low LB creditors is their 
inability to extract project cash in the bad state, when asset resale markets are 
weak.
A creditor with very high LB was seen to have contrasting strengths and 
weaknesses. A high LB value enables the creditor to extract all available cash in 
the bad state. However, this strength may well be excessive. The creditor may 
have too great an incentive to wrest control of the project from the entrepreneur. 
To counter this tendency, the creditor must either set low debt face value 
(guaranteeing the entrepreneur's ability to repay), or he must provide the 
entrepreneur with sufficient reserves to cover shortfalls in the bad state. In either 
case the outcome is that high LB creditors are relatively ineffective at extracting 
cash from the entrepreneur in the good state of the world, when the 
entrepreneur is cash rich.
As shown above these opposing effects are only perfectly resolved for a unique
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creditor with LB = XB. In general however such an ideal creditor will not exist. The 
question we now address is whether multiple creditors can be employed to 
effectively balance these forces more generally.
Suppose that there are two non-identical creditors - lender a  and lender p. These 
creditors have personal values for the project assets of LB and respectively, 
where we will assume LB > L§ without loss of generality. We will further suppose 
that lender j provides Fj of investment cash and an amount Rj of cash reserve to 
the entrepreneur at date 0. The face value of lender j's debt is Dj.
Crucially we will assume that in the bad state of the world the high LB creditor at 
least is cash constrained. Without this assumption side contracting between 
creditors will destroy any multiple creditor effects (hence such an assumption lies 
at the heart of the literature on this topic). Since a high LB creditor is likely to be 
an industry insider and hence affected by the same shocks as the entrepreneur, 
this assumption may not be unreasonable.
In the event of default on a single loan, procedures are as in the basic single 
creditor model. However, it is possible that the entrepreneur will now default on 
two loans simultaneously. In such circumstances the following procedure is 
adopted:
Following default the entrepreneur can put a single take it or leave it offer of 
revised repayments to both creditors. If the revised schedule is accepted by both 
creditors then the new payments are made and the entrepreneur maintains 
control of project assets. If the revision is rejected by either creditor then 
liquidation proceeds. Project assets pass first to the junior creditor. He must then 
either clear the senior creditor's debt or hand over the project assets to that 
creditor.8
8 Note that this allocation of rights to creditors on liquidation is analogous to 
the revised bankruptcy procedures proposed by Aghion, Hart and Moore (see 
Hart (1995), Chapter 7 for a discussion). Under their procedure, control of 
liquidated project assets passes first to the senior creditor. However, the junior 
creditor has the right to purchase this control at a price equal to the value of the 
senior debt. The Aghion-Hart-Moore approach generalises to multiple creditor 
classes, with multiple creditors in each class.
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Again we wish to find the set of debt contracts that maximise the funding 
available for project finance.
If both potential creditors have low LB values i.e. < LB < XB then it is easily 
seen that the maximum finance available for project investment is given by:.
F = PG Xg + pB Lg
This is no more than that obtained from the high LB creditor alone, setting debt 
face value Da = XG. Essentially, repayment in the bad state is limited to at most 
the liquidation value of the senior creditor (a maximum of Lg).
It should be clear from the analysis in Section 1.4 that when LB < XB project 
finance is maximised by ensuring that the creditor is as tough as possible in the 
event of default in bad states of the world. Introducing additional creditors with 
even lower LB values cannot lead to greater cash extraction.
Suppose now that both potential creditor types have high LB values i.e. Lg > Lg 
> XB. In this case the maximum project start-up that can be financed is given by: 
F = PG [Xg - (Lg - XB)] + pB XB
This is no more than the finance available from the low LB creditor alone. With 
Lb > XB the creditor is excessively tough, as the analysis in section 1.4 makes 
clear. An additional cost is then incurred in securing essential entrepreneurial 
control of project assets. Adding an additional creditor with even tougher 
liquidation incentives cannot improve the situation in our framework.
Finally we can consider the case where one of the creditors has a low LB value, 
and one a high LB value i.e. Lg < XB < Lg. In this case the optimal debt structure 
is given by:
Dp = XG - Da Rp = 0 Da priority over Dp.
D„ = XB - LI  Ra = 0
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Such a debt structure supports maximum project finance F given by:
F = Pg Xg + Pb XB
where Fa = XB - Ljj and Fp = pG (XG - XB) + Ljj. Note that no greater F is 
possibly feasible, given the incomplete contracts assumptions of the model.
The total face value of combined debt Da + Dp = XG. In the good state neither 
contract will be renegotiated. A healthy market for project assets ensures that 
liquidation values are high, and consequently default is unattractive. Both debt 
agreements will be honoured in full by the entrepreneur, allowing all date 1 
project returns (XG) to be extracted.
In the bad state of the world the entrepreneur cannot avoid default on at least 
one of the loan agreements, since the cash available to her is limited (XB < XG 
= Da + Dp). In fact the entrepreneur will pay the senior debt, Da = XB - Ljj, in full. 
Default on the junior debt is then inevitable. Liquidation can, however, be avoided 
if the entrepreneur offers the junior creditor all her remaining cash (Ljj). This is 
just sufficient to ensure successful renegotiation of the junior debt. Note that 
default on the senior debt is never attractive since the entrepreneur then has 
insufficient cash to avoid liquidation (XB < LB). Once again, date 1 project returns 
(XB) can be extracted in full.
It should be clear that the above structure dominates one where the low LB 
financier is senior creditor. In that case default on both loan agreements is 
optimal in the bad state. Liquidation can then be avoided by offering the senior 
creditor only a cash payout of Ljj (< XB). To see this note that if liquidation were 
to proceed the cash constrained junior creditor could not clear the senior debt. 
Liquidated assets would therefore pass to the senior creditor yielding him a return 
Ljj. The junior creditor would get nothing.
It can never be optimal to raise the face value of the senior debt Da. Liquidation 
in the bad state could then not be avoided, since Da + Ljj > XB and LB > XB, 
unless the entrepreneur were provided with an additional cash reserve R > 0 or
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the junior debt Dp were reduced. Since cash reserves are not needed for 
liquidation-avoiding repayment in the good state, they can be retained by the 
entrepreneur. Consequently, the creditor makes a loss in expected terms on such 
reserves. Project finance must therefore be reduced if creditors are to break 
even. Alternatively, if the junior debt is reduced it must be to a level such that Da 
+ Dp < XB, to avoid liquidation in the bad state. Clearly repayment in the good 
state too is then restricted to XB, again reducing project finance. Reducing Da can 
never raise project finance since then repayment in the bad state = Da + <
XB. Increasing Dp has no effect since post-default renegotiation of the junior debt 
will leave equilibrium repayments unchanged.
The working of this contract is simple. The senior debt is set low (so that it can 
be repaid in all states of nature) but is never renegotiated, ensuring maximum 
cash extraction in the bad state. The junior debt owed to the low LB creditor is set 
high (to extract maximum repayment in the good state, where LB is irrelevant) but 
is renegotiable in the bad state (since junior creditor liquidation value is low), 
facilitating continued entrepreneurial project control.9
The results of this section are summarised in the following proposition:
Proposition 1.2
(i) Multiple (two) creditor borrowing yields greater funding for project finance than 
single creditor debt if and only if one creditor has a relatively low asset liquidation 
value while the other has relatively high asset liquidation value - more precisely 
if Lg < XB < Lb.
(ii) Under the terms of the optimal contracts, senior debt is owed to the high LB 
creditor, is set low and is never renegotiated. Junior debt is owed to the low LB 
creditor and is renegotiated in the bad state.
9 Note that, unlike the analysis in Bolton and Scharfstein (1993), it is the 
contrasting characteristics of creditors rather than their number that drives the 
optimality of multiple creditor borrowing.
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1.6 Trading Partner Borrowing
Throughout the preceding analysis we have assumed that all returns from the 
entrepreneurial project accrue to the agent in control of project assets. Of course, 
one or more creditors may also gain a share of those returns - but only indirectly 
through entrepreneurial debt repayment. In general, however, the project might 
be expected to generate direct returns for a number of other parties - employees, 
suppliers, customers, etc. In this section we will focus on the role of a 
generalised group of project trading partners. In particular we wish to address the 
following question: Should the trading partner and creditor roles be combined?
We will assume that an overall trading partner profit of T is generated in the 
event of full entrepreneurial control of the project. For simplicity we will assume 
that this trade profit is realised at date 2 only, and is directly proportional to date 
2 core project returns. An individual trading partner's profit is proportional to his 
share of project trade.
We will begin by assuming that all trading partners share a common ability to 
manage project assets. In particular each can personally generate date 2 profits 
Lb (< Y) from core project assets. When a trading partner takes control of the 
core project we will assume his limited ability to manage project assets inflicts a 
proportional effect on trading partner profits i.e. they are reduced by a factor LB/Y.
A competitive, cash rich pool of potential trading partners is available at date 0. 
Each is prepared to offer the entrepreneur a cash advance to secure future 
trading partner profits. A trading partner will also lend the entrepreneur additional 
cash provided he can expect to break even on this loan. To abstract from the 
multiple creditor issues raised in the previous section, we will assume that the 
entrepreneur borrows from a single trading partner, involved in a fraction o of 
project trade.
Combining the trading partner and creditor roles has no impact in the good state. 
In the event of default, project assets can be sold to cash rich substitute
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managers for their full date 2 value. These managers are fully able to manage 
project assets, given initial investment by the entrepreneur. In particular, the value 
of project trade will remain unaffected by such control switches. To prevent post­
default liquidation, the entrepreneur must offer the creditor the full value of date 
2 project returns.
Events in the bad state are rather different. Suppose the entrepreneur defaults 
on loan repayments at date 1. If the trading creditor then takes control of project 
assets, his overall return is:
Lb + aT [Lb / Y]
By managing project assets himself the creditor can generate core project returns 
Lb at date 2. However, his limited management ability also has a knock-on effect 
on the value of trade profits.
Alternatively, the creditor can accept a cash offer x from the entrepreneur made 
in return for her continued control of the project. If this offer is accepted overall 
creditor revenue is given by x + aT - the immediate cash payment plus the full 
value of date 2 trade profits.
A cash offer x will secure post-default entrepreneurial control of the project if: 
x + aT > LB + aT [LB/Y] 
i.e. if x > max[0, LB - aT [1 - LB/Y]] (-we restrict x to being non-negative).
It is immediately apparent that controlling a share a of project trade effectively 
reduces the creditor's liquidation value in the bad state from LB to: 
max[0, Lb - aT[1 - LB/Y]]
In deciding whether to liquidate project assets, the trading creditor explicitly 
considers the effects on trade profit of entrepreneurial separation from project 
assets, whereas a non-trading creditor would not. In taking control of project 
assets, and replacing the entrepreneur with a less effective manager (- the
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creditor himself!), the trading creditor reduces the value of his own trade profit. 
This trade effect discourages liquidation.10
Figure 1.3 illustrates the relationship between F* and LB in the trading creditor 
case, for the extreme case of complete creditor - trading partner separation (a =
0) and unified creditor - trading partner roles (a = 0). The situation is as in Figure 
1.2, but now a given value LB corresponds to an effective liquidation value of 
max[0, Lb - gT [1 - LB/Y]].
Where the creditor has low LB value his ability to extract cash from the 
entrepreneur in the bad state is already limited by his low liquidation value. 
Introducing a further discouragement to liquidation further reduces this ability. As 
a result the funding available for project finance is reduced still further.
For creditor's with large LB values a share of project trade increases the funds 
available for project finance. Such creditors' liquidation tendencies are too great 
in bad states of nature. In order to ensure continued entrepreneurial control of 
project assets in bad states of the world, and hence encourage entrepreneurial 
effort, such creditor's must limit their ability to liquidate project assets. This is 
achieved by setting low face value for debt, or else by providing the entrepreneur 
with a cash reserve which can be used to avoid liquidation. In either case such 
measures limit the extraction of cash from the project in good states of nature. 
Combining loan provision with a share of project trade in such cases, by reducing 
liquidation incentives, alleviates these problems. In particular since the trade 
effect is specific to the bad state it does not impair cash extraction in the good 
state.
The greater the value of project trade to the combined trading partner - creditor 
the weaker his liquidation incentive in the event of default in bad states of the 
world. The magnitude of this effect will vary as the creditor undertakes more or
10 A somewhat related point is made in Aghion and Tirole (1994), where the 
links between the trading relationship and financing incentives are also explored. 
There, a buyer who holds equity in the supplier firm will bargain less aggressively 
over supply terms, since it regains a fraction of any lost cash via its equity share.
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less of the trading partner business.
The effective liquidation value t B is given by:
Lb = Lb - o T [ 1  - IVY]
To limit values of t B, a higher private value for project assets (higher liquidation 
incentives) must be offset by a greater share of trading partner business (lower 
liquidation incentives). The shape of the resulting iso-C. curves in (LB, a) is 
illustrated in Figure 1.4.
As the creditor's private value for project assets, LB, increases an offsetting 
increase in trade share a  is required to maintain constant liquidation incentives. 
The greater the creditor's share of trading partner business the more he loses 
(via reduced trade profit) if the entrepreneur is separated from project assets. 
However, as LB increases the extent of these losses diminishes since the creditor 
becomes increasingly able to manage core project assets himself. The offsetting 
share increments must therefore increase with LB to effectively limit liquidation 
incentives.
As outlined in Proposition 1.1 the relationship between bad state liquidation value 
Lb and maximum project finance F* is non-monotonic. For values of LB < XB, F* 
is increasing in LB. In such circumstances LB should be set as large as possible. 
Clearly this involves a complete separation of trading partner and creditor roles 
(re. Figure 1.2). Conversely when LB > XB project finance is maximised by 
reducing the creditor's effective project liquidation value. When LB is very large 
this involves the creditor taking the largest possible share of project trade (a =
1). For creditors with intermediate LB values [XB < LB < Y*(XB + T)/(Y* + T)] the 
optimal value of t B= XB can be achieved. The optimal share of trade value is then 
given by:
g _ Y * (Lb -  Xg)
T (Y* -  Lb)
The (negative) effect of trade value on liquidation incentives then perfectly offsets
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the direct effect of high private value LB for project assets. The relationship 
between LB and optimal trade share a is illustrated in Figure 1.5.
The results of the above discussion are summarised in the following proposition:
Proposition 1.3
For creditors with given low value for liquidated project assets it is optimal to 
separate the trading partner and creditor roles. Conversely, for creditors with high 
values for liquidated project assets a single trading partner should provide project 
finance.
In other words when creditor value for project assets is high, the creditor should 
own the trading partner business.
In our analysis of trading partner borrowing we have assumed that the private 
value Lb of project assets is identical for all creditors, whether trading partner or 
not. However a trading partner's experience interacting with the entrepreneur may 
enable him to manage core project assets more effectively - generating a higher 
Lb value. Even with a higher LB the impact of trade on the effective liquidation 
value is nevertheless ambiguous. The trade gain from continued entrepreneurial 
project management may completely offset the increased incentive to liquidate 
generated by a higher LB, as points a and b in Figure 1.4 illustrate.
As an extension of this discussion suppose the trading creditor's LB is in fact a 
continuous, increasing function of his project involvement. It seems reasonable 
to suppose that as the creditor's share of trading partner business (and hence the 
extent of his interaction with the entrepreneur) increases, so will his ability to 
generate value from the project. If trade interaction with the entrepreneur has a 
sufficiently positive effect on creditor LB then increasing the creditor's share of 
project trade will actually harden liquidation incentives. The effect of increased 
interaction on LBthen more than offsets the increases in the adverse trade effect. 
In such circumstances the relationship between LB and optimal trade share is 
radically altered.
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Suppose that the relationship between trade share and LB is given by:
Lb = G(o , X)
where LB is an increasing function of creditor trade share o. X reflects the value 
a non-trading creditor can generate from core project assets (see Section 1.3). 
The above discussion can then be summarised in the following proposition:
Proposition 1.4
Define X* such that G(1, X*) = XB.
If the rate of increase of creditor LB with increases in market share (a) is 
sufficiently great then it is optimal for creditor's with X < X* to take a maximum 
market share (o = 1) and for creditor's with XY* > XB to take a minimal market 
share (a = 0).
In particular this holds if:
dG a T p r -L , , )  
do (oT+Y* )
The condition in Proposition 1.4 ensures that at all points the slope of the 
function G exceeds that of the iso-L contour. This will hold, for instance, if:
dG  ^ (Y*  -  Lb)
do o
This is a natural formulation since it implies that the effect of additional market 
share on ability to manage project assets decreases as the creditor becomes 
proficient (LB close to Y*) and as trade share tends towards 1.
The optimal asset value/trade share relationship in this case is sketched in Figure 
1.6. The potential effect of trade interaction in increasing creditor value for project 
assets is seen by contrasting Figures 1.5 and 1.6.
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1.7 Conclusions
In this chapter we have considered the debt financing of an entrepreneurial 
project, where the innovator has a critical asset-specific investment contribution 
to make but no wealth. To maximise project funding, debt structure should 
minimise both voluntary, strategic default and the liquidation of project assets 
following unavoidable liquidity default. These goals are linked since minimising 
unavoidable liquidation of project assets encourages long-term asset-specific 
investment by the entrepreneur. By raising the returns to future project control, 
such investment in turn encourages greater debt repayment by the entrepreneur.
Creditor liquidation incentives are critical, and depend on two factors: the state 
of asset resale markets, and the creditor's private value for project assets - L. In 
goods states of nature, when the entrepreneur is cash rich, asset markets are 
likely to be healthy, enabling the creditor to extract substantial repayment from 
the entrepreneur. However, in bad states of the world, asset resale markets are 
likely to be weak, and the creditor must rely on his own value for project assets 
(L) to prevent strategic default. The characteristics of the creditor, i.e. from whom 
the entrepreneur borrows, are therefore important. Lending by low L creditors is 
limited by their ability to extract repayments in bad states of nature. Conversely, 
borrowing from high L creditors is limited by their excessive liquidation incentives. 
A non-monotonic relationship between liquidation value and maximum project 
finance is derived.
Borrowing from multiple creditors, with diverse characteristics (L values), is found 
to be optimal in general. Senior, high L debt is set low, but is never renegotiated 
- allowing maximum cash extraction in the bad state. Junior low L debt is set 
high, to extract maximum cash in good states when the entrepreneur is cash rich, 
but is readily renegotiated in bad states to manageable levels.
Finally,the role of borrowing from trading partners is considered. The effects of 
entrepreneur-project separation on trade profit then dilutes liquidation incentives. 
A trade share is therefore beneficial when creditor L is high, but lowers credit
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from low L financiers. However, countering this, interaction with project assets 
may also raise creditor value for project assets (via experience effects, etc.), 
increasing liquidation incentives.
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Appendix 1
Lemma A1:
In considering the provision of a cash reserve R, we can restrict attention to 
R e {0, max[0, LB - XB]}
Proof:
(i) Entrepreneurial cash constraints at date 0 => R > 0.
(ii) Suppose 0 < R < LB - XB.
Maximum debt consistent with date 2 entrepreneurial control in the bad state: 
D = XB + R.
Cash retained by entrepreneur in good state = (XG + R) - (XB + R) = XG - XB.
Maximum finance, F* = pGXG + pBXB - pG(XG - XB) = XB.
Suppose instead that R = 0 and D = XB.
Then F* = XB.
(iii) Suppose R = R* > LB - XB.
Bad State: Cash retained = XB + R* - min[D*, LB].
= max[XB+R*-D*, XB+R*-LB]
Good State: Cash retained = XG+ R* - min[D*, LG]
= max[XG+R*-D*, XG+R*-LG].
Now suppose instead that R = R+ = LB - XB < R*, and D+ = D* - (R* - R+)
Bad State: Cash retained = XB + R+ - min[D+, LB]
= max[XB+R*-D*, XB+R+-LB]
Good State: Cash retained = XG + R+ - min[D+, LG]
= XG + R+ - min[D* - (R*-R+), LG] 
=max[XG+R*-D*, XG+R+-LG]
Clearly, cash retained with R = R* ^  cash retained with R = R+.
Therefore F*(R = R*) F(R = R+).
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Proposition A1
Let 5 = Lb - XB and (3 = (LG - LB)/(XG - XB).
(i) If for Lb such that 8 = 0 (i.e. LB = XB) p > 0, the relationship between maximum 
project finance F* and the creditor's bad state liquidation value LB is non­
monotonic. In particular dF7dLB > 0 for LB < XB, and dF*/dLB < 0 for at least some 
Lb = L, where XB < L < Y*.
(ii) F* is non-decreasing in the good state liquidation value LG i.e. dF*/dLG >0. 
Proof:
Let F** = pBXB + pGXG
(i)Suppose 8 < 0 i.e. LB < XB.
Clearly R = 0.
Bad state: 8 < 0 => min[D, LB] < XB =» repayment feasible irrespective of D. 
Good state: repayment feasibility => min[D, LG] < XG + R = XG.
For maximum F*, set D = XG.
Then F* = F** - pB (XB - LB) - pG max[0, Xe - Le]
=  Pbl b +  PGmir|[X G. L<J
Clearly dF*/dLB > 0 ,dF*/dLG > 0.
(ii) Suppose now that 8 > 0 i.e. LB > XB, and Y* - C(Y*) > F + R 
Bad state repayment = min[D, LB] < XB + R
Good state repayment = min[D, LG] < XG + R.
Case I: R = 0 and D = XB
Ft = F** - pG(XG - XB) = XB 
Case II: R = LB - XB and D = XG + (LB - XB)
F,T = F** - pG max[0, XG + (LB - XB) - Le]
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Now LG - LB = p (XG - Xb)
p < 0 => F; > F,I =» dF*/dLB = dF*/dl_G = 0.
P > 0 => f ; < F *
Further, p > 1 => (LG - LB) > (XG - XB) => max[0, XG + (LB - LG) - XB] = 0
Then F* = XB =* dF*/dLB = dF*/dLG = 0.
0 < p < 1 => max[0, XG + (LB - LG) - XB] = (XG - XB) + (LB - LG)
Then F,* = XB + pG(LG - LB) => dF*/dLB < 0 and dF*/dLG > 0.
(iii)Now suppose Y* - C(Y*) = F,*, + R
=> R = Lb - XB => F*, = Y* - C(Y)* - (Lb - XJ => dF*/dLB < 0, dF7dl_G = 0.
From (i), (ii) and (iii): 
dF*/dLG > 0,
8 < 0 => dF*/dLB >0,
p > 0 when 8 = 0 => 3 8,p s.t. 8 > 0 ,  1 > p > 0 => dF*/dLB < 0.
QED.
Under the assumptions of Proposition 1: Y* = XG = LG.
It follows that p > 0
Therefore Ff < F,; = pBXB+pQXQ+pG(XB-LB) =XB+pQ(Y*-LB)
If 8 < 0 i.e. LB < XB, then F* = pBLB + pGXG 
If 8 > 0 then F* = max[F*, min[F,*, F,*,]]
Now Ft = XB, F,t = XB + pG(Y*-LB), F* = Y*-C(Y*) - (LB-XB)
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V  - C Q f )  -  (LB -  XB) 
XB + Pg (Y * -  Lb)
if Lb > Y *  -2 1 X 1  
Pb
if Lb < Y * -
Pb
max[F|, min[F,j, F,*,]] =F* if F* > F,*,, since F* < F,*.
F; > F*„ if XB > Y* - C(Y*) - (Lb-Xb) i.e. if LB > Y* - C(Y*)
Therefore,
F* =
Pb -^b + Pg ^ g
Pb^ b + Pg ^ g + Pg ( ^ b ~ ~^b)
Y* -C (Y 0  -  (LB -  XB)
XD
Lb -  XB
x B < l b < y* -2WA
Pb
Y * -  m  < LB < Y* 
Pb
Y* -  C (Y") < LB
-  C(Y *)
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Chapter 2
Integration and Investment Specificity
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2.1 Introduction
A key characteristic of any investment is its specificity. Specific investments will 
be more effective in their optimal application, but less widely applicable than 
general investment. Where hold-up problems exist an inefficient specificity choice 
may be made. If an agent makes a specific investment, value is high but outside 
options are weak - the agent is effectively locked in. A general investment 
reduces value but strengthens outside options and hence may be chosen to 
escape lock-in.
Clearly if it is possible to contract upon the nature and specificity of investment 
ex ante then these hold-up costs can be overcome. The agent can be guaranteed 
sufficient reward for making the optimal, contractually specified, investment 
choice. However in a complex world it is not unlikely that investments cannot be 
adequately described ex ante and hence contingent contracts cannot be written 
(or at least writing such contracts may be prohibitively expensive). Verification of 
any contract by a third (arbitrating) party may be difficult, even if a contract can 
be formulated. In such a context residual rights of control - who controls what in 
areas where any contract is silent - become important. Following Grossman and 
Hart (1986) we can think of ownership as allocating these residual control rights. 
If an agent owns an asset it seems reasonable to suppose that they make the 
decisions concerning that asset, unless control has been ceded to another party 
through the provisions of a contract.
Ownership, in allocating control rights over an asset, may alleviate the threat of 
hold-up. If a worker owns the machines he or she works with then the dangers 
of lock-in following asset-specific human capital investment are eliminated. 
Conferring ownership rights will encourage efficient (i.e. specific) investment by 
that worker. However giving ownership rights to one agent in effect denies them 
to others. Non-owning workers will develop less tailored, more generally 
applicable skills. Consequently, as one asset-worker relationship is strengthened 
others are weakened. As stressed by Grossman and Hart (1986), the costs and 
benefits of a particular allocation of ownership rights go hand in hand.
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Of course, the determination of what is a generally applicable skill may depend 
on the inter-related decisions of several agents. If a whole industry of 
independent firms utilises common asset technology then asset-specific 
investment will still be generally applicable, since there is no danger of lock-in to 
any one firm. However if the technology is unique to one firm, then the very same 
investment is idiosyncratic. In particular, where a single owner controls the 
industry the investment will be owner-specific. Clearly, the industry-wide allocation 
of ownership rights and the resulting technology choices of firms will impact on 
the costs of any particular ownership decision. In our model we attempt to 
capture this endogeneity - emphasising the links between integration decisions, 
market structure and the specificity of investment.
We believe that a location model is an appropriate framework within which to 
study these issues. An agent or firm's location represents its choice of 
investment. Where assets and workers are located apart transport costs are 
incurred with trade, reflecting the costs of inappropriately tailored investment.
The general thrust of our results is as follows. When the costs of a poor match 
between a worker's human capital and a physical asset are great, that worker 
should own the asset. Similarly if weak ties between physical assets are very 
costly those assets should be jointly owned and controlled. If they are not then 
an inappropriate choice of asset specificity may lead to excessive mis-match 
costs. If, on the other hand, highly tailored worker skills are more valuable than 
strong asset ties then upstream workers should control upstream assets and 
downstream workers should control downstream assets. Where it is essential to 
coordinate the skills of upstream workers with both upstream and downstream 
assets then those workers should be given control of all assets (both upstream 
and downstream) i.e. full forward integration results. Conversely when poorly 
matched upstream skills are relatively unimportant the downstream worker should 
control both upstream and downstream assets.
The costs of mis-match in the model are generated by attempts to alleviate lock- 
in to a given firm through the choice of more generally applicable though less
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effective investment. The magnitude of these costs will be influenced by the value 
of alternative opportunities i.e. the strength of the market. If several firms choose 
to locate close by then a particular investment has wider applicability. These 
opportunities in turn are sensitive to the general extent of integration in the 
industry. In particular, non-integrated downstream firms will adopt versatile 
general technologies, thus generating stronger demand for the services of 
downstream workers with specific skills. As a result more specialised human 
capital investment is encouraged.
An independent downstream sector may therefore ameliorate the costs of 
individual forward integration decisions, whereby downstream workers are denied 
ownership (control) rights. In such a context the coordination benefits of some 
integration may be sustained in the industry even when the costs of poorly 
tailored downstream worker skills are relatively high, encouraging a fragmented 
ownership structure. Asymmetries in the model set-up exclude a similar result for 
backward integration.
In an extension to our basic model we investigate the manner in which this last 
property influences the extent of horizontal integration. If a firm limits its 
integrating activity a greater number of independent firms are operational in the 
industry. These compete for the services of non-owning workers, expanding 
demand and encouraging more specific worker investment. A firm may therefore 
forgo superficially attractive integration possibilities, in order to elicit improved 
worker performance. We explore how this last feature depends on the contracts 
that can be written, and the possibility of ownership renegotiation. In particular, 
if ownership rights can be traded after investments have been made, initially 
independent firms may not remain so when actual transactions occur. Ex post 
integration is attractive to the extent that it allows the (partial) monopolization of 
the market for workers' services. Of course this perfectly foreseen possibility will 
influence the human capital investment decisions made by those workers. The 
ability to commit to the original ownership structure may then be important.
It was Ronald Coase, in his classic 1937 Economica paper, that first emphasised 
a transaction cost minimising approach to the "markets versus hierarchies" 
question. He argued that transactions would be organised within the firm when
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the costs of doing so were less than those of market transacting. In particular, he 
stressed the value of authority in a complex, evolving world where comprehensive 
contracts are an impossibility and constant re-contracting is costly.
This theme was taken up in the work of Oliver Williamson (see e.g. Williamson 
(1985)). He has stressed the relevance of private authority and ownership when 
contractual incompleteness, opportunistic behaviour and asset specificity 
concerns coincide.
Asset specificity is a key component in Williamson's writing. He identifies four 
types of specificity - human asset and physical asset specificity, site specificity, 
and dedicated assets - as important factors in determining the structure of 
transactions. Our model incorporates the first three types in a common 
framework. Where assets are specific to a given transaction there are dangers 
of ex post hold-up because of lock-in. We are then more likely to see integrated 
structures and internal transactions. Where asset specificity is low market 
transactions are more likely. Williamson fails however to explain how transfer of 
ownership affects the opportunistic behaviour of the new owner-turned-manager.
These issues have been addressed in a bilateral context in the seminal paper by 
Grossman and Hart (1986). Control of assets reduces the dangers from lock-in 
and hence improves ex ante investment incentives. Transferring ownership (and 
therefore control) of assets from agent A to agent B thus improves B's incentives 
but weakens A's incentives to invest. A given transfer of ownership rights (e.g. 
an integration decision) therefore generates both costs and benefits. Broadly their 
results are similar to some of ours. If control affects investment incentives, and 
upstream investment is very important then upstream workers should be given 
control. If, on the other hand, downstream investment is important then 
downstream workers should be given control.
It is useful to consider this analysis in a multi-lateral setting. In such a context the 
specificity of investments can be considered. A multi-lateral framework introduces 
a role for strategic interactions and allows outside options possibilities to be 
investigated. In addition the externality effects of any integration decisions, and 
the possible divergence between private and 'social' objectives can be
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considered. Such a framework has been formulated in a recent paper by Bolton 
and Whinston (1990), but in rather a different context to ours. They investigate 
issues of supply and foreclosure in a setting with restricted supply of input. The 
broad structure of their model is nevertheless similar to ours and the emphasis 
on outside options, and the investment inefficiencies that may be generated in 
their pursuit, is a common one.
A rather different approach to a multi-agent, multi-asset environment with 
incomplete contracts is taken by Hart and Moore (1990). They adopt a 
cooperative approach (based on the Shapley value) to the optimal allocation of 
asset control rights. Again the costs and benefits of ownership are determined by 
the effects on ex-ante investment in human capital. A number of our results echo 
their conclusions. Where there are strong ties between an agent's investment and 
a particular asset then that agent should own the asset (other things being 
equal), and where there are strong ties between physical assets they should be 
owned together (though the benefits of strong physical ties in their model occur 
indirectly via the effects on human capital investment).
In all of the above papers the transfer of ownership does not affect the control of 
ex ante investment decisions. The powers of ownership come in to play once 
investment has occurred and trade takes place. In contrast, our paper 
emphasises that owners of assets choose the physical investments that are made 
in those assets. Thus ex ante investment decisions will be affected directly by the 
allocation of ownership rights.
Furthermore, none of the above papers considers the choice of asset specificity 
in any detail. We believe that this is an important factor influencing ownership 
structures and deserves particular consideration. In this paper we develop an 
explicit model of specificity decisions along the lines of Bickenbach and Williams 
(1991).
An early explicit treatment of asset specificity is provided by Riordan and 
Williamson (1985). However their analysis focuses on the general differences 
between market and internal organizational forms. They do not consider the 
endogenous determination of specificity and its costs through the explicit
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allocation of ownership rights. Furthermore Riordan and Williamson examine a 
bilateral setting hence there is no room for externalities in their model.
There are also similarities between our paper and Holmstrom and Tirole's 
analysis of transfer pricing and organizational form (Holmstrom and Tirole 
(1991)). As in our work they highlight the relationship between ownership 
structure, investment coordination and managerial search for outside options in 
an incomplete contract environment. They also model the choice of investment 
specificity explicitly. Choosing a general market orientation improves outside 
options but may reduce the value of trade. However the analysis in their paper 
concentrates on the design of contractual incentives for non-owning managers 
and emphasises the internal organisation of the firm. Again, changes in 
ownership structure affect investment only indirectly, by altering the ex post terms 
of trade. In our model, by contrast, changes are also induced by the re-allocation 
of control over investment decisions. Furthermore, though the outside options 
available to managers are influenced by their own investment orientation 
decisions (and the rules on market trading imposed by the owners of the firm) in 
Holmstrom and Tirole's model, they are not affected by the actions of other 
managers and owners in the industry. A central theme of the current paper 
however is the relationship between overall industry organisation and the outside 
options available to individual managers. We investigate the impact of industry 
ownership structure on the costs of 'market orientation' and the resulting 
externality effects.
Finally, two closely related papers by Farrell and Gallini and Shepard emphasise 
the role of second sourcing in alleviating lock-in where investment is idiosyncratic 
and contracts are incomplete. A firm may license its proprietary technology to a 
second producer, ensuring some competition for consumers and hence 
encouraging technology-specific investment. As in our model a firm may thus 
prefer to limit its monopoly power through the choice of industry structure. The 
ability to credibly commit to such a policy is crucial. These papers do not however 
consider these effects in the context of a firms' integration decisions.
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2.2 The Model
The model involves two independent markets for final goods, each consisting of 
a single consumer with unit demand. Each market is served by one of two 
downstream firms (D^ D2) i.e. Dj is a monopolist in market i. 11
A downstream firm transforms input supplied by one of two upstream firms (U^ 
U2) into final output using a 1-1 technology. There are no input capacity 
constraints, hence there is no competition between downstream firms for 
supplies.
For simplicity we fix the locations of the upstream firms at the ends of a unit line 
(U1 at 0, U2 at 1). The downstream firms are free to locate (simultaneously) at 
any point along the unit line (D1 chooses location c, and D2 chooses location c2). 
We can think of location as representing technology choice, for instance. A 
location close to one of the upstream suppliers indicates a highly specific 
investment while a location equi-distant from both suppliers corresponds to a 
more general technology.
The value of the basic product to the final consumer is v. However, this core 
value can be increased by employing the services of skilled workers. Associated 
with the downstream firms are two workers (w1f w2) who can each increase the 
value of a product by an additional v. Both workers can work for the same firm, 
each increasing the value of the product by v. The value of a worker's 
contribution does not depend on the identity of the employer or on the total 
number of workers employed. In the model we represent human capital 
investment as a location on the unit line.
Once downstream firms have chosen their locations each worker can choose to 
locate at any point on the unit line (w1 locates at b1 and w2 at b2). All workers 
locate simultaneously at time T=2. We can relax this assumption and allow 
workers to choose their location at the same time as that of any assets they own
11 Downstream competition for consumer trade is therefore not a factor 
influencing integration decisions.
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(see Footnote 17).
If a downstream worker locates a distance (3 from a downstream firm then a 
transport cost rp is incurred by the firm in using the worker's skills. This can be 
thought of as the cost of transforming the skill, or alternatively as the reduced 
value of using an imperfectly tailored skill. Similarly, when a downstream firm 
locates a distance yfrom an upstream firm then there is a cost tyto transforming 
the input. Again this cost reduces the basic value of the product. We assume that 
v > r, t - ensuring that downstream firms can always source input from either 
supplier and that both downstream firms will always seek the services of a 
worker. The availability of outside options is thus guaranteed, whatever the 
location of the downstream asset or worker.12 The relative values of the 
parameters r and t will play a critical role in our analysis.
We assume Bertrand competition between upstream firms to supply downstream 
firms, and between downstream firms for the services of workers. These trades 
involve spot contracts. Therefore, we might expect an upstream worker to work 
on an input which is then sold to a downstream firm, where a downstream worker 
performs additional value-enhancing tasks.
Prices will be influenced by location choice and the magnitude of transport costs. 
For instance, if a downstream worker locates distance 1/6 from D1 and 1/2 from 
D2 then D, is prepared to pay up to v - r/6 for the worker's services (i.e. value 
added net of transport costs) while D2 will offer up to v - r/2. Bertrand competition 
ensures that the worker will in fact receive v - r/2, and work for Dv In our 
example, the worker could (and would) increase the wage by locating distance 
1/3 from both D1 and D2. Where a worker has several equally attractive 
employment offers, we assume worker i works for firm i. Similarly, if indifferent, 
downstream firm i will buy input from upstream firm i.
The results are unaltered if we assume v>r/2, v>t/2 though calculation is 
messier. It is sufficient that when a firm or worker locates at the centre of the unit 
line trade can occur with either of two firms located at opposite ends of the line.
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In this simplified model each upstream asset has an owner, m,.13 Downstream 
asset i can either be owned by downstream worker Wj (the non-integrated case) 
or by mii (forward integration). Horizontal integration of either upstream or 
downstream assets is not permitted. This last restriction is needed to ensure that 
any non-owning worker or non-integrated downstream firm has a choice of 
trading partner (and thus an "outside option" in any negotiation). If both upstream 
firms were jointly controlled, for instance, then an independently owned 
downstream firm would face a monopolised input market. In total there are 4 
possible overall ownership structures: Forward Integration, Non Integration and 
Partial Integration (- 2 symmetric structures). The owner of an asset decides on 
its location.
We assume that contracts cannot be written or verified conditional on the choice 
of location (investment) of either firms or workers. In the context of our location 
model this may seem extreme. However, we have in mind a situation where 
describing complex investments precisely is impossible. Profit sharing schemes 
are also deemed infeasible. The only contracts permitted are those conferring 
ownership (and hence residual control) rights at T=0. All information is identically 
available to owners and workers, though not to a court.
Ownership of D, is allocated at T=0 to maximise the joint profits of rrij and w^ We 
refer to the resulting industry structure as the Equilibrium Ownership Structure. 
Throughout we will contrast this ownership structure with that which maximises 
the combined profits of all upstream and downstream agents. We refer to this 
configuration as the Industry Optimal Ownership Structure. More on this below.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the form the model may take. Ownership ties are 
represented by the bold connecting lines. Thus on the right of the diagram 
downstream worker 2 (w2) is shown to own downstream asset 2, while on the left 
of the diagram upstream owner 1(17^ ) owns both upstream and downstream 
assets. Downstream worker 1 (w^ is a non-owning worker. Overall the industry 
is partially integrated.
13 For now this upstream owner takes no actions, but is assumed to be 
essential. In Section 6 we will consider rrij's role explicitly.
78
Figure
2.1
U1 U2
B
D2
1/4
w1 w2
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The unit line has been blown up into 3 parallel lines for ease of exposition. The 
fixed locations of the upstream firms are shown on line A, the locations of 
downstream firms on line B and the location choices of downstream workers on 
line C. For instance if D1 locates a 1/4 unit from 0 and w1 locates 3/8 of a unit 
from 0 then the transport costs incurred when w1 works with D1 are r/8, while the 
cost of D1 buying input from U1 are t/4.
2.3 The First Best Outcome
As a benchmark it will be useful to consider the first best outcome. The source 
of inefficiency in the model is location mismatch between downstream workers 
and firms, and between upstream and downstream firms. A social planner could 
thus achieve first best by the appropriate choice of downstream worker and asset 
locations. Upstream assets are of course fixed at the ends of the unit line.
Each downstream asset should be located next to an upstream asset, 
guaranteeing an input supply free of transport costs. Supplier identity is irrelevant. 
Each worker, in turn, should be located next to a downstream asset.
Result 2.1 [First Best]
To attain the first best outcome:
(a) Each downstream firm should locate next to an upstream firm i.e.
q = 0 or 1 i = 1,2
(b) Each downstream worker should locate next to a downstream firm i.e.
bj = Cj i = 1,2 ; j = 1,2
Clearly there are several industry configurations that achieve first best. It is 
always inefficient for firms or workers to locate in the interior of the unit line.
It may be worthwhile noting, at this preliminary stage, that if upstream firms were 
allowed to choose location freely then the first best would exist as an equilibrium 
of the model. In this equilibrium all firms and workers share a common location. 
Clearly, transport issues are no longer relevant. Furthermore, no worker or asset- 
holder would have a strict incentive to deviate - by locating apart from all other 
assets and workers. When specificity (location) considerations cease to be
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relevant, competition guarantees efficiency (but more on this in the Conclusions).
2.4 Preliminaries
In this section we provide some basic results concerning the prices paid for 
inputs and the services of workers, and hence the profits accruing to the different 
parties. Prices are driven by location choice. Agents therefore locate their skills, 
and any assets they own, to maximise profits. The location choice results are at 
the heart of the paper, since they determine the costs and benefits of any 
ownership allocation.
There is Bertrand competition for the supply of inputs and the services of 
workers. Downstream firms buy input from the upstream firm that offers the 
lowest price, while workers work for the firm that offers the highest wage. We 
assume that internal transfer prices are set at competitive levels. 14
Lemma 2.1 [Prices]
(a) If a downstream firm locates at c then it receives input at a price
p = tmax[c,1-c]
If c > 1/2 the firm is supplied by U2 while if c < 1/2 it is supplied by
(b) Suppose D1 and D2 locate at q  and c2 respectively. If a downstream worker 
locates at b then he/she receives a price
p = v - r max[lb-c.|l,lb-c2l]
If lb-c1l>lb-c2l the worker works for D2 while if Ib-cjclb-c,,! he/she works for Dv
Proof: See Appendix 2.2.
When a worker locates closer to one employer and further from the alternative, 
outside options are weakened. As a result that employer can offer a lower 
winning price to secure the worker's services. In Klein et al's classic terminology
Transfers between an agent as buyer and the same agent as supplier, or 
between the agent as employer and as employee do not affect decisions. 
However, this approach allows us to adopt a common notation for prices and 
profits, whatever the ownership structure.
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"the appropriable specialised portion of the quasi-rent is that portion in excess of 
its value to the second highest-valuing user" (Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978) 
p. 298). Specialised skills are less applicable, and hence command lower prices, 
in alternative use. Similarly, if a downstream firm locates its assets close to one 
of the upstream suppliers, its alternative supply source is distant and relatively 
inappropriate. As a result, the closer supplier can demand a higher price for its 
product. It is a feature of the model that the trading price is always determined 
by the second best offer.
From these price results we can establish the profits earned by each party. Of 
course, a worker may well earn a profit not only as a worker but also as an asset 
owner too. Since internal transfer prices are set at the competitive level, the 
allocation of ownership rights affects profits solely through its influence on 
location decisions. The owners of downstream assets (D^ D2) choose their 
locations at T=1, followed at T=2 by worker location choice. A firm or worker will 
choose a location that maximises its profits.
Lemma 2.2 [Location Choice]
(a) An owning downstream worker locates next to his/her downstream asset [i.e. 
bj = Cj if W| owns DJ, while a non-owning downstream worker locates mid-way 
between downstream assets.
(b) Integrated upstream and downstream assets are located together. Non- 
integrated downstream firms will locate mid-way between upstream firms. Thus 
integrated D1 locates at 0 and integrated D2 at 1. Non-integrated D1 and D2 locate 
at 1/2.
Proof: See Appendix 2.2.
When upstream and downstream assets are owned together lock-in worries 
discouraging adjacent asset location disappear. Indeed, such locations will then 
be chosen, to minimise transport costs and hence maximise profits. An owner will 
select the technology that ensures the best possible match between input 
attributes and production needs. Similarly, if a worker owns the asset he/she 
works with, then the threat of ex post hold-up disappears. Owning workers will 
locate next to their assets to minimise transport costs. Such workers will acquire
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value maximising firm-specific skills. Ownership affects profits through its impact 
on location choice, and hence on transport costs.
For example, if upstream owner 1 (m^ owns D1 and U1 both physical assets will 
be located next to each other (at location 0). However, the non-owning 
downstream worker (w^ locates mid-way between D, and D2. On the other hand 
if and D1 are separately owned then locates next to D1 (to minimise costs) 
but w1-D1 combined locate at 1/2 - between upstream firms - to minimise lock-in 
to either input supplier.
2.5 Ownership choice
There are three possible industry ownership configurations in our basic model. 
In this section we will first consider the outcome of equilibrium location choice, 
for each structure in turn. We will then analyse the allocation of ownership rights 
undertaken at T=0. Finally, we will compare this with the Industry Optimal 
ownership configuration.
Full Integration
Each pair of upstream and downstream assets is jointly owned and controlled. 
Integrated assets are located together (at the ends of the unit line) to minimise 
the transport costs of input supply. Non-owning downstream workers locate at 
1/2, equi-distant from both integrated firms - as illustrated in Figure 2.2. This 
(general human capital investment) minimises worker lock-in to either potential 
employer. However, as a result, a transport cost r/2 is incurred in adapting 
workers' general skills for a particular use. Bertrand competition for workers' 
services ensures it is they who bear this cost. The profits of the four parties are 
as follows:
Uni =v nw1 = v - r/2
nm2 =  V nw2 =  V - r/2
Non-Integration
Ownership of assets is now separated. Downstream assets are owned by 
downstream workers (w1? w2) and upstream assets are owned by upstream
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Figure 2.2
Equilibrium Location Patterns
Full Integration
Non-Integration
m m
Partial Integration
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owners (m^ m2). Each downstream worker will locate next to his/her downstream 
asset, avoiding transport costs. Ownership eliminates lock-in worries and adjacent 
location maximises the value of the worker's human capital. However, to minimise 
lock-in to either upstream input supplier, each downstream worker-asset 
combination locates in the centre of the line, at 1/2.15 The "appropriable element 
of the asset quasi-rent" is then minimised too. A transport cost t/2 is incurred 
transforming either supplier's input to the specifications of each downstream firm 
(i.e. a distance of 1/2, at unit cost t). The profits of the four parties are now given
Partial Integration (U1-D1 integrated)
This is the most interesting ownership structure. One pair of upstream and 
downstream assets are integrated, while the other pair are owned separately. 
Assume U1 and D1 are integrated. Equilibrium location patterns are again 
illustrated in Figure 2.2. Integrated Dt locates at 0, next to its upstream division 
Non-integrated downstream firm D2 locates at 1/2 (together with its worker- 
owner). The potential employers of non-owning worker w1 are therefore located 
at 0 and 1/2. Consequently, this worker will choose to locate at 1/4, mid-way 
between D, and D2. A cost of only r/4 is then incurred in transforming that 
worker's human capital. Profits for the four parties in this case are:
Having obtained equilibrium location choices and profits for each ownership 
configuration, we can now consider which configuration will prevail in equilibrium. 
The allocation of ownership rights over asset D| is chosen to maximise the joint
Each downstream firm could be separately owned by an independent 
outside party in the non-integrated case. To avoid lock-in to either input supplier 
both downstream firms locate at 1/2. This in turn creates a perfectly competitive 
market for non-owning downstream workers' skills at 1/2. with competition, the 
allocation of ownership rights is unimportant. Workers are happy to locate next 
to firms, eliminating worker-asset mismatch. This outcome exactly replicates that 
generated by downstream worker control. The key here is the separation of 
upstream and downstream asset ownership.
by:
n w1 = 2v - 1/2 
n w2 = 2v - 1/2
nw1 = V  - r/4
nw2 = 2v - 1/2
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profits of rrij and Wj. These joint profits, for each industry structure, are given 
below:
Integration FIm1.w1 = 2v - r/2 n m2.W2 = 2v '  r/2
Non-Integration nm1.w1 = 2v - 1/2 n m2-w2 = 2v - 1/2
Partial Integration nm1.w1 = 2v - r/4 nm2.w2 = 2v - 1/2
Joint profit maximisation clearly involves minimising the transport costs incurred 
by the relevant upstream-downstream pair.
A general trade-off is apparent. Integration ensures strong ties (short distances) 
between assets, but weak ties (larger distances) between assets and workers. 
Conversely, non-integrated structures encourage strong ties between workers and 
assets, but correspondingly weaker ties between assets. When the (transport) 
costs of using badly tailored input are greater than the costs of non-specific 
worker skills then the physical assets should be owned together. On the other 
hand, if the value of specific worker skills is relatively high then downstream 
assets should be worker owned. Costs are driven by two factors: unit transport 
cost values, r and t, and location patterns.
Turning to the first of these effects, when unit worker transport costs (r) are high 
relative to unit input transport costs (t), non-integrated structures are attractive. 
On the other hand, low values of r/t encourage integrated outcomes. Figure 2.3 
shows the relationship between equilibrium ownership structure and r/t. For r/t < 
1 an integrated industry structure emerges in equilibrium, while for r/t > 2 
equilibrium industry structure is non-integrated.
Total transport costs are also affected by location decisions i.e. by the distances 
between assets and workers. Critically, these location decisions may depend on 
overall industry ownership structure. To see this, compare m1 and w /s profits in 
a fully integrated industry with those under partial integration (where U2 and D2 
are assumed non-integrated). The cost of forward integration to the m1-w1 pair is 
the transport cost incurred when the non-owning w1 makes its individual profit 
maximising location decision. This downstream worker will always locate mid-way 
between D1 and D2. The transport cost incurred therefore falls from r/2 to r/4 as 
the industry as a whole becomes more fragmented, and the distance separating
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downstream firms contracts from 1 to 1/2.
The more idiosyncratic are firms' skill requirements the more reluctant non-owning 
workers will be to invest in firm-specific skills. Integration, in encouraging 
idiosyncratic options, raises the costs of using such workers' skills. Non- 
integrated downstream firms will adopt less specialised technology (to avoid lock- 
in to particular suppliers), encouraging more firm-specific worker investment.
It is important to note that, since the downstream markets are independent, there 
is no strategic incentive here for vertical integration in order to discourage specific 
investment i.e. we do not see strategic foreclosure effects.
The results are formally collected below.
Proposition 2.2 [Equilibrium Ownership Structure]
The equilibrium allocation of industry ownership rights depends critically on the 
magnitude of unit worker transport costs (r) relative to input transport costs (t). 
In particular:
(i) low values of r/t (< 1) generate a fully integrated structure in equilibrium,
(ii) high values of r/t (> 2) imply a non-integrated structure, and
(ii) for intermediate values (1 < r/t < 2) the industry is partially integrated i.e. 
integrated and non-integrated firms coexist.
The relationship between equilibrium ownership structure and r/t is illustrated in 
Figure 2.3.
Equilibrium ownership structures that do not maximise overall industry profits are 
inefficient. In assessing this we must consider the combined profits of m1: m2, 
w, and w2, for each ownership configuration:
IKFull Integration)) = 4v - r
II(Non-lntegration) = 4v - 1
II(Partial Integration) = 4v - 1/2 - r/4
For a range of r/t values the industry optimal (efficient) ownership structure is not 
observed.
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Proposition 2.3 [Industry Optimal Ownership Structure]
There is excessive integration in the industry. For 2/3 < r/t < 1 a fully integrated 
industry is observed in equilibrium though partial integration is efficient.
Industry optimal and equilibrium ownership structures can be compared in 
Figures 2.3 and 2.4.
In assessing the benefits of merger, non-integrated upstream and downstream 
firms trade-off the benefits of closer asset ties (and a cost saving of t/2) against 
the added cost, r/2, of more general investment by the downstream worker. 
However, a merger also has consequences for the industry as a whole. 
Integration shifts downstream asset location from 1/2 to the end of the unit line. 
This increases the distance between downstream firms, weakening the options 
facing a worker with specific skills. Consequently, less firm-specific investment 
is undertaken by these workers. The human capital mismatch costs for an 
existing integrated firm in the industry are therefore increased, from r/4 to r/2. 
Integration of assets Uj and Di thus imposes a negative externality on integrated 
firm i.
Of course, in such circumstances the integrated firm could offer the firms 
considering merger a fee conditional on their not integrating. If ownership 
structures were observable to a court, such a contract would be enforceable. In 
this case the Industry Optimal Ownership Structure could be sustained - as 
predicted by the Coase Theorem. However where ownership rights can be 
verified in a court by the owner, but are not openly observable, such contracts 
may not be effective.16
We will now consider a more general version of the model, that allows fully 
endogenously determined ownership.
16 The integrating firms could then accept payment from the integrated party 
in exchange for not integrating, and then proceed to integrate secretly. Of course, 
a secret re-allocation ot control rights may still encounter problems. In order to 
assert ownership rights in the event of a dispute, ownership must be proved to 
a court. If this violated previous agreements, then damages might be claimed. 
Any secret asset transfer agreements, therefore, might also involve agreements 
over responsibilities for damage payments.
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2.6 The General Case
In the basic model upstream assets are always owned by inactive entrepreneurs. 
We did not permit downstream workers to control both upstream and downstream 
assets. Yet this would appear to remove all the inefficiencies of non-specific 
investment. Since upstream entrepreneurs have no investment (location) 
decisions, removing their control rights would not have adverse efficiency 
implications. The benefits of integration could be achieved, at no apparent cost, 
by giving downstream workers control of upstream and downstream assets.
However, more realistically, upstream owners too have skills that contribute to 
overall value. Transfers of ownership that improve downstream workers' 
incentives to make specific investments may therefore cause a deterioration in 
upstream workers' incentives. As Grossman and Hart (1986) stresses, integration 
will then generate costs as well as benefits. To examine this issue in more detail 
we must extend our simple model somewhat.
We will introduce a pair of upstream workers (nr^  and m2) that can enhance the 
value of input by an additional amount v. These workers must choose locations 
(a1 and a2 respectively) on the unit line. If an upstream worker locates distance 
a from a firm then the firm incurs costs sa using the worker's skills (v > s). 
Upstream firms compete a la Bertrand for workers. Once again it should be 
emphasised that both upstream workers can work for the same firm (but when 
indifferent rrij will work for Uj). Upstream workers choose their location at T=2 - 
after the location of physical assets. 17
All assets in the model are now owned by workers. We restrict ownership of Uj 
and Dj to either upstream worker i or downstream worker i. Both Uj and Dj can 
be owned by nrij (forward integration, or upstream control), both can be owned by 
Wj (backward integration), or nri; can own U, and Wj can own Dj (non-integration).
We can relax this assumption and allow workers to choose location 
simultaneously with any assets they own, provided worker location choice is 
unobservable until the end of T=2. If sequential worker location decisions were 
observable then the possibility of ownership trade between location choices would 
arise. It is important that non-owning workers locate after downstream assets.
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We do not allow upstream control of downstream assets combined with 
downstream control of upstream assets,18 nor do we allow any horizontal 
integration for the reasons outlined in the simple case above.
The key mechanism driving location choice is precisely that highlighted in the 
basic model. Therefore, we will not describe the equilibrium location patterns in 
detail here. However, it is worth repeating the fundamental location principles:
(a) Non-owning workers locate mid-way between potential employer firms, while 
worker-owners locate next to their assets.
(b) Vertically integrated assets are located next to each other, while independent 
downstream firms locate mid way between upstream assets.
These results, from Section 2.4, are proved for the general case in Appendix 2.2.
We now have two types of worker investment to consider. Our optimal ownership 
structure will therefore depend not only on the cost of transforming downstream 
worker skills relative to input transformation costs (r/t), but also on the cost of 
transforming upstream worker skills relative to the cost of transforming input (s/t).
Proposition 2.4 [Equilibrium Ownership Structures]
The equilibrium ownership structure is determined by the relative unit cost of 
transforming upstream human skills (s/t) and the relative cost of transforming 
downstream human skills (r/t):
(i) For low values of r/t and/or s/t full integration is observed in equilibrium,
(ii) With high values of r/t and s/t both sets of assets are non-integrated.
(iii) Partial integration is the equilibrium industry ownership structure for a range 
of intermediate parameter values (s/t > 1, 1 < r/t < 2).
Proof: See Appendix 2.2.
18 Suppose we allow Wj to own Uj, and rrij to own D,. In the model as specified 
this "inverted" ownership allocation is never desirable. However if w, could 
commit to locate next to Uj then Dj may locate next to U; too. The location 
structure (and combined profit) is then identical to that obtained with backward 
integration. A mutual hostage-type scenario develops (cf. the value of reciprocal 
exposure in Williamson (1983)). D= is prepared to locate next to U (though this 
exposes it to lock-in) because it in turn can hold-up Wj (given the laiter's location 
commitment). This issue is explored further in Appendix 2.1.
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The relationship between equilibrium ownership patterns and the key parameter 
ratios, s/t and r/t, is shown as a phase diagram in Figure 2.5. The obvious 
asymmetry is driven by the fixed location of upstream firms.
It is immediately apparent, in this more general model, that backward integration 
does not universally dominate all other ownership structures. With backward 
integration, upstream workers are non-owning workers. As a result they choose 
general, non-specific location at 1/2 - generating transport costs s/2. When the 
cost of transforming non-specific upstream human capital is relatively high (s/t 
high), upstream worker ownership of supplier assets is preferable. Upstream 
worker transport costs are then eliminated.
Note that for high s/t, the relationship between ownership patterns and r/t is that 
seen in the basic model i.e. Figure 2.3 corresponds to a horizontal cut through 
Figure 2.5, with s/t set high. Once again, though now in a more general setting, 
partial integration emerges as an equilibrium for a range of parameter values.
In general, when the costs of poorly tailored human capital are high relative to the 
costs of non-specific input (r/t and s/t high), strong worker-asset ties are valuable. 
Fragmented ownership structures are then attractive. Conversely, when r/t or s/t 
is low it is relatively important to secure strong physical asset ties. Integrated 
structures will then dominate, with upstream and downstream assets being owned 
together.
We can again consider whether the structures observed in equilibrium maximise 
the overall profits of all four workers (given that workers always choose location 
to maximise their individual profits).
Proposition 2.5 [Industry Optimal Ownership Structure]
No ownership structure achieves first best. The ownership equilibrium exhibits 
excessive tendencies towards full (forward and backward) integration. For a 
range of parameter values a partially integrated structure maximises overall 
profits, but full integration is observed in equilibrium.
Proof: See Appendix 2.2.
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The shaded region in Figure 2.6 highlights parameter combinations where the 
equilibrium industry ownership structure is inefficient. In this region there is 
excessive integration.
For high values of s/t and low values of r/t in this region there is too much 
forward integration. The source of inefficiency in this case is precisely that 
highlighted in the basic model. The integrating firms do not take account of the 
adverse impact of their decision, in particular the effect of their downstream firm 
location choice, on the employment options of non-owning downstream workers. 
Consequently, increased human capital transport costs are incurred by other 
integrated firms.
For relatively low values of s/t and intermediate r/t values the cause of 
inefficiency is excessive backward integration. This case is a little more complex. 
When s/t < 1 non-integrated firms are attracted to the possibility of backward 
merger (and the subsequent adoption of idiosyncratic downstream technology). 
However in considering this transition (and the subsequent shift in downstream 
asset location) the integrating parties again fail to take account of the impact on 
non-owning downstream workers employment options. This adverse effect of 
backward merger may render forward integrated structures, where downstream 
workers are non-owners, unattractive to other parties. Since s/t < 1 and 
integration is preferable to non-integration, a fully backward integrated industry 
structure then results.
2.7 Limits to Horizontal Integration
In the simple model presented in Section 2.2 and extended in the last section 
horizontal integration was not permitted. However, our analysis has highlighted 
benefits to fragmentation. First, of course, more workers gain control of the 
assets they work with, encouraging asset-specific human capital investment. 
Secondly, fragmentation creates greater employment opportunities for non-owning 
non-owning workers. The mismatch costs of inappropriate worker investment are 
then reduced. These arguments suggest self-imposed limits to horizontal
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integration, even where this is permitted.
To examine the issue in more detail we add a third downstream firm (D3) and an 
associated worker (w3) to our industry. This firm sells one unit of output in a third, 
independent market. Values and costs are identical to those of the other 
downstream firms. At T=1 the owner of asset D3 chooses its location on the unit 
line, while worker w3 takes his/her location decision at T=2. We allow the new 
downstream firm to be owned either by downstream worker w3 or downstream 
worker or upstream worker m1. The ownership structure is chosen to maximise 
the joint profits of all three workers. To simplify our analysis, we will assume 
upstream assets are always owned and controlled by upstream workers. As 
before, this amounts to assuming that s/t is large.
There are four candidate ownership structures for assets D, and D3:
Forward Integration - nr^  owns and controls D1 and D3.
Partial Forward Integration - m1 owns w3 owns D3.
Horizontal Integration - w1 owns D1 and D3.
Non-Integration - w1 owns D1( w3 owns D3.
D2 may be upstream (Forward Integration) or independently (Non-Integration) 
owned. It should be clear therefore that 8 industry ownership configurations are 
possible.
Given the independent final markets assumption, prices (Lemma 2.1) and location 
choice (Lemma 2.2) follow the patterns for the basic model. In particular:
(a) An owning downstream worker locates next to his/her downstream asset while 
a non-owning downstream worker locates between downstream firms.
(b) Integrated upstream and downstream firms locate next to each other. Non- 
integrated downstream firms locate between upstream firms i.e. at 1/2.
Again we are interested in the relationship between the allocation of ownership 
rights for the downstream assets, and the key parameter ratio - r/t. This is 
illustrated in Figure 2.7.
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Result 2.8 [Equilibrium Ownership Structures]
(i) For a range of parameter values horizontal integration is limited in equilibrium.
(ii) Where non-integration is an equilibrium ownership structure, horizontal 
integration is also an equilibrium structure.
Proof: See Appendix 2.2
Figure 2.7 clearly shows that as r/t increases the industry becomes increasingly 
fragmented. As the costs of transforming non-specific human capital increase it 
becomes more and more important to ensure strong ties between downstream 
workers and assets. Dispersed ownership is therefore encouraged.
For 2/3 < r/t < 1 industry equilibrium structure involves upstream (integrated) 
ownership of downstream assets D, and D2. However D3 is downstream worker 
owned. An element of horizontal integration is absent, though weak ties between 
assets are relatively costly (r/t < 1). Indeed, the non-integrated downstream asset 
will be located at 1/2, generating additional input transport costs t/2 that exceed 
the direct benefits of closer worker-asset ties (- a cost saving r/2). However 
fragmentation has beneficial knock-on effects for the remaining, vertically 
integrated firm. Outside options for non-owning workers are improved, leading to 
a reduction in transport costs of r/4. This indirect benefit outweighs the direct 
costs of fragmentation. Of course, other vertically integrated firms benefit from 
this option too. Consequently some vertical integration is observed in equilibrium 
even when r/t > 1.
The above structure is also an equilibrium for 1 < r/t < 2. However, a 
configuration with fully (i.e. vertically and horizontally) integrated and non­
integrated firms coexisting is also an equilibrium. Again some fragmentation in 
the industry as a whole, by altering the location decisions of downstream firms 
improves the employment options for non-owning downstream workers. As a 
consequence, the costs of worker human capital mis-match are ameliorated, and 
the costs of vertical integration to others reduced.
Not surprisingly, when unit worker transport costs are high (r/t > 2) we observe 
non-integrated structures in equilibrium. All three worker-owned downstream firms
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will locate together at 1/2, avoiding lock-in to either input supplier. Such non­
specific investment imposes transport costs t/2 for input supply, but these are 
outweighed by close ties between downstream worker-owners and assets.
Note that lateral merger (D1 and D3 owned by w^ is also an equilibrium for the 
very same parameter values. The three vertically separated downstream firms 
always locate at 1/2, irrespective of any horizontal merger. A perfectly competitive 
market for the services of downstream workers is therefore ensured, even if 
merger of two of the firms takes place (- two independent firms are sufficient for 
Bertrand competition). As such the non-owning worker (w3) can locate at 1/2, 
adjacent to its employer yet avoiding any lock-in. Horizontal integration then 
imposes no additional transport costs.
Intuitively, once independent downstream firms locate together, idiosyncrasy is 
no longer an issue. The efficiency implications of ownership then disappear. In 
the absence of asset specificity concerns, standard competitive exchange is an 
effective "contracting process" (Williamson (1985), p.31-32).19
In this section we have shown that a self-imposed restriction on horizontal 
integration may be optimal. The basic mechanism at work in our model imposes 
natural, endogenously determined limits on the degree of horizontal as well as 
vertical integration. Of course, a commitment to independence is critical in 
deriving benefits from fragmentation. This issue is explored further in Section 8.
2.8 Renegotiation
In the basic model and extensions considered above we crucially assumed that 
ownership rights were allocated once and for all at T=0. Suppose instead that the 
allocation of ownership rights is renegotiable after location decisions have been
We would expect this result to change if the model were adapted to allow 
for downstream differentiated product competition, for instance. The desire to 
secure a 'market niche' would then discourage downstream firms from 
agglomerating at the centre of the line.
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made.20 Since such investments are then sunk, renegotiation cannot directly lead 
to changes in location choice. However, anticipating that renegotiation may affect 
the future terms of trade, agents' location decisions will be sensitive to this 
possibility. To explore this issue we will focus on an ownership structure where 
D1 and D2 are vertically integrated, but D3 is owned by downstream worker w3 
(see also Figure 2.8) i.e. the horizontal dimension to integration is limited.
Downstream asset D3 is located next to its worker-owner w3, to minimise mis­
match. Both are located at 1/2 to minimise lock-in to either supplier. Non-owning 
downstream worker w1 locates at 1/4 since this minimises lock-in to either the 
independent downstream firm (D3) at 1/2, or the integrated downstream firm (DJ 
at 0. Suppose however (as an illustration) that we allow trade of the ownership 
rights for asset D3 after location choice, from w3 to m1 (the upstream owner of 
DJ. Further suppose take-it-or-leave-it offers from the buyer are considered by 
the owner. This will leave w3's location decisions unchanged, since the aim is to 
maximise independent firm value (and guarantee the highest price from take­
over).
Once investment has been undertaken, it is efficient for the downstream firms to 
integrate. Since location decisions are then sunk, integration imposes no further 
investment (location) costs. However, joint control of two downstream firms 
effectively reduces a non-owning downstream worker's employment options. This 
enables the asset owner to extract a greater share of the worker's surplus.21 Of 
course the non-owning worker will foresee this threat and will locate between D3 
and D2, at 3/4 (see Figure 2.8). 22
20 Note that the other trades in the model are spot transactions and hence 
renegotiation proof.
21 It is necessary to transfer ownership rights to achieve this since other 
collusion contracts are unenforceable.
22 We cannot allow renegotiation to involve D2 too, since w /s outside options 
would then completely disappear. Such an eventuality cannot be permitted in the 
current model. It seems at least plausible that such complete ownership 
renegotiation might be proscribed by antitrust authorities.
101
Figure 2.8
D3
102
As a result of this location change, both w1 and w3 will now work with asset D3. 
In the particular context of our model this change in location decision and 
employer does not affect efficiency. In both cases non-owning workers locate 
distance 1/4 from their employers, and no extra losses are incurred when both 
workers are linked to the same firm. However, it is easy to envisage situations 
where mis-match costs would be increased. To take one example, one could 
imagine a scenario where D3 must locate in the region [0,1/3] - in order to serve 
a particular market for instance. Whilst this would alter the details of our earlier 
analysis it is clear that the possibility of renegotiation increases mismatch costs 
(w! now locates at 2/3 rather than at 1/6).
Where ownership is observable the possibility of contracts restricting ownership 
changes, as in Section 2.4, may alleviate these problems. Agents could then 
commit to particular ownership structures before investments were made. In 
effect this brings us back to the situation studied in the sections above. Of 
course, if ownership is observable then the possibility of conditional contracts will 
allow the Industry Optimal Ownership Structure to be supported (see above), 
unless antitrust regulations bar such contracts. In practice, horizontal mergers-for- 
monopoly are prime candidates for antitrust investigation.
2.9 Conclusions
In this paper we model ownership decisions in a world where the specificity of 
investments can be chosen. Specific investments maximise value but the investor 
is vulnerable to hold-up if he/she becomes locked in to a particular relationship. 
Therefore, unless an agent is assured of full control, he/she is likely to choose 
a more general investment. General investment adds to costs but broadens 
alternatives.
When mis-match between a worker and an asset is relatively costly, that worker 
should generally be given control of the asset. Similarly when it important to form 
strong ties between assets those assets should be owned and controlled 
together.
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The lock-in caused by a given investment depends on its value in alternative 
applications. For instance, if many firms use a highly specialised input then 
investment in the input technology could still be widely applicable. Much depends 
on the structure of the market for input. We show that it may be optimal to 
maintain a degree of fragmentation in asset ownership even when close ties 
between assets are relatively important. Independent firms provide outside 
opportunities for non-owning workers and so reduce the impact of worker-asset 
mismatch. Natural bounds are therefore placed on the degree of integration. In 
addition, since independent firms do not take account of their role in providing 
outside opportunities for the workers of other firms, externality effects may arise.
A key extension to the model would be the introduction of final market 
competition. The presence of independent firms is then more problematic - 
improved outside options for workers must be balanced with increased 
competition effects. Similar problems emerge for firms too. The need to find a 
market niche may prevent a general location choice
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Appendix 2.1
Here we will consider the case for an "inverted" ownership structure, outlined in 
Footnote 7 i.e. downstream worker ownership of the upstream asset (Wj owns Uj) 
and upstream control of the downstream asset (m, owns Dj). For simplicity we will 
focus on i=1.
Wherever there is downstream control of the upstream worker m1 will always 
locate at 1/2, mid-way between U1 and U2, irrespective of other ownership and 
location decisions. The value of the worker's human capital to either firm is then 
reduced by a transport cost s/2. Clearly downstream control of U, will never be 
optimal when s is high.
As a benchmark, note that backward integration (downstream control of and 
DJ yields a combined w1-m1 profit of:
= 3v - s/2
Both downstream worker and asset locate at 0, while the upstream worker 
locates at 1/2. We have already shown that with inverted ownership the upstream 
worker will always locate at 1/2, incurring transport cost s/2. Clearly, inverted 
ownership can never be strictly preferred to backward integration, since the 
transport costs incurred are always at least as large. It follows, a fortiori, that the 
inverted structure can emerge only where backward integration dominates all 
other ownership structures i.e. when r/t > s/t and s/t < 1 (see Figure 2.4). 
Furthermore, to be attractive at all, the inverted structure must induce both w1 
and to locate at 0.
Throughout, we have emphasised the interrelationship between industry-wide 
location choice and the ownership and location decisions of individual agents. In 
the current context the location of downstream firm D2 may influence downstream 
worker w /s own decision. For parameter values that can sustain the inverted 
structure i.e. r/t > s/t, s/t < 1, D2 will always locate at 1 in equilibrium. Again, 
backward integration is the benchmark scenario.
If is unable to commit to location before D1 is located, the results of our basic 
model apply. In particular, non-integrated D1 will always locate at 1/2 thus
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reducing value by a transport cost t/2. The inverse structure will then never be 
chosen by w1 and m1 at T=0, since backward integration yields lower costs 
irrespective of w /s location decision.
Now suppose that w1 can commit to a location decision. The inverted ownership 
structure will be attractive only if w1 will commit to location 0 and given this 
commitment, D1 will locate at 0 too. We will proceed in two stages. First we 
consider whether D  ^ will locate next to \n v and second whether will locate at
0.
Suppose w1 commits to location a (where a < 1/2 w.I.o.g.), and let D1 locate at 
p. There are two opposing forces at work influencing D/s decision. To maximise 
supplier options D1 would like to locate at 1/2, between U1 and U2. If D1 locates 
closer to a it is also closer to U1f and is then exposed to some supplier lock-in. 
However, in also locating closer to the downstream worker, D1 is able to extract 
greater profit from the employment relationship with wr
In choosing p, where a < p < 1/2, D1 will trade off input supply costs [t(1 -p)] 
against its share of employee value [r(1 -P)]. It's profit is then given by: 
nD1 =  V  - t(1-p) + r(1-p) = V + r - 1 + (t - r)P
Clearly, if r/t > 1 then p = a, while if r/t < 1 then p = 1/2. Thus D1 will locate next 
to \n  ^ at a (given the latter's location commitment) provided r/t > 1.
Assuming D1 will locate at a, will w1 choose to commit to a=0 ? In locating at 0 
w1 increases its lock-in to Dv since the cost of working for D2 (at 1) is maximised. 
However, if D1 locates at a then choosing a=0 also maximises D/s lock-in to the 
w1 owned supplier, Reciprocal lock-in is therefore maximised. If p = a i.e. D! 
locates next to w1f these two components of w /s profits are given by: 
n w1_ui = [v - r(1 -<x)] + [t(1 -2cx)] = v + t + r + (r-2t)a
Clearly if r/t < 2 \ n  ^ will choose a = 0, provided D, will also locate at 0 (which it 
will do if r/t > 1).
Therefore if 1 < r/t < 2 w1 will commit to location 0 (if it commits at all), and D1 
will also choose to locate at 0. This yields overall profits of 3v - s/2, hence the 
inverse structure could be observed in equilibrium. Finally, we must now show
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that w1 will indeed choose to commit to location (taking ownership as given).
Suppose that w1 does not commit. As explained above D1 then locates at 1/2, 
and w /s profits are given by: 
n w1.u, = v - r/4
If D1 locates at 1/2 w /s optimal location is at 3/4, 1/4 unit from both D, and D2.
Commitment to location 0 is therefore worthwhile to w1 if v + 1 - r > v - r/4 i.e. if
r/t < 4/3.
Tying all this together, it is possible that the inverted ownership structure 
(downstream control of upstream assets and upstream control of downstream 
assets) will exist in equilibrium if:
(a) w1 can commit to location before D  ^ locates.
(b) Upstream worker transport costs are relatively low i.e. s/t < 1.
(c) Relative downstream transport costs lie in the range 1 < r/t < 4/3.
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Appendix 2.2
Proof of Result 2.1 [Prices]:
(a) If the downstream firm locates at c then the winning bid is given by
p = t max[c,1-c].
The cost to of supplying input is tc, therefore U1 will demand a price of at least 
tc before supplying.
The cost to U2 of supplying input is t(1-c), therefore U2 will demand a price of at 
least t(1-c) before supplying.
Suppose w.I.o.g. that c < 1-c. then offers to supply for p* = t(1-c) > tc (less an 
infinitesimal amount if trading with D2) and is accepted.
If U2 offers p < p* then nu2 = P - 1(1 -c) < 0.
If \JA offers p < p* then still accepted but Ilui(P) - Ilui(P*) < 0.
If \J, offers p > p* then U2 can offer p+ where p > p+ > p* and be accepted. Then
nU2 = p+ - t(i-c) > o, n^p) = o < nm(p*).
If U2 offers p* = t(1-c) and downstream firm is D1 then U1 still sells unit at 
p* = t(1-c) - due to tie-breaking assumption.
If U2 offers p* = t(1-c) and downstream firm is D2 then U2 captures sale.
Then n ^ p * )  = 0. By shading price infinitesimally U1 captures sale and n ^ O .
If c > 1-c then U2 offers to supply for p = tc (plus a very small amount) and is 
accepted.
(b) Suppose D1 locates at c1( D2 at c2 and Wj at b. Assume w.I.o.g. that c ^ c ^  
The value of the worker's skills to D1 = v - rlb-cj
The value of the worker's skills to D2 = v - rlb-c2l
Therefore D1 is prepared to pay up to v - rlb-c11 while D2 is prepared to pay up 
to v - rlb-c2l for the worker's services.
The winning price is p = v - r maxUb-cJJb-aJ].
(The firm with the highest valuation just outbids the low valuation firm)
Suppose w.I.o.g. that lb-c1 l<lb-c2l.
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Then D1 offers p* = v - rlb-c2l (plus an infinitesimal amount to w2) and wins.
If D2 offers p > p* then nD2 = v - rlb-c2l - p < 0.
If D! offers p > p* then still wins and n D1(p)-nD1(p*) < 0.
If D1 offers p < p* then D2 can offer p2 such that p < p2 < v-r[b-c] and win.
Then IlD2(p2) = v - rlb-c2l - p2 > 0, nD1(p)=0 < nD,(p*).
Again if worker is w1 then D1 captures services for p* (tie-breaking assumption). 
For w2 D1 must top D2's best price (p*) slightly.
If lb-c1 l>lb-c2l then D2 offers p = v - rlb-cj (plus a very small amount to w^, and 
is accepted.
Prices in the general case:
Prices for downstream worker services and input are as in Result 1. If an 
upstream worker locates at a then he/she receives a price 
p = v - s max[a,1-a]
If a>1/2 the worker works for U2 whereas if a<1/2 he/she works for Uv 
For a=1/2 worker i works for U, (tie-breaker assumption).
The proof of this last result follows the pattern for the downstream workers in (b) 
above.
Profits for upstream workers are therefore given by: 
nm1 = v - sm ax la^ l-a j 
nm2 = V - smax[a2,1-a2]
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Proof of Result 2.2 [Location Choice]:
(a) From Result 1 we know that the downstream worker receives a price for 
his/her services p = v - r m axllb -c jjb -o j].
The non-owning worker chooses location, b, to maximise profits I l w = p.
Suppose Ib-cJ > lb-c2l, and assume w.I.o.g. that c2 > cv Then either b -^  > b-c2, 
or b-c1 > c2-b.
In both cases n w = P = v - rfb-c^. The price, and hence the profit, the worker 
receives can therefore be increased by reducing b i.e. locating closer to
riw(b-e) - m b) > 0 .
Similarly if Ib-cJ < lb-c2l then the worker can increase profit by increasing b i.e. 
locating closer to D2.
Profit n w is therefore maximised when b-c1 = c2-b i.e. b = (c2+cJ/2.
If the downstream worker 1 (w j owns downstream asset 1 then location (b^ is 
chosen to maximise
n wi.Di = 2v + rmax[0,lb1-c2l-lb1-c1l] + rmaxIOJbg-Cgl-lbg-cJ]
- rmax[lb1-c1l,lb1-c2l] - tm a x lc^ l-c j 
= 2v + rmaxIOJbg-Cgl-lbg-cJ] - tm a x fo .l-c j - r lb ^c j 
Clearly this is maximised setting bA=cv
Similar reasoning applies to w2.
(b) The proof of (b) follows the structure of the proof of (a). We know from (a) 
that non-owning downstream workers locate between downstream firms (and by 
assumption worker i works for firm i when indifferent). We also know that if 
downstream asset i is downstream owned then w, locates next to the asset. 
Hence if D! (for instance) is downstream owned, profits are given by:
n D1 = v -tm axfo .l-q ] + rmaxtOJb^Cgl]
Clearly profit maximising involves setting ^=1/2.
If D1 is owned with then given the reaction of workers, the profits of the 
integrated structure are given by:
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riui-Di = v - tmaxlc^l-cj + tmaxIOJ^cJ 
= v -tc1
Clearly profit maximisation involves setting ^= 0  
Similar reasoning applies to D2.
Location in the general case:
The location decisions for downstream firms and workers are the same as those 
in Result 2. An owning upstream worker (m,) locates next to the upstream asset 
Uj. A non-owning upstream worker locates between upstream assets.
The proof of this last result follows the structure of the proof of (a) for Result 2. 
Non-owning upstream worker m chooses location a to maximise 
I I m = p = v - smax[a,1-a].
Clearly this involves setting a=1/2
If owns U1 (for instance) it chooses location (a^ to maximise 
EL1.U1 = v + tmaxIOJ^cJ + tmax[0,1-2c2] + smax[0,1-2a2]
+ smaxtOJ^aJ - s m a x ^ .l-a j  
= v + tm axtO .l^cJ + tmax[0,1-2c2] + smax[0,1-2a2] - sa1 
Clearly this involves setting a^O.
Similar reasoning applies to m2.
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Proof of Result 2.6 [Equilibrium Ownership Structure]:
Both sets of upstream and downstream workers choose the ownership structure 
of assets simultaneously at T=0. The following matrix gives the joint profits of 
each set of workers for each ownership combination (derived using the price and 
location choice results above) net of the fixed value component - 3v - which is 
independent of structure. Clearly the differences in profits are driven by transport 
cost differences.
2
BlNlFI
-t/2 -s/2-r/2
FI
-r/2 -r/4 -r/2
-r/4 -t/2 -s/2
Nl
-t/2-t/2 -t/2
-t/2 -s/2-r/2
Bl
-s/2-s/2 -s/2
Now if r>s and s/t<1 then downstream control is the only equilibrium strategy for 
each set of workers. We will therefore observe the Full Backward Integration 
overall ownership structure.
If r<s and r/t<1 then upstream control is a dominant strategy for both sets of 
workers, and we will observe Full Forward Integration in equilibrium.
If s/t>1 and r/t>2 then non integration is a dominant strategy for each set of 
workers and we will see Non-Integration as the equilibrium structure.
If s/t>1 and 1 <r/t<2 then the possible equilibria involve both Forward Integrated 
and Non-integrated structures i.e. Partial Integration.
This covers all possible values of r/t and s/t.
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Proof of Result 2.7 [Industry Optimal Ownership Structure]:
Below we list the total profits of all four workers net of the fixed value - 3v - for
all possible overall ownership structures (excluding symmetric equivalents):
n(FI-FI) = -r
^  , =  -t
n(BI-BI) = -s
ri(FI-NI) = -t/2 - r/4
n(FI-BI) = -s/2 - r/2
IKNI-BI) = -t/2 - s/2
We can immediately rule out structures FI-BI and NI-BI which are (weakly) 
optimal for only an infinitesimal area of our parameter space
FI-FI is optimal if r<t, r<s and r<t/2+r/4 i.e. r/t<1, r/t < s/t and r/t < 2/3.
NI-NI is optimal if t<r, t<s and t<t/2+r/4 i.e. r/t > 1, s/t > 1 and r/t > 2.
BI-BI is optimal if set, s<r and s<t/2+r/4 i.e. s/t < 1, s/t < r/t, s/t < r/4t + 1/2. 
FI-NI is optimal if t/2+r/4<r, t/2+r/4<s, t/2+r/4<t i.e. r/t > 2/3, r/t < 2, 
and 1/2 + r/4t < s/t.
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^
Proof of Result 2.8 [Equilibrium Ownership Structures]:
The matrix below gives the joint profits net of fixed values for (i) m1,w1 and w3 
and (ii) m2 and w2, for all possible industry ownership structures:
FI Nl
-t/2-r/2
-r/2FI
-t/2-r/4
-r/4-t/2-r/4-t/2PFI
-t/2-r/2
Nl
-t/2-r/2
HI -r/4-t
There are 8 ownership configurations. The conditions for each to be an 
equilibrium are given below:
NI-NI r/4>t/2, r/2>t, r/4+t/2>t i.e. r/t > 2
FI-NI r>t, r/2<t, r/2<r/4+t/2 i.e. r/t > 1, r/t < 2
HI-NI r/4>t/2, t<r/2, t<r/4+t/2 i.e. r/t > 2
FI-FI ret, r/t, r<r/4+t/2 i.e. r/t < 1, r/t < 2/3
PI-FI r/4<t/2, r/4+t/2<r, r/4+t/2<t i.e. r/t < 2, r/t > 2/3
HI-FI r/4+t < t - no!
PI-NI t/2<r/4, r/4+t/2<t, r/4+t/2<r/2 i.e. r/t > 2, r/t < 2 - no!
NI-FI r/4<t/2, t<r, t<r/4+t/2 i.e. r/t < 2, r/t > 1, r/t > 2 - no!
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Chapter 3:
Investment Specificity, Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure 23
23 This chapter is based on joint work with Frank Bickenbach
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3.1 Introduction
Do vertical mergers enhance efficiency or promote market power? A vigorous 
debate has raged between proponents of the rival efficiency and anti-competitive 
views. Much of this attention has focused on the possibility of integration induced 
market foreclosure. A strident attack on the anti-competitive case has been 
provided by Robert Bork. He argues strongly that "the law against vertical merger 
is merely a law against the creation of efficiency [Bork (1978), p.234]. He is 
dismissive of the view that vertical merger will lead to distortion in the supply and 
purchase prices faced by non-integrated rivals. Integration is seen as an efficient 
response to transaction cost concerns. Oliver Williamson, too, takes this view of 
"the main purpose served (by vertical integration); economising on transaction 
costs" [Williamson (1985), p.85-86]. In response to this challenge, a number of 
recent papers have attempted to set the competition perspective on a firmer 
theoretical foundation. Two distinct lines of argument have emerged.
The first, more traditional, approach emphasises the effects of integration on 
post-merger price setting. Papers in this vein include Salinger (1988), Ordover, 
Saloner and Salop (1990) and Hart and Tirole (1990). They focus on the impact 
a vertical merger has on supply pricing - both for the integrating buyer and for 
non-integrated rivals. In particular, the upstream division of an integrated firm will 
internalise the impact on the downstream division of any supply agreements 
undertaken. Essentially, in incomplete contract settings where commitment is 
difficult if not impossible to enforce, integration substitutes for contractual 
solutions in implementing a joint profit maximising pricing strategy.
A second, more radical approach, was initiated in an important paper by Patrick 
Bolton and Michael Whinston [Bolton and Whinston (1993)]. Their argument 
strikes at the transaction cost basis that underlies much of the benign view of 
vertical merger. Building on the incomplete contract approach to integration 
formulated in Grossman and Hart (1986), they show that the very investment 
incentive effects that encourage efficient vertical integration in the bilateral 
context can lead to inefficiency in a multilateral environment. When a supplier
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integrates with one of its buyers, over-investment in the internal relationship is 
encouraged. This distorts supply patterns, and may lead to inefficient foreclosure 
of non-integrated rivals. Significantly, such foreclosure is not driven by changes 
in post-investment pricing behaviour.
In this paper we will follow the Bolton-Whinston approach, emphasising the 
importance of investment specificity in a multilateral context. Within this 
framework the interaction between efficiency and anti-competitive motives for 
integration will be explored. In particular, we extend the basic Bolton-Whinston 
framework to examine the effects of vertical integration on horizontal downstream 
competition, where we believe our specificity approach is particularly insightful.
We consider a simple setting where a single retailer can be supplied by either 
one or two differentiated manufacturers. The retailer must make three sequential 
decisions: (i) whether to integrate with one of the suppliers, (ii) whether its 
technology should be largely specific to a single supplier or flexible, and (iii) 
whether to source product from one or both manufacturers. In turn, a number of 
key factors drive the outcome of this decision process: (a) the (exogenous) cost 
of merger, (b) the relative supply costs for specific and general technology, (c) 
the relative values of single versus multi-product retailing, and (d) the toughness 
of inter-retailer competition. We will focus on the interaction between these 
factors and the retailer's decisions.
A location framework is a natural setting for our analysis. With the suppliers fixed 
at opposite ends of a unit line, the retailer's once-and-for-all location decision 
represents its investment choice. A position at either end of the line constitutes 
investment that is highly specialised towards a particular manufacturer, while a 
mid-point location indicates general purpose investment. Locating at one end of 
the line minimises the cost of transacting with the adjacent manufacturer, but 
maximises the transport costs of exercising the alternative supply option. A mid­
point location ensures the widest range of supply options.
In an incomplete contract environment, where enforceable contracts on future
119
supply terms cannot be written, an independent retailer may be reluctant to locate 
at either end of the line. Once such location commitment is made, the retailer 
may effectively be locked-in to a particular supply relationship. Indeed, whenever 
single-product retailing is attractive, the independent retailer will always locate at 
the mid-point of the unit line, maximising supply options. Yet, in precisely these 
circumstances, an end-point location will be efficient, minimising transport costs. 
Vertical merger may then be attractive, overcoming lock-in concerns and 
encouraging adjacent retailer-supplier location. Of course, even then, integration 
will only take place if the resulting transport cost benefits outweigh the exogenous 
merger costs. However, in this case, when integration is individually attractive it 
will always increase overall welfare.
Costly integration will only occur if it leads to a different retailer location decision. 
This may, but need not, affect the retailer's product sourcing decision i.e. leading 
to single product rather than multi-product retailing. Where this change does 
occur, the supply market for the non-integrated manufacturer is foreclosed. Since 
the integrating parties take no account of such third party foreclosure effects in 
deciding to merge, a negative externality results. Clearly, inefficient foreclosure 
may therefore occur.
However, foreclosure need not always be inefficient. A move from double 
sourcing at the mid-point of the unit line to integrated single-product retailing at 
the end-point involves a saving on transport costs. This efficiency gain 
counteracts the loss of multi-product surplus. Any anti-competitive conclusion 
deduced from foreclosure therefore depends delicately on the resolution of the 
trade-off between these opposing forces.
In the context of our model, when multi-product retailing is optimal wherever the 
retailer locates, the lock-in threat will not materialise. Consequently, the retailer 
is indifferent to location in these circumstances. Integration may still take place, 
if it results in a different retailer location decision. Efficiency implications then 
depend solely on the structure of transport costs. Privately attractive but 
inefficient integration may occur.
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Our results also hold for a simple re-interpretation of the model, where a 
monopoly manufacturer must decide to supply one or two retailers. The potential 
anti-competitive effects of integration can then be viewed as impacting on 
consumers. In this alternative context, upstream capacity constraints are 
important for our results to hold. The analogue of single product purchasing is 
then single retailer supply, thereby creating a retailing monopoly. Again, vertical 
integration may bring about such an exclusive dealing arrangement, where 
standard contractual mechanisms fail.
In a key development to our basic model we introduce a second downstream 
retailer. This allows us to consider final market competition and its endogenous 
relationship with vertical integration. We will demonstrate that competition 
considerations may drive the integration process, which will in turn affect the 
competitive environment (via location choice). Such interactions can generate 
partially integrated equilibria, where integrated and non-integrated firms co-exist, 
and chains of integration, where the integration decisions of individual firms are 
driven by industry-wide merger activity.
The new force driving vertical integration is a desire to alleviate the pressures of 
downstream competition. One obvious strategic response is product differentiation 
(see e.g. Porter (1980) for a detailed discussion). In the context of our model, a 
natural means of achieving this is for the retailers to locate at opposite ends of 
the unit line. Making idiosyncratic, supplier specific investments enables retailers 
to enhance their "uniqueness".
Of course, non-integrated, independent retailers will be reluctant to invest in 
supplier-specific technology. Instead, they are likely to locate together, at the 
centre of the unit line - avoiding lock-in to either manufacturer, but intensifying 
downstream competition. Vertical integration of retailer and supplier, by 
eliminating lock-in concerns, provides a mechanism for encouraging competition- 
reducing differentiation. The potential anti-competitive effects of vertical 
integration are then clear-cut. Retailers can locate at the ends of the line without 
fear of hold-up. Furthermore, close location ties between manufacturing and
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retailing stages are generated. Such vertical linkages are often cited as a source 
of advantage to firms in competitive environments. Against these benefits will be 
set the inevitable costs of integration.
In his seminal analysis of the emergence of big business in the United States, 
Alfred Chandler has emphasised the importance of the vertical dimension in firm 
organisation (see e.g. Chandler (1959) and (1977)). He stresses the growing 
value of integrated production and distribution as specialised, idiosyncratic 
marketing services were required by manufacturers - for instance, with sewing 
machines (Singer) and advanced agricultural machinery (McCormick). Chandler 
highlights the scale effect of market expansion, through urban growth and the 
emergence of the railway network, as the driving force in encouraging integrated 
coordination. However, with an improved transport infrastructure, the growth in 
competitive pressure was a vital factor too. Indeed, the value to producers of 
product differentiation, effected through vertical integration into marketing, was 
increasingly recognised as a fruitful response to tougher competition in consumer 
goods industries (Chandler (1959), p. 11-12).
In our extended model, we find that competition considerations may result in 
integration where it would otherwise not take place. Partial integration is the 
industry equilibrium response to moderate levels of competition. Integration by a 
subset of retailers is then sufficient to ease competitive pressures. Other firms 
can benefit, without incurring the additional costs of merger. However, as 
competition intensifies, a differentiation strategy may only succeed if ail retailers 
participate, implicitly coordinating their actions. Individual integration decisions will 
then only be taken in response to (or in anticipation of) wider merger activity. 
Such chains of integration generate a fully vertically integrated industry.
Our basic model framework is set out in the next section. This is followed by a 
numerical example that highlights some of the main issues raised in the paper. 
Our formal analysis is presented in Section 3.3. In Section 3.4 we briefly outline 
two simple variations to the basic model. The basic framework is extended in 
Section 3.5 to consider the impact of final market competition.
122
3.2 The Basic Model
The basic model involves three interacting firms. A downstream retailer D can 
stock the products of two potential suppliers, U1 and U2. The upstream firms 
produce differentiated products, represented by their (fixed) locations at the ends 
of a unit line. U1 is located at 0, U2 at 1. D however can choose its location, I. 
For simplicity we allow it to locate at 0 or 1/2. Model symmetry allows us to 
ignore the possibility of location at 1. If D chooses l=0 its assets are tailored to 
U1 supply while a mid-point location (1=1/2) indicates investment in general 
technology.
In purchasing product from upstream firms, D must decide whether to source 
from a single firm, or both firms. In making its decision the retailer will be 
influenced by the values of stocking a unique product line (m) relative to that of 
stocking product from both upstream firms (2d, or d per product line). We will 
assume that m > d. Note, however, that either multi-product or single product 
retailing may generate greater overall value.
Product must be transported from the upstream supplier to the retailer. The cost 
of transporting product from U1 is denoted by t1 while the transport cost for U2's 
product is t2. The magnitudes of these transport costs will depend on D's 
location. We will assume here that the total transport cost is independent of the 
volume stocked from a given supplier (but see Section 5(i)). This cost can 
therefore be thought of as the set-up cost of stocking a particular product line.
The cost of transporting supplies over half the unit line is given by I ,  while the 
transportation cost from end to end is t, where t > I .  No transport cost is incurred 
if retailer and supplier locate together. For example, if D locates at 0 no costs are 
incurred in purchasing product from U1, but purchasing product from U2 involves 
a transport cost t. We will assume that d > t, ensuring that both upstream firms 
will always be active in the supply market, irrespective of downstream firm 
location. Any additional downstream costs are embedded in the product values, 
m and d.
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For simplicity, we will suppose that D buys product sequentially, in two batches. 
D receives sealed bids from both upstream firms to supply each batch. It must 
then make simple accept/reject decisions. Given a first batch sourcing decision, 
the retailer must then decide whether to stock a single product line, by 
purchasing the second batch from the same supplier, or to opt for double 
sourcing by purchasing the second product batch from a new supplier. Bidding 
for the second batch takes place after the first supply contract has been awarded.
Ours is a world of incomplete contracts in which supply prices and allocations, 
as well as location choice, cannot be enforceably specified at T = 0. The idea 
here is that supply requirements are uncertain at T=0 and location (quality) can 
never be verified by an outside arbiter. Profit sharing agreements between 
independent firms cannot be implemented either.24 The only effective T=0 
contracts are those conferring asset ownership rights. Note that, in the absence 
of enforceable price or profit agreements, exclusive dealing contracts are never 
attractive to the retailer and will be ignored in our analysis.
We will consider the effects of vertical integration between the downstream firm 
and one of the upstream firms. Model symmetry allows us to restrict attention to 
the possibility of D-U1 integration only. Horizontal integration is not permitted, on 
anti-trust grounds. The integrated firm is assumed to maximise the joint profits of 
both its upstream and downstream divisions. A fixed cost E is incurred in 
undertaking a vertical merger. This is intended to broadly capture the legal, 
bureaucratic and incentive costs of integration. It is relatively simple to generate 
such a cost explicitly (e.g. as outlined in the model of Chapter 1), but for 
simplicity we do not do so here.
At T=1, uncertainty about supply needs is resolved and D decides on a location 
(to maximise profits). Supply are then purchased (T=2). After transporting 
supplies the final output is sold to consumers (T=3) and revenues are realised.
24 For a discussion of the profit sharing assumption, with and without 
integration, see Hart and Tirole (1990).
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3.3 Analysis
As a benchmark for our analysis we will first consider efficiency. We assume that 
the monopoly downstream firm is able to extract all consumer surplus. In 
considering efficiency we can therefore restrict attention to the combined profits 
of the three firms. The efficiency of two decisions must be considered - the 
product sourcing decision and the downstream firm's location choice.
At each location there is a supply choice. Product can be sourced from U1 alone, 
yielding value m-t1. Alternatively, product can be sourced from both upstream 
firms, generating an overall profit of 2d-t1-t2. Note that our assumptions 
(innocuously) rule out single sourcing from U2 since t1 < t2.
For a given location, efficient sourcing implies combined profits of n*, where: 
rr = max[m-t1, 2d-t1-t2]
The efficient choice of D's location, either at 0 or 1/2, must also be considered. 
We first derive the efficient supply allocation for a given location, and then 
determine the efficient location.25
Proposition 3.1 [Efficiency]
(a) For a given location, efficiency implies:
U1 supplies both batches if t2 > 2d-m 
U1 and U2 supply one batch each if t2 < 2d-m
(b) The efficient location choice is given by:
l=0 if 2(d - 1) < max[m, 2d-t]
1=1/2 if 2(d - 1) > max[m, 2d-t]
Proof:
(a) Our assumption that t1 < t2 guarantees that it always optimal to source at 
least one unit from U1. If t2 > 2d - m the value of sourcing both units from U1 (m- 
t1) exceeds that of double sourcing (2d-t1-t2). Clearly if t2 < 2d - m the reverse
25 To ease notation we will drop the location argument, I.
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is true.
(b) If 1=0 the transport costs for U1 supply are 0, and for U2 supply are t. Thus 
efficient profits are max[m, 2d-t]. Similarly when 1=1/2 both Us have transport 
costs I  so efficient profits are max[m-I, 2(d-I)]. The efficient location choice is 
then determined by which of these expressions is the larger. Since m > m -I 
locating at 1/2 is only efficient if 2(d-I) > max[m, 2d-t]. QED.
Stocking both products as opposed to one involves an additional transport cost 
(t2). Double sourcing is optimal only if the added value of multi-product retailing 
exceeds this cost. If 2d-m < 0, then stocking a single product is a fortiori optimal.
It is important to recognise that, because of changes in transport costs, the 
efficient sourcing decision may (but need not) depend on location choice. If 2d-m 
> t both products will always be stocked, irrespective of D's location. Transport 
cost considerations alone then determine the optimal location - two costs of I ,  for 
1=1/2, being compared with one cost of t for l=0. If 21 > t an end-of-line location 
is optimal, even if product is sourced from both upstream firms. Clearly, when 
single sourcing is optimal D should always locate at 1=0. Stated differently, 
location at 1/2 is efficient only if multi-product sourcing is efficient.
Finally, note that if I  < 2d-m < t a change in D's location choice from 1=1/2 to l=0 
will result in an efficient switch from double to single sourcing. Choosing l=0 will 
then be efficient, if the transport cost savings (21) exceed the loss of the 
incremental value of multi-product retailing (2d-m).
Integration incurs additional costs E and no benefits, fora given location choice. 
From a first best perspective, integration is therefore never desirable. However, 
where D's self-interest drives its location decision, integration alone may bring 
about efficient location choice - as we will see below.
The integration and location decisions made in equilibrium will depend on the 
overall magnitude of profits and their division among firms. Competition between 
suppliers clearly plays a critical role. The following result summarises the
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outcome of supply competition, for given location.
Lemma 3.1 [Supplier Competition]
(a) Sourcing decisions are always efficient given location.
(b) U1 always supplies the first unit, for a price 2d-m-t1
(c) The second unit is supplied by:
U1 if 2d-m-t2 < 0 
U2 if 2d-m-t2 > 0 
The price paid is 12d-m-t21
(d) In the non-integrated case profits are given by:
nD = m-d + min[m-d, d-t2]
= max[2d-m-t1, t2-t1] 
nU2 = max[2d-m-t2, 0]
In the integrated case profits are given by: 
r V o  = m-t1 -E
nU2 = max[2d-m-t2, 0]
Proof: See Appendix.
The basis for the above results is the fact that the upstream firm with the higher 
value supply can always undercut its rival, and will do so. The supply prices are 
determined by the value of D's best alternative i.e. by the second highest value 
supply option. If product is sourced from both Us, then D's outside option in 
negotiating with either supplier is single sourcing. The differential value added is
then m-(2d-t2). In our basic model this is independent of transport costs. The
supplier captures the residual value.
Where product is sourced from a single supplier (always U1 in our model) then 
D's outside option, and hence its total share of trade value, is m-t2. This is the 
value of exclusive sourcing from U2. The result is driven by the perfect foresight 
of suppliers during the supply process. In dealing with U1, D's threat point is U2 
supply. Such trade would yield D a payoff of d-t2 for a single unit, and m-t2 for 
two units. Clearly if one unit were to be bought from U2 then U1 could win the
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competition for the supply of the second unit by offering D a share m-d of trade, 
again yielding D an overall profit of m-t2.
Given that an identical supply competition is used when integration occurs, supply 
price and allocation are independent of this decision.26 Thus, for a particular 
location, integration does not alter trade returns (though integration costs E are 
incurred). The effects of integration must therefore arise from induced changes 
in D's location choice. It is to this issue that we now turn.
Lemma 3.2 [Location]
(a) Under non-integration D chooses location 1=1/2 if 2d-m < t and is indifferent 
about location otherwise.
(b) The integrated firm always locates at l=0.
Proof:
(a)Non-integration: D chooses location to maximise nD = m-d + min[m-d, d-t2]. 
Clearly locating at l=0, thus maximising d-t2 can never be strictly profitable. 
Indeed if m-d > d -I > d-t or d -I > m-d > d-t then D locates at 1=1/2 in maximising 
min[m-d, d-t2]. However if m-d < d-t < d -I then min[m-d, d-t2] = m-d, and 
location is irrelevant.
(b) Integration: D's location is now chosen to maximise = m-t1-E.
Clearly this entails minimising t1 i.e. choosing l=0 since t(0) = 0. QED.
In the non-integrated case D chooses its location to maximise downstream profits 
only. When product is sourced from both upstream firms, D's share of the profit 
on each supply contract is determined by the incremental outside option value of 
single sourcing - m-d. Since this value is independent of transport costs, location 
choice is irrelevant in this case. Where D opts for single sourcing (- always from 
U1 given our assumptions) its share of profits is m-t2 i.e. the value of the U2 
sourcing alternative. Clearly downstream profit maximisation then involves
26 We therefore concur with Bork when he states that "the real cost of any 
transfer from the manufacturing unit to the retailing unit includes the return that 
could have been made on a sale to an outsider". In our model the retailer will 
source internally only when this generates greater value than external supply.
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minimising the costs of U2 supply. D2 will therefore choose l=1/2.27 Though 1=1 
is not permitted in our model, symmetry and the adverse consequences of lock-in 
to U2 would render this option unattractive to D in any event.
In the integrated case, the effects of D's location choice on UTs profits are 
internalised. D will locate at 0. Lock-in to U1 is no longer a concern, simply 
involving a transfer between divisions of the integrated enterprise. Internal 
transport costs are then minimised. Note that since additional transport costs are 
not incurred on incremental product volume, the location decision is never driven 
by attempts to raise D's share the value of trade with non-integrated U2 (but see 
Section 5(i)).
Where the non-integrated D locates at 1/2, integration always brings about a 
change in location choice. However, in the case where the non-integrated D is 
indifferent about location no such prediction can be made.
Proposition 3.2 [Integration]
(a) U1 and D will integrate if this changes D's location choice and E < I .
(b) If E > I , D and U1 will never integrate.
Proof:
If integration does not result in a change in location, then the sole effect is to 
reduce the combined D-U1 profit by the merger cost, E.
If integration changes D's location choice (from 1=1/2 to l=0) then D-UTs gains 
are given by:
I W k O )  - n m(l=1/2) - n D1 (1=1/2) = m-E - m -I = i  - E
Then D and U1 have a strict incentive to integrate iff E < I . QED.
27 Note that, in our formulation, the non-integrated D is concerned only with 
its outside option. It considers the efficiency consequences of its actions for the 
second best supply value, not the value of realised supply. This is, of course, an 
extreme formulation. In general bargaining between the buyer and supplier will 
result in a sharing of the efficiency gains. Some of the externality effect observed 
in our model would then be internalised.
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Integration is attractive only if it will lead to a change in D's location decision, 
from 1=1/2 to l=0. The cost of internal supply is then reduced by t_. For integration 
to be worthwhile this cost saving must exceed the merger cost, E. Clearly if no 
change in location, and therefore no transport cost gain, is forthcoming, then 
integration will never proceed.
In making the integration decision, U1 and D consider their own future joint profits 
only. Integration may therefore impose a negative externality on the non- 
integrated upstream firm U2. There are two mechanisms by which this can occur.
First, consider the case where U2 always supplies one unit, irrespective of D's 
location. D's share of the gains from such trade, driven by its outside option, is 
then always m-d. The upstream firm collects the residual profit, 2d-m-t2, and 
therefore bears the full increase in transport costs (t - 1) if D changes its location 
decision from I = 1/2 to I = 0.
The transport costs induced by the integrated D's location decision can, in 
addition, affect supply patterns. In particular, D may utilise U2 as a source of 
supply when located at 1/2, but rely exclusively on U1 when l=0 is chosen. In this 
case, if integration induces a change in D's location decision, it will result in 
foreclosure of U2's sales.
From a first best perspective, integration is never efficient since it involves a 
merger cost E. However, recognising that integration may be necessary to induce 
efficient location choice, merger may improve equilibrium welfare. Clearly, when 
the non-integrated retailer makes an efficient location choice, integration can 
never be welfare-improving.
Proposition 3.3 [Welfare and Integration]
(i) If 2I-E  < 2d-m < t then any vertical integration that occurs will reduce welfare.
(ii) If 2I-E  < 2d-m and the retailer locates efficiently when indifferent, then any 
integration that takes place will reduce overall surplus
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Proof:
(i) The integrated retailer always locates at 0. From Proposition 1, integration only 
takes place if E < I  and the non-integrated retailer locates at 1/2.
21 - E < 2d-m => 21 - (2d-m) < E < I  => m-d < d-I.
Consequently the non-integrated firm double sources at 1/2.
Surplus from integration, and subsequent location at 0 = max[m, 2d-t] - E. 
Surplus from non-integration and location at 1/2 = 2(d-I).
Now 2d-m < t implies m > 2d-t therefore integration inefficient if:
2(d-I) > m - E 
i.e. if 2d-m > 21 - E.
(ii) Where double sourcing occurs irrespective of location then D is indifferent 
about location. If it then locates efficiently, integration (at cost E) must reduce 
surplus.
From (i) we know that, if 21 - E < 2d-m then double sourcing is optimal at 1/2 
and a switch to single sourcing at 0 is welfare reducing. QED.
When single sourcing is optimal at 0, the non-integrated retailer will locate at 1/2. 
Where this takes place, integration, in shifting location from 1/2 to 0, can only be 
inefficient if it affects U2's profits (i.e. it has externality effects). This will only be 
the case if double sourcing occurs at 1/2. A switch from double sourcing at 1/2 
to single sourcing at 0 generates a clear transport cost saving (21). However, a 
merger cost E is incurred, and the benefits of multi-product retailing (2d-m) are 
lost. Merger is inefficient if the costs outweigh the benefits.
Suppose that single sourcing is everywhere optimal. A non-integrated retailer will 
then always locate at 1/2, though location at 0 is efficient. Nevertheless, vertical 
integration that brings about a change in downstream location decision would not 
always increase welfare. To be specific, if E > I  merger costs exceed transport 
cost savings. Of course, where single sourcing is optimal irrespective of location, 
inefficient integration never takes place, since all welfare effects are internalised 
by D and U1.
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If double sourcing is optimal at every location the non-integrated retailer will be 
indifferent about location. The efficient location minimises overall transport costs. 
If 21 > t then location at 0 is efficient, while location at 1/2 is optimal if t > 21. 
Of course, if the indifferent retailer always chooses the efficient location then 
integration can generate no benefit, and involves an added cost E.
Our analysis has suggested that integration may well cause a switch from double 
to single sourcing. The market for U2's product is then effectively foreclosed. We 
will now address the question of whether such foreclosure is inefficient.
Proposition 3.4 [Foreclosure]
Conditional on integration:
(a) Foreclosure occurs if I  < 2d-m < t.
(b) This foreclosure is inefficient if 21 < 2d-m.
Proof:
(a) Under non-integration D is supplied by both U's if m-d < d - I .
When integrated D locates at 1=0 and is supplied by U1 only if m-d > d-t. 
Combining these conditions proves (a).
(b) Foreclosure yields overall profits m. Since the integrated firm locates at l=0 
there are no transport costs for D1. Therefore from the efficiency results above, 
this is inefficient if m < 2(d-I). Rearranging gives (b). QED.
Integration changes D's location decision from 1=1/2 to l=0. Foreclosure results 
if supply patterns are sensitive to location choice. This will be the case if double 
sourcing occurs at 1=1/2 i.e. m-d < d-I, while single sourcing is efficient for l=0
i.e. m-d > d-t. The benefits of multi-product retailing must therefore be sensitive 
to transport costs.
For a given location choice, the downstream firm's sourcing decision is always 
efficient. In considering the efficiency of foreclosure we therefore focus on the 
following question: Given that a change in location choice from 1=1/2 to l=0 will 
result in foreclosure of U2, does such a move maximise overall profits? Single
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sourcing at 0 involves no transport costs, while double sourcing at 1/2 incurs 
transport costs of 21. For foreclosure to be efficient, these cost savings must 
exceed the lost value of multi-product retailing - 2d-m.
Comparing Propositions 3.2 and 3.3 it is worth noting that the efficiency of 
integration does not hinge on foreclosure effects. Suppose double sourcing is 
optimal at all locations and the non-integrated retailer locates at 1/2. Integration 
then brings about a change in location, but no foreclosure. Depending on the 
structure of transport costs, this may or may not bring about efficient location. 
Note also that foreclosure-inducing integration can be efficient.
3.4 Variations and Extensions to the Basic Model
i) Unit transport costs
An obvious variation on our basic model is to impose a transport cost per batch 
supplied by upstream firms. This contrasts with the basic setup, where a single 
transport cost is incurred per product line.
D's profits in this case can be obtained by simple adaption of the basic model 
results. Where double sourcing occurs, D's outside option is the single sourcing 
alternative. Of course this option now involves an additional cost, since a 
transport cost is incurred on both batches. D is thus able to extract m-d-t2 from 
supplier U1 and m-d-t1 from supplier U2 (cf. basic model results). Downstream 
profits are therefore given by 2(m-d)-(t1+t2). Where D opts for single sourcing 
(from U1) the outside option of sourcing from U2 now has value m-2t2.
Now, when D finds double sourcing attractive at all locations, it is in general no 
longer indifferent about that location. To see this, note that D's profit is given by 
2(m-d)-(t1+t2). The retailer therefore aims to minimise t1+t2. Where t < 2t_ it is 
clear that D will prefer to choose 1=0. Though such a location increases D's lock- 
in to U1 (by reducing the value of the U2 single sourcing option by t - t_), this is 
offset by an increase of I  in D's outside option when dealing with U2.
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Conversely, when t > 21, D prefers to locate at 1/2. Only when t = 21 will D now 
be indifferent to location choice.
Where a location choice of 1=0 results from single sourcing, the non-integrated 
D will no longer always locate at 1=1/2. In particular, this may not be so when 
single sourcing is optimal at l=0, but double sourcing is optimal at 1=1/2. In the 
basic model, when such circumstances prevail, location at 1=1/2 dominates. The 
key to this is to note that where single sourcing prevails a mid-point location is 
clearly optimal. However, when double sourcing occurs the value of the single 
sourcing option is independent of location. On introducing a per batch transport 
cost, the single sourcing option for the second batch is now transport cost 
dependent. Location at 1=1/2 is no longer a dominant action for D.
When a per batch transport cost is incurred, this additional cost is always passed 
on to the downstream firm. Profits for the U-D1 combination are therefore given 
by:
^ d -u i  =  r n _2 t1
Where integration affects the location decision, it will therefore be optimal in a 
wider range of circumstances i.e. integration will now occur when a change in 
location is induced and E < 21 .
Note that this profit expression holds irrespective of which supplier D trades with. 
Where integrated D trades with U2 there is an additional incentive to locate at 
1=0. The reduction in the transport costs of internal supply (by U1) is of value not 
only when internal sourcing actually occurs, but also when supplies are sourced 
externally from U2. In such cases, by raising the value of D's (internal) outside 
option, locating at l=0 increases D's share of external trade profits.28 Note that 
this effect is absent in our basic model above since there the value of a second 
unit of supply from a given supplier is not affected by additional transport costs, 
and hence by location choice.
28 This effect is the driving force behind some of the results in Bolton and 
Whinston (1990). See, for example, their Proposition 4.1.
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ii) Upstream monopoly
A simple re-interpretation of the basic model allows us to consider a scenario 
where a monopoly upstream firm supplies competing downstream firms. The 
results derived above hold for this case too. However it is then vital that the 
single supplier is capacity constrained. A downstream firm, by securing all 
upstream output, can then be sure that it monopolises the downstream market. 
Of course, to achieve this a downstream firm must outbid its rival for all supply 
capacity. Thus a downstream firm may (inefficiently) purchase all upstream 
capacity to secure downstream monopoly, even though a single unit is sufficient 
for its production needs.
In the absence of such capacity constraints (and given the impossibility of 
exclusive dealing contracts) the upstream supplier cannot guarantee either 
downstream firm a monopoly position. Indeed the supplier would always have an 
incentive, having supplied one retailer on monopoly terms, to proceed to supply 
the other firm. Foreseeing this outcome, competition for supplies disappears, and 
with it so does supplier profit.
This effect is precisely that highlighted by Hart and Tirole (1990) in their first 
model (Ex Post Monopolization). A non-integrated upstream firm, with unlimited 
capacity can never commit to supplying a single downstream firm. Monopoly 
profits are fully dissipated. Hart and Tirole show that, in this context, integration 
will eliminate upstream incentives to oversupply the downstream market. Where 
downstream monopoly is attractive, the integrated upstream supplier has every 
incentive to confer that monopoly power on its own downstream subsidiary.
In our model, by contrast, it is the downstream firm that is the monopolist. Since 
it is the residual claimant it will not purchase from both suppliers if single sourcing 
is optimal. The Hart-Tirole motive for integration is therefore absent in our basic 
model. Their effect would re-appear, however, if the retailer sold services to 
upstream manufacturers, but final sale revenues were earned directly by the 
upstream firms.
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3.5 Multiple Retailers
An important development of the basic model involves the introduction of an 
additional retailer. Only then can the possibility that both vertically integrated and 
non-integrated firms coexist in equilibrium be considered. We will show that such 
an industry structure can emerge, even though all downstream and all upstream 
firms are initially identical.
Secondly, we will be able to consider the endogenous relationship between 
downstream competition and vertical integration. A key concern in the anti-trust 
literature is whether vertical merger, that leaves horizontal concentration at both 
upstream and downstream levels unchanged, can adversely effect competition. 
In the context of a stylised model of such competition, we will show that 
downstream competition can indeed be weakened by integration. We will also 
explore the potential existence of chains of integration.
The two upstream firms, U1 and U2, are again located at the ends of the unit 
line. However, now two downstream firms, D1 and D2, can each locate at either 
end of the line or mid-way between the endpoints. We will permit vertical 
integration between U1 and D1, and between U2 and D2. U2 and D2's decision 
to integrate follows that by U1 and D1. Again a cost E is incurred in undertaking 
a merger. In evaluating the merits of integration, upstream-downstream pairs aim 
to maximise their combined profits.
Where a downstream firm is indifferent as to its supply source, we will assume 
that Di purchases from Ui. To simplify matters considerably we will also assume 
that there is no value to either downstream firm in multi-product supply i.e. d=0. 
In the absence of competition, each downstream firm will therefore extract surplus 
m from consumers.
Our stylised model of competition will take the following form. We will suppose 
that if downstream firms locate strictly closer than A apart, then competition
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reduces each firm's revenues by 0m.29 Allowing A to vary will enable us to 
analyse the impact of increasing downstream competition on integration 
decisions.
A = 0
In this case there is no competition between downstream firms, irrespective of 
their location decisions. In such circumstances non-integrated downstream firms 
always locate at 1/2 (see Figure 3.1 (i)). In doing so, they maximise their outside 
options and hence minimise lock-in to either upstream supplier. An integrated 
downstream firm will locate next to its upstream partner, at the appropriate end 
of the line (Figure 3.1 (iii)). Integration removes lock-in worries and firms will then 
seek to eliminate inefficient transport costs. In the absence of competition, joint 
retailer-supplier profits are independent of industry-wide integration and location 
decisions. Partial Integration will therefore never be observed.
Profits for U-D pairs (A = 0):
Non-Integration = m - 1
Full Integration = m - E
Clearly integration is attractive if and only if the transport cost savings outweigh 
the fixed cost of integration i.e. E < I .
29 Note, in particular, that this competition effect is assumed independent of 
the levels of retailers' transport costs. This is natural in our setting, since 
transport costs are fixed not (per unit) variable costs. Our analysis of the 
competition effects of integration will therefore focus on location effects. In 
general, integration would also lead to changes in variable costs that will impact 
on competition. The costly merger process could then be seen (partly) as an 
investment in variable cost reduction. Numerous authors (e.g. Bonanno and 
Vickers (1988), Fershtman and Judd (1987)) have shown that the strategic effects 
of integration on rivals' behaviour may outweigh the direct cost benefits, rendering 
vertical integration unattractive. Vertical separation may then be the optimal 
response to tougher competition.
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0 < A < 1/2
With A > 0 the possibility of downstream competition emerges. In this case, if 
downstream firms locate together then competition reduces their revenues by 0m. 
On the other hand, if downstream firms locate at least a 1/2 unit apart, 
competition is avoided.
In the non-integrated case there are now two opposing forces at work. A desire 
to avoid lock-in to either upstream supplier drives both downstream firms towards 
location at 1/2. However, countering this, the prospect of competition encourages 
those downstream firms to locate apart. Below, we derive the condition for the 
lock-in effect to dominate.
Lemma 3.3 [Non-integrated Location Choice]
If 0m < t - 1 then non-integrated downstream firms locate at 1/2.
Proof:
Locating at 1/2 is a dominant strategy for each non-integrated downstream firm. 
Suppose first that Dj locates at 1.
Di's profits as a function of location are then given by:
(1 -0)m - 1 at 1
m - 1 at 0
m - 1 at 1/2
Clearly locating at 1/2 maximises downstream profit.
Suppose now that Dj locates at 1/2 
Di's profits for each location are then: 
m - 1 at 1
m - 1 at 0
(1-0)m - 1 at 1/2
Profit is again maximised at 1/2, if (1-0)m - 1 > m-t i.e. if 0m < t - 1. QED.
Locating at one end of the unit line is bad for independent retailer profit, because 
it reduces the value of the second best sourcing option. Compared with a mid­
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point location, the transport cost incurred with this option increases from X to t. 
Offsetting this is the potential value of creating distance between retailers. We will 
assume that the lock-in effect always dominates.
Condition 3A: 0m < t - 1 .
Note that an integrated downstream firm will always locate next to its upstream 
subsidiary. Not only does this location decision minimise transport costs but in 
addition, by locating away from 1/2, the integrated retailer will avoid competition 
with any non-integrated downstream firm. Given Condition 3A, vertical integration 
will therefore always lead to a separating of retailers.30 With competition, the 
incentives to integrate are increased.
Profits for U-D pairs (0 < A < 1/2 ):
Non-Integration
Partial Integration (Dj-Uj integrated)
^ui-Di
Full Integration ny.D
= (1-0)m-I 
= m-E 
= m -I 
= m-E
When E > 6m + I  both upstream-downstream pairs will remain unintegrated, 
since the costs of integration then outweigh any competition and transport cost 
benefits. Conversely when E < I  both firms will integrate. However for 
intermediate E values, where I  < E < 0m + I ,  we will observe a partially 
integrated industry structure (see Figure 3.1 (ii)). Note that both firms would prefer 
that their rival integrated (and located at an end-point) alone. In this way they 
would benefit from reduced competition without bearing the necessary costs of 
integration. Since U1 and D1 have a first mover advantage they will remain
30 Dixit (1983) develops a model where the structure of vertical relationships 
may result in greater spatial separation of retailers. However, in his model, this 
increased separation of downstream firms is driven by reduced entry into the 
retail industry. Furthermore, Dixit focuses on a traditional analysis of the value of 
contractual vertical restraints (franchise fees, royalties, etc.), in comparison with 
full integration, to a monopoly supplier. Transaction cost aspects of integration 
are ignored.
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unintegrated, forcing U2 and D2 to incur the costs of merger.
From an overall producer perspective, individual incentives to integrate are too 
weak. As stated above, for E > 0m + 1 non-integration is the equilibrium industry 
structure. The costs of integration then exceed the competition and transport cost 
benefits of integration for the individual firm. However, in making their integration 
decision, a given manufacturer-retailer pair fail to internalise the competition 
benefits of merger to the rival retailer. Where 20m + i  > E > 0m + I ,  partial 
integration is optimal from an overall firm viewpoint, but will not be sustained in 
equilibrium.
The key observation from this section is the emergence of an asymmetric partially 
integrated industry structure for moderate competition, despite initially identical 
firms.
1/2 < A < 1
Competitive pressures in the downstream market are now strong, and profit 
reducing interaction occurs unless Ds locate at opposite ends of the unit line.
A fear of lock-in still attracts non-integrated downstream firms towards the mid­
point of the unit line. Countering this, the competition effect encourages these 
firms to locate at the end-points. Condition 3A again ensures that the lock-in 
threat dominates any competition effect encouraging firms to locate at the 
endpoints. Independent downstream firms will therefore always choose to locate 
at 1/2.
Integrated downstream firms locate next to their upstream partners. Again, such 
location avoids inefficient transport costs, and may eliminate downstream 
competition. The role of this competition effect may be crucial, and depends 
delicately on integration patterns in the industry as a whole.
To be precise, if firms Uj and Dj do not integrate, no competition benefits will 
follow from integration of Ui and Di. Even if Di integrates with Ui and locates at
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0, competition between downstream firms will not be eliminated, since non- 
integrated Dj continues to locate at 1/2 (and A > 1/2 !). However, if Uj and Dj are 
integrated, and Dj locates at 1, then integration of Ui and Di (in shifting Di's
location from 1=1/2 to l=0) brings about the elimination of downstream
competition. The delicacy of this competition effect prevents a partially integrated 
industry structure from emerging, as the following profit results make clear.
Profits for U-D pairs (1/2 < A < 1):
Non-Integration: = (1-0)m-t_
Partial Integration (by Dj-Uj): n UH)j = (1-0)m-E
Hui-Di = (1-6)m-t 
Full integration: = m-E
It should be clear that with tough competition the partial integration structure will 
never emerge in equilibrium. Integration by one upstream-downstream pair alone 
cannot reduce competition. For E < 0m+I both U-D pairs will integrate, while for 
E > 0m+I both firms will remain unintegrated.
Note that for intermediate E, where I  < E < 0m + 1, U1 and D1 only integrate in 
anticipation of merger by U2 and D2. Likewise, U2 and D2 will only integrate in 
response to D1-U1 merger. Chains of integration are therefore observed.
These competition results are summarised below.
Proposition 3.4 [Competition and Integration]
For I  < E < 0m + I ,  the competitive environment plays a critical role in 
determining industry structure:
(i) In the absence of competitive forces (A = 0), both downstream firms will be 
non-integrated.
(ii) Moderate competitive pressure (0 < A < 1/2) generates partially integrated 
outcomes i.e. vertically integrated and non-integrated firms co-exist.
(iii) A fully vertically integrated industry emerges when downstream competitive 
pressures are intense (1/2 < A < 1). Furthermore, a chain of integration is observed.
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In our analysis of the basic model (with monopoly D) it was assumed that the 
downstream firm was able to extract all consumer surplus generated by product 
sales. This allowed us to focus on (upstream and downstream) producer surplus 
alone in assessing efficiency. However, once competition between downstream 
firms is permitted, explicit consideration of consumers is illuminating. In particular, 
it seems reasonable to suppose that at least a fraction of the downstream profit 
dissipated through competition is passed on to consumers. Of course, it could be 
argued that this profit is in fact expended on (wasteful and unsuccessful) attempts 
to regain full market power. However, here we will assume that all revenues lost 
by firms as a result of the competitive process accrue to consumers.
Once competition between downstream firms is initiated, we have seen that for 
a range of merger costs E, integration takes place solely because this results in 
a reduction in that competition. When I  < E < 0m + I ,  integration occurs even 
though merger costs exceed the transport cost savings that result. In effect, the 
integrating firms in the industry are undertaking costly merger simply to avoid 
making transfers to consumers. Clearly, integration in such circumstances will be 
inefficient.
It should be pointed out that our analysis has been based on the assumption that 
consumers derive no added value from retailer separation. In general, consumers 
may benefit from the greater variety offered by integration-induced retailer 
differentiation. Such considerations would obviously affect our view of the 
efficiency implications of integration.
Finally, note that to simplify our analysis in this section, we have only considered 
single product firms. Given our basic assumptions, this rules out foreclosure 
effects. However, the changes in downstream location patterns induced by 
integration suggest that foreclosure effects would be restored in a richer model. 
Furthermore, in a multi-product setting, retailers' product portfolio choices may 
affect the intensity of inter-firm competition. This may further encourage additional 
integration-induced foreclosure.
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3.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we have modelled a retailer's choices between two rival suppliers 
and between single-product and multi-product retailing. An investment specificity 
decision must also be taken - in the form of a discrete location choice. Vertical 
integration may encourage supplier-specific location, where an independent 
retailer would choose general investment. Indeed, costly merger will only take 
place if a change in the retailer's location decision is induced.
When single product retailing dominates, an independent retailer will always 
choose a general location, thus minimising lock-in to a given supplier. However, 
in precisely these circumstances a supplier-specific location is efficient. Vertical 
merger may then be attractive, eliminating lock-in concerns and encouraging 
specific investment. Of course, such integration will occur only if the benefits of 
appropriate investment outweigh the (exogenously given) costs of merger. 
Whenever bilaterally attractive merger occurs, it will be efficient in this case.
Retailer supply patterns may be sensitive to the location decision. Integration can 
therefore result in foreclosure of the non-integrated supplier. Whether this 
foreclosure is efficient or not depends delicately on the inter-relationship between 
the relative merits of specific versus general investment, and single versus 
multiproduct retailing. In the context of this simple model we explore the 
interaction between efficiency and anti-competitive motives for vertical integration.
The basic model was extended to consider the impact of vertical integration on 
competition between retailers. Such competition may motivate otherwise 
unattractive merger. Integration, in encouraging supplier-specific investment, 
allows retailers to adopt competition-reducing product differentiation strategies. 
For moderate levels of competition, a partially integrated industry structure then 
results, as integration by a subset of firms is sufficient to reduce rivalrous 
interaction. With tougher competition, a coordinated integration process is 
essential. In this case, a fully vertically integrated industry results. The integration 
process then displays the characteristics of an integration chain.
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Figure 3.1
(i) Non-Integration 
U1 U2
D1 D2
(ii) Partial Intagration 
(U1-D1 integrated)
U1 U2
I
D1 D2
(iii) Full Integration 
U1 U2
: ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------:
D1 D2
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Appendix 3
Here we derive the results of the auction process, proving Lemma 3.1. 
Non-integration
If unit 1 from U1: value if both units from 1)1 = m
value if unit 2 from U2 = 2d-t2 
winning supply price = 12d-t2-m | .
If unit 1 from U2: value of unit 2 from D1 = 2d-t1
value of both units from D2 = m 
winning supply price = 12d-t1 -m | .
If U1 offers unit 1 for p1 and wins it gains: p^  + max[0,m-2d+t2]
If U1 does not bid for the unit 1 contract it gains: max[0,2d-m-t1].
Indifference implies p1max = max[0,m-2d+t1] - max[0,2d-m-t2].
If U2 supplies unit 1 at price p2 it gains: p2 + max[0,m-2d+t1]
If U2 loses the unit 1 contract it gains: max[0,2d-m-t2].
Indifference implies p2max = max[0,m-2d+t2] - max[0,2d-m-t1].
D will accept a bid that yields maximum two period gains. Here this implies D 
gains n D, where:
n D= min [d-t2-p2max + min(d-t1,m-d) , d-t1-p1max + min(d-t2,m-d)].
Let M = [d -t l-p ^ a x  + min(d-t2,m-d)] - [d-t2-p2max + min(d-t1,m-d)].
Substituting in the expressions for p1 and p2:
M = (m-t1) - max[0, 2d-m-t1] - (m-t2) + max[0, 2d-m-t2]
If M>0 U1 wins the unit 1 supply contract.
If M<0 U2 supplies unit 1.
(Rembering that unit 1 from U1 in case of tie).
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Now M = [m-t1 - max(0,2d-m-t1)] - [m-t2 - max(0,2d-m-t2)]
Some simple algebra yields
M = [m-d + min(m-d,d-t1)] - [m-d + min(m-d,d-t2)]
By assumption t1 < t2, thus M > 0 and U1 always supplies unit 1.
Since M > 0, n D = m-d + min(m-d,d-t2).
Now, if D pays p* for unit 1 from U1 in equilibrium its profit is given by: 
n D = d-t1-p* + min[m-d, d-t2]
However, we know that n D = m-d + min[m-d, d-t2]
Consequently,
unit 1 price 2d-m-t1, and
unit 2 price = 12d-m-t21.
U1 supplies both units if d-t2 < m-d.
One unit is supplied by each U if d-t2 > m-d.
This is precisely the efficiency criterion, given location.
The payoffs are:
nD = m-d + min[m-d,d-t2] 
n yi = max[2d-m-t1, t2-t1] 
n u2 = max[0,2d-m-t2].
Vertical Integration (D-U1)
If we assume the same auction process then again input allocation will be 
efficient, given location. The profit of U2 remains the same, while the combined 
profits of U1 and D are reduced by integration costs E.
Payoffs:
nui-D =m-t1-E 
nu2 = max[0,2d-m-t2].
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Chapter 4
Incomplete Contracts, Vertical Integration
and
Product Market Competition 31
This chapter is based on joint work with Maija Halonen
4.1 Introduction
In recent years there has been renewed interest in the potential adverse effects 
of vertical merger. In particular attention has focused on the possibility that 
integration will result in the foreclosure of nonintegrated rivals i.e the restriction 
of buyers' access to suppliers or suppliers' access to buyers. Clearly an adequate 
response to such questions requires explicit consideration of the effects 
integration has on firm organisation, and of the relationship between firm 
organisation and the competitive environment within which that firm operates.
In this paper we will adopt an incomplete contracts, optimal control rights 
approach to integration. A number of recent papers, e.g. Grossman-Hart (1986) 
and Hart-Moore (1990), have emphasised the vital role played by the allocation 
of ownership rights in motivating investment by self-interested agents. The link 
between ownership structure and investment-driven value creation (cost 
reduction), is made explicit. A recent, related paper by Bolton and Whinston 
(1993) has highlighted the role integration may play in the reduction of rival 
product value and in foreclosure effects. However these papers do not address 
product market competition in any depth.
In contrast, a more traditional literature has explored the effect integration has on 
product market competition and on the possibility of foreclosure, e.g. 
Bonanno-Vickers (1988), Salinger (1988), Hart-Tirole (1990), 
Ordover-Saloner-Salop (1990). These papers relate changes in market cost 
structure (and hence firm performance) to integration decisions. Strategic motives 
for integration are emphasised. However the precise effects of integration often 
appear arbitrary and unclear. For instance, merger is often assumed to lead to 
profit sharing and the removal of all conflicts of interest within the integrated firm.
In this paper we examine the implications vertical integration decisions have for 
the supply relations and cost structure within an industry. A given allocation of 
ownership rights effectively constitutes a specialisation decision i.e. a group of 
assets can be assembled to concentrate on selling the final product, to specialise 
in input production or to combine both tasks. The effects of integration are
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explicitly related to the investment incentives of self-interested agents. Further, 
we will examine the effect of varying the degree of product market competition 
on industry structure. The paper is therefore an attempt to relate overall industry 
structure and competitive environment to firms' internal organisation decisions.
Following Grossman and Hart (1986) we will assume that ownership confers 
residual control rights. If an agent owns an asset then he/she makes the 
decisions regarding the use of that asset, except where such decision powers are 
granted to others through contractual agreements. In a complex world, where it 
may be difficult to verify or even write the clauses of a complete contract, the 
allocation of ownership rights will therefore be important.
In particular, it may be impossible to write workable contracts offering agents 
rewards conditional on complex asset enhancing investments being undertaken. 
In such circumstances, the only guarantee an agent has of receiving a share in 
the benefits created by such investment is through ownership of the relevant 
assets, and hence direct control over returns. Similarly, a buyer may be unable 
to negotiate enforceable contracts for the purchase of input supplies. For 
instance, it may be impossible or prohibitively expensive for a court to decide 
whether prescribed quality standards have been met in the event of a dispute.A 
buyer's incentives to undertake product development will therefore be diluted if 
the supplier can command a share of the benefits, via its control of input 
supplies. Much, of course, will depend on the degree of competition in the input 
supply market and the options available to the buyer. It may however prove 
optimal, if product development is crucial, to allocate ownership of input 
production facilities to the buyer.
From the above we see that a fragmented ownership structure will lead to some 
investment, and hence reasonable performance, at each stage in the production 
chain. In contrast, concentrating ownership in the hands of a particular agent will 
guarantee strong investment by that agent, but will also create a class of 
non-owning workers with weak effort incentives. The optimal allocation of 
ownership rights will depend on the effectiveness of investment at various stages
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of production, and the value of specialisation.
Obviously, the nature of the competitive environment will play a key role in 
determining firm structure. On the one hand, the optimal response to vigorous 
competition at a particular stage in production may involve a focus at that stage, 
encouraging significant investment and strong performance. On the other hand, 
it may be preferable to concentrate activity (through an appropriate allocation of 
asset ownership rights) where competition is weak, thereby generating improved 
profit opportunities. These opposing forces are central to the ownership allocation 
decision in this paper.
The following example illustrates the main effects at work in the model. Consider 
a two stage production process. At the first (upstream) stage, a simple widget is 
produced. This widget is a key component in the second stage (downstream) 
production of a sophisticated gadget. Associated with widget production is an 
engineer who can improve the component's value by overhauling manufacturing 
equipment. Similarly, a designer working on the gadget can increase its value 
considerably.
Suppose that initially ownership of both upstream and downstream assets is 
allocated to the designer. Given his control rights, the designer can develop 
gadgets without the need to negotiate with outside parties. He will therefore have 
every incentive to devote time and effort to producing a quality product, since all 
benefits are retained. Clearly, if the designer could contract with the engineer for 
maintenance services then he would do so, since improved widgets would add 
value to gadget manufacture, generating potential gains for both parties. 
However, if enforceable agreements cannot be written, once the engineer has 
overhauled the widget machine she can be sacked, without compensation. 
Foreseeing this eventuality, the engineer will not exert any effort.
Of course, an obvious solution to the maintenance problem is to give the 
engineer the ownership rights to the widget machine. She would then have 
control of the production and sale of widgets (and therefore a share in the
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benefits of greater effort), creating improved incentives to overhaul the machine. 
However, if ownership rights are given to the engineer they must be taken away 
from the designer. He now has to negotiate with the engineer to acquire the 
widgets essential for gadget production. As a result, the benefits of better design 
(i.e. higher value gadgets) must be shared, since without engineer-controlled 
widget supplies, better designs are valueless. Consequently, the designer's 
incentives to innovate are dampened. The relative sizes of these effects 
determines which ownership structure dominates. If maintenance is largely 
cosmetic then we might expect the designer to retain all ownership rights. On the 
other hand, if effective maintenance is essential, ownership of the widget 
machine will be given to the engineer.
Now suppose that another integrated, gadget manufacturer starts producing in 
a different market. Though it can produce adequate widget substitutes in-house, 
it is keen to purchase the genuine, engineer-enhanced variety. The in-house 
facility will, however, provide useful bargaining power, since the integrated gadget 
manufacturer does not rely entirely on external widget purchases. Clearly the new 
widget sales will increase the value of a machine maintenance programme, and 
hence the benefits of engineer ownership and control of widget production. The 
dulled incentives of the designer may be offset by the added value of external 
sales.
But what if the new firm starts competing in the home market? Selling widgets 
to the rival allows it to focus on downstream production. In contrast, the home 
designer's incentives are dulled and he will suffer in a competitive market. If 
competition is weak then extra component sales will outweigh the adverse effects 
on the gadget market. However as competition gets tougher it may pay to 
concentrate on gadget design, by concentrating ownership of widget and gadget 
manufacturing assets with the designer. Of course, widget production will be 
affected, but the rival suffers from this too. In addition concentrating ownership 
gives the designer improved incentives to work hard on the downstream market. 
Finally, if competition on the downstream market gets really tough, then it offers 
little attraction for two gadget producers, since the fruitless fight for advantage will
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largely exhaust profits. It may then prove optimal for one of the firms to effectively 
withdraw from the final market and re-deploy its assets to concentrate on widget 
production.
The above example provides a flavour of our results. We are particularly 
interested in the relationship between industry ownership structure and two key 
parameters - the relative value of effort at the upstream and downstream 
production stages, and the degree of product market competition. Broadly we see 
greater upstream ownership of assets (nonintegration) the more valuable is the 
upstream worker's investment. Allocating ownership rights to ineffective upstream 
managers dilutes the effort incentives of downstream workers with little offsetting 
gain. If, on the other hand, upstream effort is reasonably effective then 
encouraging activity at both production stages is optimal.
We also observe a non-monotonic relationship between ownership structure and 
the toughness of competition, for a range of parameter values. With little or no 
competition, the value of improved input sales to outside buyers may outweigh 
the losses due to reduced downstream managerial effort, encouraging 
fragmented ownership. As competition increases however, the resulting weakness 
of the downstream production arm (combined with strengthened rival 
performance) encourages a more integrated (downstream controlled) ownership 
structure. When competition in the final good market is extremely strong, there 
is little reward for identical duopolists. In such a setting the optimal (fragmented) 
ownership structure effectively encourages one firm to specialise in input 
production while the other dominates the final good market.
4.2 The Model
We consider an industry with two upstream assets, U1 and U2, and two 
downstream assets, D1 and D2. Input is produced upstream for use at the 
downstream, final production stage. The basic upstream and downstream 
production processes utilise costless, constant returns to scale technology.
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Each manufacturing unit is managed by a worker. Pre-production effort by the 
worker can increase the value of the unit's output. This effort can be thought of 
as improving the productive efficiency of physical assets. The manager of Di 
chooses the value added in final good production - Jj e [0,Jmax]. Similarly, the 
effort of upstream Urn's manager, Km e [0, Kmax], raises the value added at the 
input stage by Km/(j). Therefore <|) is a measure of the relative effectiveness of 
upstream effort. Suppose downstream firm i obtains input from upstream supplier 
m. The final product value is then the sum of the values added at each stage in 
production: = Jj + Km/(j) .
The cost of effort level X to a manager is c(X), where c' > 0 and c" >0. 
Assumption 4.1 : <J> > 1.
This assumption ensures that a given level of effort is more effective in increasing 
value when applied during final good production, rather than at the input 
manufacturing stage. We do not claim that this is in any way a general property. 
Rather, we limit our attention to <j> > 1 for simplicity - focusing on the attractions 
of backward integration.
Once they have expended effort in value-enhancing investment, the original 
workers can be replaced costlessly for the remaining stages of production. A 
qualified replacement manager can be hired from a competitive pool to supervise 
post-investment operations. Once effort has been applied, access to the firm's 
assets rather than continued employment of the original worker secures the 
benefits of improved performance. The key here is to note that managerial effort 
is directed at enhancing the quality of physical assets, rather than at developing 
human capital
Adopting an incomplete contracts framework, we assume that effort requirements 
are too complex to be described effectively in an ex ante contract. Consequently, 
effort levels are chosen non-cooperatively. It is for this reason that inefficiencies 
can arise and that the allocation of ownership rights matters in our model.
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Contractual incompleteness means that any effort compensation a manager 
receives must be offered after that effort has been undertaken. We also assume 
that it is very difficult to adequately describe the required input characteristics, 
ruling out anything but spot contracts for input trade. Effective profit sharing 
agreements cannot be enforced either.
Ex ante contracts can however be written on the allocation of ownership rights. 
Among the rights ownership confers is the power to hire and fire managers. The 
owner of an asset also has the rights to any residual profits generated by the 
asset. Ownership of assets Ui and Di is allocated between the initial managers 
of the upstream and downstream units, ui and di respectively. These managers 
allocate ownership rights to maximize joint ui-di profits, taking as given the 
ownership of assets Uj and Dj.
As a considerable simplification we will only consider two candidate industry 
configurations:
(i) Partial Integration (PI)
One set of assets (U2-D2) is owned by a downstream manager while the second 
set of assets (U1-D1) are owned separately, and
(ii) Integration (I)
Both sets of assets are owned by downstream managers.
Industry structure is therefore determined by U1 and D1's integration decision 
only. The restriction on the set of possible ownership structures partly reflects our 
emphasis on downstream effort incentives.
Ex post, uncertainty about the required characteristics of input is resolved and the 
owners of upstream and downstream assets negotiate spot contracts for the 
procurement of input. The contract will take the form of a two part tariff. Input will 
be exchanged at price zero, while the fixed fee negotiated will depend on the 
bargaining power of the parties. Bargaining over non-owning managers' effort 
compensation takes place ex post, after effort has been undertaken.
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Assumption 4.2: Internally sourced input can be utilised for internal production 
only.
This assumption is made for convenience. In a more complete model, that would 
endogenise firms' technology specificity choice, this assumption could be derived 
from first principles.
Ultimately, production of final good occurs and the downstream firms compete in 
the final market. There, an overall consumer population of 1 is assumed. 
Consumers' demands are driven by downstream product values, and the degree 
of market competition. The profits of downstream firm Di are given by: 
rcDi = n> (vi’ vp p)
where V; and Vj are final product values, and p is a measure of the degree of 
competition.
When p = 0 i.e. there is no competition, each downstream firm is a monopoly in 
its half of the market. Profit for Di then depends on the value of its own product 
only:
rcDi =  ^  (v i. Vjl 0) = v, / 2 
A number of additional assuptions on the effects of competition are also made:
Assumption 4.3: For p > 0:
d2K: d2K;
< 0
dvf dv ,dv t
Assumption 4.4\ p < pmax, where 7i;i(Jmax, Jmax; pmax) - c(Jmax) = 0 
This assumption ensures that, by making the maximum investment, integrated 
downstream firms can always guarantee non-negative profits whatever the 
competitive environment. A duopolistic industry is therefore guaranteed when 
both D1 and D2 are integrated.
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Assumption 4.5\ For V; < Vj :
< 0 and > 0
3p 3Vj 3p
Increased competition always reduces the profit of the downstream firm with the 
lower value product. Furthermore, the investment incentives of the (weakly) 
superiof firm are increasing in the tougness of the competitive environment.
To produce the final product, downstream firms require supplies of input. An 
integrated firm can source input either internally, or from any independent 
upstream firm. Assumption 4.2 restricts non-integrated downstream firms to 
seeking input from independent upstream firms. Control of this essential input 
supply gives upstream owners some negotiating power in dealing with 
downstream firms. We will assume a specific bargaining structure.
If Di can be supplied with input by a non-integrated upstream firm Uk only, an 
even split of the gains from trade between the two parties will result:
where di and uk are the owner-managers of Di and Uk respectively.
If Di is supplied with input internally, control of the supply unit guarantees the 
downstream owner-manager 100% of downstream profits:
d/s payoff: n /y .u ip )
Any investment by a non-owning upstream manager is, of course, sunk when 
input trade takes place.
Finally, when a downstream firm Di can obtain input either internally or from an 
independent supplier Uk, but in equilibrium is supplied by the latter, then the
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allocation of payoffs is given by:
r .u  n i(v,<vr P) +di's payoff: 
uk's payoff: - » , ( ^ iP )
where v, is the value of Di's product if the internal supply option is realised.
The gains from external over internal input supply are then shared by the 
downstream firm and the independent upstream supplier. The idea here is that, 
while negotiations with the independent supplier are incomplete, the integrated 
downstream firm can always make use of its own (inferior) input production 
facility. Clearly, whenever the internal option is chosen, Di retains all profit.
Note that all actions are observable to managers. Upstream and downstream 
managers' effort decisions are made simultaneously, after asset ownership has 
been determined. Bargaining over input procurement and effort compensation 
occurs under symmetric information: effort levels are observable, but not 
verifiable. Finally, downstream managers know the extent of their rival's input 
purchases when setting final good prices
4.4 Manager Payoffs and Effort Incentives 
i) Preliminaries
Before addressing the issue of managerial investment incentives in detail, it will 
first be useful to consider the position of non-owning upstream workers. From our 
bargaining assumptions, it should be clear that only owner-managers will receive 
a return on effort investment. Consequently, no effort will be undertaken by non­
owning workers.
Lemma 4.1
Non-owning managers receive no compensation for effort. Consequently no effort 
will be undertaken by them.
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Since contracts contingent on effort cannot be written, managers can only be 
offered credible reward for effort after it has been undertaken. However, once 
effort has been undertaken, its value is sunk in the firm's assets, and the asset 
owner can reap full returns without further managerial involvement. Post­
investment, a manager can therefore be replaced at no cost. As a result, 
managers will not be rewarded for their effort, unless they are also asset owners. 
Foreseeing no reward, a non-owning manager will therefore make no investment 
in effort.
Since asset U2 is always downstream controlled, Lemma 4.1 implies K2 = 0. To 
ease notation we will therefore let K1 = K, from now on.
It follows naturally from Lemma 4.1 and our bargaining structure that if K > 0, the 
independent upstream supplier can always generate a return selling input to the 
integrated downstream firm. K > 0 ensures that the independent upstream firm's 
product will always be preferred to internal supply.
Lemma 4.2
In the non-integrated case, upstream firm U1 supplies both downstream firms 
with input, provided managerial effort K > 0.
Since there are no capacity constraints on output, and exclusive dealing contracts 
are not enforceable, an independent upstream firm cannot commit to serve one 
downstream firm only. Having dealt with one downstream firm on an exclusive 
basis, it then has every incentive to trade with the rival, since input is traded in 
spot exchanges before final good sales are realised. Foreseeing this, each 
downstream firm will negotiate the terms of its supply contract accordingly.
Assumption 4.2 ensures that under integration, both firms will source input 
internally.
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ii) Payoff Functions
We are now in a position to calculate the payoffs for owner-managers, under the 
two possible ownership regimes.32
Partial Integration (PI):
With a partially integrated industry structure there are three independent firms - 
the non-integrated upstream and downstream firms U1 and D1, owned by their 
respective managers, and the integrated downstream firm D2, owned by 
downstream manager d2. The payoffs for these owners are given by:
K-i(vv v2’P) W ^ I P )  lu .
nui = ---g  + ------------------ 2-----------------  ’
_ K ( v v vi,p) + 
nd2  ---------------- ----------------  CW2J
K Kwhere v1 = J1 + — , v2 = J2 + — and v2 = J2
$ $
Under the partial integration regime the independent upstream firm U1 receives 
half of D1 's profits. Since D1 has no alternative source of input, bargaining results 
in this 50:50 split. U1 also receives half of its contribution to the profits of the 
integrated downstream firm, D2. If D2 fails to come to an agreement with U1, it 
can source input from its own (inefficient) upstream plant. U1 and D2 therefore 
bargain over the incremental contribution of the superior input. As a result D2 
secures the full value of its internal supply option plus 50% of the incremental 
value of U1 input supply.
32 As explained, since non-owning managers do not invest, they are largely 
irrelevant to our analysis once ownership rights are allocated.
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Since contracts contingent on effort cannot be written, bargaining for input takes 
place after effort has been undertaken. Each party therefore bears the full cost 
of its own investment.
Integration (I):
In the integrated setting there are only two firms. Each downstream manager 
also controls an upstream plant. Payoffs for the owners are given by:
=Kl(Vi’Vi’P) ~C(Ji) / = 1 ’2 
where Vj = Jj.
With no independent upstream producers, each downstream firm must source its 
input needs internally.33 Given that non-owning upstream managers exert no 
effort, these inputs are of basic, unenhanced quality. However, the downstream 
owner-managers have costless access to input and as a result retain all final 
market revenues.
For the remainder of the analysis we will drop the arguments of the profit 
functions and let n-, = ^(v jf v  ^ p) and ft j = ^(Vj, v  ^ p).
iii) Incentives to invest
Competition
Each party's incentives to invest in effort are determined by their individual payoff 
functions. Where managers receive the full revenue increments generated by 
their effort, incentives are maximised. If the returns to investment are shared, 
incentives are diluted too. Effort levels are chosen such that, at the margin, the 
incremental cost of extra effort, borne solely by the investing manager, is equal 
to the incremental return to that manager. Below we list these relationships, for 
each ownership structure.
33 Assumption 4.2 rules out the possibility that both downstream firms utilise 
a common in-house production facility.
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Partial Integration (PI):
ui: ±  
2<t>
3tc1 07i1 dn2 dn2 dn2
+ _  + _ ^  + _ r  - _ 2
dvA dv2 3 ^  dv2 3 ^
= c '(K )
An increase in effort by u1 raises the value of the input used by D1 and D2, and 
hence the value of the final products. Since u1 must negotiate with each buyer, 
its contribution to profits will be shared 50:50 with the downstream firm. Greater 
effort by the upstream manager will enhance the value of D1's product, in turn 
tending to increase its revenues. However, improved input also benefits D1's 
rival on the downstream market, D2, creating a counteracting negative force on 
D1's profits. Clearly, the scale of this negative effect will depend on the degree 
of competition in the downstream market. If competition is weak then increases 
in the value of D2's product have very little effect on D1's profits, and vice versa. 
Conversely, if competition is strong the negative effects will be quite 
considerable. Similar forces are at work in the impact of increased upstream 
investment on D2's profits. However, were D2 to utilise its internal input source, 
greater u1 effort would have a purely negative effect - via tougher competition 
from an enhanced D1 product. Greater effort by u1 therefore weakens D2's 
internal sourcing option, thereby increasing u l's  share of actual trade profit.
d1: l ^ = c ' ( J , )2 9v, v
When d1 exerts greater effort, it increases its profits. Given the necessary 
bargaining for input, d1 receives half of the resulting profit increment, which it 
equates with the marginal cost of extra effort.
d2: -1 
2
3tc„ 3tc,
3v„ 3v„ = c'(J2)
By investing in more effort, d2 not only increases overall revenues, but also
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increases its share of these revenues (- by raising product value with internal 
supply, and hence increasing "stand-alone" profits). The overall and internal 
option profit effects each have a half weighting in determining d2's effort.
Let the efforts of u1, d1 and d2 in the partial integration case be denoted by KPI, 
JPI and JPI respectively.
Integration (I):
d i : ^5. =c'(J|) i = 1,2 
3v,
Under the integrated regime each downstream firm must source input internally. 
However, this ensures that each downstream manager keeps the full incremental 
value of extra effort.
We will denote d1 and d2's investments in the integrated case by Jj and J l2 
respectively.
Nash equilibrium in investments is determined by these first order conditions, 
under partial integration and integration. We will assume that all equilibria are 
locally stable. Our assumptions ensure that a unique equilibrium in investments 
exists for both structures.
From these effort equations, some of the trade-offs driving the choice of 
ownership structure are clear. Under the integrated regime, downstream 
managers keep all of the gains from extra effort, but lose out on the benefits of 
upstream investment. With a partially integrated industry structure, firms benefit 
from upstream investment in input value, but the incentives for effort by the 
downstream managers are diluted. Of course, the precise nature of these trade 
offs will depend on the relative values of upstream investment, and on the 
influence of competition on the downstream market. These factors will be 
considered further below. First however, we will examine investment incentives 
in the no competition case (i.e. p = 0) in more detail.
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No Competition
When there is no competition on the product market, the profits of each 
downstream firm are unaffected by the value of the rival's output. Market share 
for each firm is set at 1/2 and profits depend only on the own product value. As 
a result, the effort equations have a particularly simple form.
Partial integration (PI):
u1: 1
2(>
d1: 1
4
d2: 1
2
-  pi
= c'(J2PI)
U1 serves the whole market (=1) and the benefits (1/<j>) of each added unit of 
effort are shared 50:50 with the relevant downstream firm. D1 monopolises a 
market of 1/2 and receives half the increment to unit value its effort generates, 
the other half going to the input supplier. D2 also has a market of 1/2, but keeps 
the full value increment of its marginal effort, since it can realise all of this with 
internally sourced input. Each manager optimises by choosing effort such that 
their individual marginal return is equated to the marginal cost.
In the absence of strategic effects (p = 0), it is clear that D2's internal sourcing 
option ensures its manager undertakes greater effort than D1's owner-manager. 
The value, and therefore the level, of upstream effort is driven by the parameter 
<t> - the measure of the relative effectiveness of upstream investment. When $ is 
large an investment in upstream effort has little value. Consequently there is little 
return on such investments, and effort by a upstream owner-manager will be low. 
When ()> is small upstream effort is highly productive and large returns ensure 
high effort levels.
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Integration (I):
d1: — = c'(J,')
2
d2: l = c ' ( J 2')
2
With an integrated structure, the downstream managers (with market share of 
1/2) each receive the full benefit from increased effort, thus maximising their 
incentives to invest in such effort. Symmetry ensures that effort levels for both 
downstream managers are identical. Note that, for p = 0, d2's investment is 
identical under both industry ownership configurations.
Lemma 4.3
With no competition between downstream firms (p = 0) investment by the 
integrated firm owner (d2) is identical under integrated and partially integrated 
industry structures. This effort level is identical to that undertaken by both active 
managers in the integrated regime, but more than that of the owner-manager of 
a non-integrated downstream firm i.e.
J2PI = J2' = j ;  > J pl
We are now in a position to consider the equilibrium industry ownership structure.
4.5 Industry Ownership Structure
In the context of our simple model, the equilibrium industry ownership structure 
is determined by the integration decision of managers u1 and d1. If assets U1 
and D1 are jointly controlled the industry will consist solely of integrated firms. 
While if U1 and D1 are separately controlled the industry will be partially 
integrated, since by assumption assets U2 and D2 are always jointly owned. 
Ownership of assets U1 and D1 is allocated to maximise the combined profits of 
managers u1 and d1.
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Profits, for each ownership regime, are given below:
TCu1-d1 ~ 711 “  c(Ji)
r pl “ pli
p| Pl , 1^2 “  n 2 1 | Fix a *  pK
*ui-di = *1 +------- 2 * 1 ) " ^  ™
We are particularly interested in the dependence of industry structure on two key 
parameters - the effectiveness of upstream effort (§) and the degree of product 
market competition (p). The locus of points separating the Integrated and Partially 
Integrated regions of our parameter space is therefore the set of (<t>, p) 
combinations where u1-d1 profits under the two ownership structures are equal.
No Competition
We will begin by considering the case where p = 0 i.e. when there is no 
competition between the downstream firms. The industry ownership structure 
observed in equilibrium then depends on the value of the parameter <j).
Proposition 4.1
Suppose that p = 0 i.e. there is no competition between the downstream firms. 
Then there exists a $ such that for <j> > $ the industry will be integrated, while for 
§ < $ the industry will be partially integrated.
Proof:
The difference between u1 and d1 's joint profits under the integrated and partially 
integrated regimes is given by:
I PI
I PI r ^ 1  /  | K-i 1-^1 ~ / | P I \  3 K PI „ / i x p i \ i
^ui-di -nui-di = b r  “ h r  - c (Jl ) “ C(K )]2 2 4<J)
The individual, profit maximising, effort incentive equations of the previous section
If <|> =1:
I X  PI J  Pl J 1
i i _ - c ( K pl) = - L  - c ( J D  = - j  -  c(J,')
and as (j> -> oo;
Q K p|
-  c(KPI) —>0
4(|)
Hence for (J) =1: n i1<M - n „ J.d1 < 0, and for large enough <|>: - n „ J_d1 > 0.
By continuity, there is a <|) = $ such that: - n „ j.d1 = 0.
QED.
In considering the possible integration of assets U1 and D1, managers u1 and 
d1 face a simple trade-off. Concentrating ownership of both assets in the hands 
of the downstream manager ensures the best possible downstream effort 
incentives. Since full control of input supply is assured, the returns on effort 
investment are not shared with the upstream manager. Of course, the upstream 
manager - denied control of the upstream asset - will not exert any effort in this 
case. Furthermore, with integration, no input is sold to D2.
Effort will be undertaken by the upstream manager if he owns the input producing 
asset. Such input investment not only contributes to the value of D1's product, 
but in addition generates input sales to D2. Of course, upstream effort incentives 
are dampened by the need to share the benefits with downstream buyers. 
Similarly, the returns to effort by downstream manager d1 must now be shared 
with u1, who controls the supply of input. A dilution of downstream effort results 
from the separation of upstream and downstream asset ownership.
For low values of <|> the value of upstream investment is high. The benefits of 
some upstream effort then outweigh the effects of dilution on dTs investment 
incentives. Consequently, a non-integrated ownership structure is attractive. 
However, when (j) is high, encouraging upstream manager effort translates 
ineffectively into added input value. Separating ownership of upstream and
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downstream assets then buys a small upstream value contribution, at a relatively 
high cost in terms of diluted downstream incentives. For high values of the 
parameter (|>, ownership is best concentrated in the hands of the downstream 
manager.
When u1 and d1 make their integration decision, they consider their own 
combined profits only. Yet that integration decision has important implications for 
D2, even when there is no competition between downstream firms. Integration 
effectively eliminates a valuable source of input. For D1, this is traded off against 
improved downstream managerial incentives. However, from D2's perspective, 
integration has an unquestionably negative impact. Only half of the extra 
revenues generated for D2 by an independent U1's superior input accrue to U1. 
In making their integration decision, u1 and d1 fail to take account of the other 
50% of these benefits, captured by D2. Integration thus imposes an externality 
on D2, through the foreclosure of its most attractive input source.
To maximise overall producer surplus, integration should only occur when the 
downstream incentive benefits for d1 outweigh the adverse effects of reduced 
upstream investment and lower value input for both downstream firms. Note that 
since our demand structure allows producers to capture all the surplus in the no 
competition setting, an undesirable ownership structure from a producer viewpoint 
is also inefficient in overall welfare terms. Proposition 4.2 formally summarises 
this.
Proposition 4.2
When there is no competition between downstream firms (p = 0), there exists a 
range of values of $ for which the equilibrium industry ownership structure does 
not maximise producer (and hence total) surplus. Within this parameter range, 
integration by U1 and D1 results in inefficient foreclosure of D2's optimal input 
source.
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Proof:
When p = 0, both downstream firms are monopolists. Consumer surplus is then 
zero, given our assumptions. Hence overall welfare is maximised when producer 
surplus is maximised.
By definition, at p = 0 and (j) = $: 7ii1.d1 = 7c „ J_d1.
From Lemma 4.3: Jg = J2 
Therefore:
J pi J 'PI u 2 ^ K r ' « / , P I \  2 / I l\ IKd2 ~ —— + ~ c ( j2 ) > —  c ( j2) - Kd2 
2 4$ 2
Hence at $ = $: tc^ + n pu J.d1 > k[2 + ^ , .d, .
Define $ = $ such that when p = 0 and $ =$ : npd2 + n  ^ J.d1 = 7td2 + .
By continuity, $ > $.
QED.
It may be worthwhile at this point to compare these results with those of Bolton 
and Whinston (1993). In their model, the analogue of the above scenario, where 
there is no competitive interaction at all between. downstream firms, is an 
environment with no supply constraints. In the absence of competitive interaction, 
the multilateral context effectively reduces to a pair of bilateral relationships, 
between the input supplier and each of the two downstream firms. Integration of 
the sole supplier with one of the downstream firms in the Bolton and Whinston 
model is then always privately attractive, and also improves social welfare. First 
best investment is ensured from the integrated downstream manager and, since 
there are no externality consequences, this has no adverse impact on the non- 
integrated downstream firm's investment.
In contrast, our model, generates externality effects to integration even where 
there are no competitive pressures. Vertical Integration of U1 with D1 eliminates 
D2's most efficient input supplier. However, since u1 captures only half these 
supply benefits, it does not take full account of the overall effect on D2 profit in 
making its integration decision.
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Furthermore, in the Bolton and Whinston model, even where supply is 
constrained, integration still generates first best if outside options do not bind. In 
this case, though both downstream firms are chasing a single unit of input, there 
is still no effective competition between them. The value of internal supply to the 
integrated input supplier does not then affect the terms of its negotiations with the 
non-integrated downstream firm, nor does it affect the supply decision. It should 
be noted, however, that for outside options never to bind, the Bolton-Whinston 
framework requires extreme assumptions on the correlation of downstream firms' 
values for input across states of the world.
Competition
As we increase the degree of competition between the downstream firms this 
general pattern will continue with the integrated structure being preferred by u1 
and d1 when is high and the non-integrated structure dominating when is low. 
However the value of (j) where the agents are indifferent between integration and 
non-integration will in general vary as the degree of competition is increased. It 
is to this relationship that we now turn.
We have already determined that when p = 0, u1 and d1 are indifferent between 
integrated and non-integrated structures when <!> = $. Which structure dominates, 
however, when we increase p i.e. we introduce product market competition?
It will be useful to begin by considering the relative attractions of integrated and 
non-integrated structures for managers u1 and d1, when competition is tough.
Lemma 4.4
There exists a p* such that for p > p* partial integration is preferable to non­
integration for all values of <|>.
Proof: See Appendix.
Tough competition results in considerable dissipation of profits under the 
symmetric structure, with both downstream firms owning and controlling input
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production facilities. Downstream managers undertake considerable investment 
in effort. However, since these investments are exactly equal, market shares 
remain at 1/2. Therefore, at high p almost all profits are dissipated under the 
symmetric industry structure. In contrast, a non-integrated U1 can always make 
positive profit as a supplier. Though separation of upstream and downstream 
assets may effectively eliminate D1 on the final good market, this is offset by the 
(admittedly small) supplier profits accruing to U1. For strong levels of competition, 
a non-integrated structure for U1 and D1 is therefore preferred. Rather than 
structuring ownership to encourage vigorous head to head competition in the 
downstream market (i.e. through integration), assets are more advantageously 
organised to extract maximum benefit from the U1-D2 buyer-supplier relationship.
We will now consider the other extreme, where competition is weak. It will first 
prove useful to compare downstream product values for p = 0 and <|> = $.
Lemma 4.5
At p = 0 and <|> = $, the following relationships between product values hold:
v2pl > v2PI = vl = v2 > v PI
Proof:
The equalities follow trivially from Lemma 4.3.
At p = 0 and <|> = $, 7illl1.d1 = n p j.d1 implies that:
-  C(JD * _ c(Kpl}
2 2 4$
But from Lemma 4.3:
1 I
_L -  c(J2) = —
2 2
pi
-  c ( j f i  + 3 K P4?
- c(Kpl)
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Re-arranging:
j f  - j,r K pl
$
PI
= 4 [A -  - c(JD]
4 4
+ 4 [ - t J - c ( K P1)]
2 $
PI
- c(J2PI)]
Now from the profit maximising effort conditions:
J PI J PI1 « / | P I \  U 2 /  ■ PK—— c(Ji ) > —— c(J2 )
4 4
and
Therefore
i pl i PI j .  ^ PlJ2 > Ji + —— 
QED.
Consider the set of parameter values such that there is no competition (p = 0) 
and u1 and d1 are indifferent between integration and separation (<J) = $) i.e. we 
are at the point in parameter space where the critical boundary between 
Integrated and Partially Integrated regimes cuts the (|> axis (see Figure 4.1). In the 
Integrated case downstream firms' products are identical, while under the Partially 
Integrated regime the value of D2's product (even when using internally sourced 
input) exceeds that of D1's product.
Therefore, when U1 and D1 are non-integrated we would expect D2 to 
increasingly dominate the market as competition gets tougher. On the other hand, 
when U1 and D1 are integrated the values of the two downstream products are 
identical and hence both firms will maintain a market of 1/2 (though increasing 
competition will reduce profits).
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When p = 0, = n I  Idi at <|> = $ (by definition). It is then simple to show that
when competition increases, the change in relative profits for the two structures 
is given by:
9[rc|ji-di -nfl-dil = , 9 ^  _ 9 ^ ' _ J_ . 9 ^ ' _ 9 iff _ 30? + 3 K P'
3p 9p 9p 2 3p 3p 4 3p 3p
The first two bracketed terms give the relative direct effects of a competition 
increase on u1 and d l's  combined profits in the integrated and non-integrated 
regimes. The first term is the differential direct effect on D1's profit. Lemma 5 has 
shown that, at p = 0, the value of D1's product is lower and that of the rival D2 
is higher under partial integration. We would therefore expect this effect to be 
positive, enhancing the attractiveness of the integrated structure.
The second bracketed term denotes the effect of competition on UTs share of 
D2's profit in the partially integrated case, where U1 supplies input to D2. If, as 
competitive pressures grow, U1's higher value input becomes increasingly 
important to D2's profit, then UTs share of that profit will also be enlarged. Of 
course, for every £1 added to D2 profit, bargaining limits UTs share to £0.5. This 
input sales effect may at least partially offset the direct competition effect on DTs 
profit. For every sale D2 captures from D1 as competition gets tougher, U1 will 
share some of the benefit.
The final term in the expression above captures the indirect investment effects 
of competition on non-integrated u1-d1 profits. As our investment incentive 
equations have shown, in the no competition case a fragmented ownership 
structure induces underinvestment by both u1 and d1, when seen from a 
combined u1 -d1 profit perspective. To the extent that competition encourages an 
escalation in effort investment, this will ameliorate the basic underinvestment 
effect.
In general it will not possible to sign the overall relative effect of an increase in 
the toughness of competition on integrated and non-integrated u1-d1 profits. Such 
an increase in competition can be viewed as reducing the prices sustainable by 
both downstream firms, for given structure (see e.g. Sutton (1991), p.9).
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However, the underlying forces inducing tougher price competition need not imply 
reduced overall industry profit. For instance, an increase in the substitutability of 
the rival products will in general lead not only to an increase in competitive 
interaction, but also to increased sales for the higher value product. If the latter 
expansion effect dominates the competition effect, overall profits will rise. 
Provided the non-integrated supplier U1 captures a sufficient share of D2's profit 
increase, overall u1-d1 profits may increase, though competition has become 
tougher. In general, both competition and expansion effects will coexist - see 
Shaked and Sutton (1990). This limitation accepted, we will attempt to illustrate 
the implications when the competition effect is dominant.
Lemma 4.6
Suppose that, for p = 0:
07li
3p
= f (Vi)
p =0
then
^ [7tu1-d1 ^u1-dl] > 0
p=0
This lemma takes the initial impact of competition as depending on the rival's 
product value alone. The idea here is that very weak competition will result in few 
consumers switching their demand to the rival's product. Instead, competitive 
pressure only impacts on the prices that the dominant firm in each half of the 
overall market can charge. This is a scenario where the pure competition effect 
outlined above dominates.
When U1 is independently controlled (non-integration), a valuable input source 
is created for D2. At <|> = $, Lemma 4.5 has shown that this results in a higher 
value D2 product and a lower value D1 product relative to the integrated case, 
where both downstream products have identical values. Given our assumptions,
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it is the former effect that matters when p = 0. The competitive impact of a higher 
value D2 product results in greater profit reduction for the non-integrated D1, 
when compared with that for the integrated case. Furthermore, U1's ability to 
extract a profit share from D2, as its input supplier, is unaffected by marginal 
increases in p from 0, since changes in v2 do not alter the effects of competition 
on D2 profit.
It will be useful to compare the effect of integration in our model with that in Hart 
and Tirole (1990). There, integration results in a change to the supply price faced 
by the non-integrated rival. Effectively, integration is undertaken to secure a 
commitment to higher supply prices for this downstream firm. In contrast, 
integration in our model eliminates supply of the rival entirely. Our explicit 
modelling of the relationship between ownership and investment incentives has 
shown that backward integration will reduce investment at the upstream stage, 
while increasing downstream investment. For the integrating parties a trade-off 
exists. However, integration is clearly disadvantageous for the non-integrated 
downstream firm. As competition begins, integration is therefore an increasingly 
attractive option for u1 and d1.
Taken together, the results of Lemma 4.4 (tough competition) and Lemma 4.6 
(weak competition) imply a non-monotonic relationship between the key 
parameters <t> and p, along the critical boundary between Integrated and Partially 
Integrated regions of our parameter space. This is summarised in the proposition 
below.
Proposition 4.3
If the conditions of Lemma 4.6 hold, then the relationship between equilibrium 
ownership structure and competition (p) may be non-monotonic. If $(p) denotes 
the locus of points in our parameter space where u1 and d1 are indifferent 
between full integration and non-integration, then $'(p) is negative for low values 
of p (weak competition), but positive for high levels of p (strong competition).
Proof: This follows directly from the results of Lemma 4.4 and Lemma 4.6.
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The result is illustrated in Figure 4.1. The critical level of <j) that separates the 
Integrated and Partially Integrated regions of our parameter space initially falls 
as p increases from 0 (since an integrated structure is increasingly attractive for 
U1 and D1). However, as competitive pressures rise further, a fragmented 
structure becomes more and more attractive. Eventually the Partially Integrated 
industry structure will dominate, and the critical value of (|), $, will rise.
4.6 Conclusions
In this paper we have analysed the extent of vertical integration between 
upstream (input) and downstream (final good) producers in an industry. We have 
adopted an incomplete contract, residual control rights approach to integration, 
emphasizing the role ownership rights play in inducing non-contractible 
investment by worker-managers. In particular, we have examined the role of two 
key parameters: the relative value of upstream (versus downstream) investment, 
and the degree of final product market competition.
We find that when upstream investment is relatively important then control of the 
upstream asset should be given to its manager - yielding a fragmented industry 
structure. In contrast when the value of upstream investment is relatively low (or 
the importance of downstream investment particularly great) control of both 
upstream and downstream assets should be concentrated in downstream hands, 
yielding good downstream investment incentives.
The choice of ownership structure is therefore also a specialisation decision. 
Downstream control of all assets induces specialisation in final good production, 
while a fragmented (non-integrated) structure encourages some investment at 
both final and intermediate production stages. We find that for a range of 
parameter values the specialisation decision depends delicately on the degree 
of final market competition. As competition increases it may become increasingly 
important to concentrate on the downstream market (via an integrated structure) 
to "meet the competition". However, for very tough competition, head-to-head
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confrontation leads to large profit dissipation. It is then optimal for one group of 
assets be deployed in a non-integrated configuration, emphasising the supplier 
relationship and allowing the rival (integrated) firm to effectively dominate the 
downstream market. We therefore observe a non-monotonic relationship between 
industry structure and the degree of competition.
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Figure 4.1
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Appendix 4
Proof of Lemma 4.4:
(i) pmax is defined such that 7i(Jmax, Jmax; pmax) - c(Jmax) = 0. 
Our assumptions imply:
3J:1 (%.. -  n..)n.
1 _  K IJ V  I? >  Q
(^11^ 22 ~ ^12^ 21)
Therefore:
^^ui-di 3 tc.. 3tc1 3 Jo "Iz l  =  L +  ]__ _ < 0
dp 3p 3v2 3p
32tt, 32tt, 327T;
where n. =  — , n„ =    and k„ =
*  d v ^ p ’ " d v f  " d Vj 3  Vj
Consequently, Jmax will be selected at pmax by each firm.
It therefore follows that for any e > 0, there exists p* such that < £.
(ii) Now 7t2 (v1f v2; p*) > 0 at <> = §.
u1 can therefore make a very small investment at infinitessimal cost 
(remembering c'(0) = 0), which ensures:
[tu2(V i , v 2; p*) - t i2(v 1 , v 2; p*)]/2 > 0
Hence np6\ > 0, which immediately implies 7i£]_d1 > 0.
QED.
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Proof of Lemma 4.6:
i) Considering the direct effect on D1's profits:
^ piu  7 l i  d  7 C i  i p i
[ _ L  - _ L ]  = f(v2) - f ( v 2pl) > 0
d p  d p
since f '( )  < 0 and v2 < v p  i
(ii) The competition effect on UTs share of D2's profit is given by:
1 & £  _ a t f  *  _ f  p, =Q
2  d p  d p
(iii) From the effort incentive equations:
32tc1
dp dv1d J1
"dp" 2 0 ^ )
dK
dp
d27l1 d27l1
+
d27l2
+
d27T2
+
d27C2
dp dvl dp dv2 dp dv2 dp dvl dp dvl
2 < |)C //(K)
Now:
d27l:
dp dVj
d27C2= 0 and
p=0
dp dv1
= f /(v1) < 0
p=0
Consequently:
3K < o = 3Ji
3p
QED.
3p
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